Games of truth in the age of transparency: international organisations and the construction of corruption by Snyman, Roan Alexander
Games of Truth in the age of Transparency: International 
Organisations and the Construction of Corruption 
by 
Roan Alexander Snyman 
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Philosophy) in the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
Supervisor: Dr Minka Woermann 
March 2017 
ii 
DECLARATION 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my 
own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), 
that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party 
rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any 
qualification. 
Date: March 2017 
Copyright © 2017 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
 
Abstract 
The objective in this thesis is to analyse the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in 
international governance and in the administration of states. The anti-corruption industry has 
expanded at a very rapid rate since its inception in the mid-1990s. Despite the growth of the 
industry, anti-corruption reforms have failed to make progress in the alleviation of corruption. 
This failure to address the widespread prevalence of corruption has not deterred the 
expansion of the industry. On the contrary, failure in the alleviation of corruption has served 
only to incite its vigour and vitality. There is very little understanding of what the anti-
corruption industry is and what its actual global impact has been. For this reason, it is very 
important to come to grips with the underlying motivating factors that drives the expansion of 
the industry, as well as the totalising nature of its discourse. Therefore my aim in this thesis is 
to create a better understanding of the fight against corruption as an international 
governmental practice. This entails unpacking its discourses and practices and the role that 
international organisations have played in bringing the industry to life and driving its global 
proliferation. I make use of Foucault’s method of genealogy to trace the development of anti-
corruption discourse since the 1950s. Additionally, Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, 
disciplinary power, normalisation and the three modes of objectification are used to analyse 
the industry. Utilising Foucault’s work presents a clear picture of how knowledge and truth 
are constructed for the purposes of achieving governmental, political and ideological 
objectives. The argument is made that International organisations and western actors have 
fostered into existence a totalising form of discourse which is part of an endeavour to clarify 
the complexities of the international political economy, as well as part of a strategy to 
mitigate the risks that are presented by unpredictable and ‘abnormal’ states, societies and 
cultures. This indicates that the failure of the industry to address the prevalence of corruption 
is not due to a lack of support or resources. On the contrary, the industry has not failed at its 
objective, because fighting corruption is not its primary purpose. The industry is driven, 
legitimised and globally propagated with the objective of displacing and transposing 
divergent governmental structures, institutions, policies, and practices of states and societies 
that operate contrary to international norms. As such, anti-corruption has become an 
endeavour to instil a normative framework of governance globally; a framework through 
which alternative modes of governance, different ethical codes, morals and societal values are 
characterised as abnormal and thereby delegitimised and displaced.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis het ten doel om 'n analise te doen ten opsigte van die rol wat die teenkorrupsie-
bedryf speel in internasionale bestuur en staats-administrasie. Die teenkorrupsie-bedryf het 'n 
tydperk van baie vinnige uitbreiding en ontwikkeling ervaar sedert dit in die middel-1990s as 
'n bedryf ontstaan het. Ten spyte van hierdie bedryfsgroei het teenkorrupsie-regstellings nie 
voldoende vooruitgang in die vermindering van korrupsie getoon nie. Die mislukking om die 
omvattende voorkoms van korrupsie te beperk, het egter nie die ontwikkeling en uitbreiding 
van die bedryf benadeel nie. Dit het inteendeel tot gevolg gehad dat daar met groter ywer en 
doelgerigtheid gepoog word om meer sukses te behaal. Daar bestaan 'n beperkte begrip ten 
opsigte van die teenkorrupsie-bedryf en die globale impak wat dit tot dusver gehad het. Dit is 
dus noodsaaklik om insig te verkry in die onderliggende faktore wat as motivering dien tot 
die ontwikkeling en uitbreiding van die bedryf. Ek het dus met hierdie tesis gepoog om 'n 
beter begrip te verkry ten opsigte van korrupsie as internasionale bestuurspraktyk. Hierdie 
navorsing behels die ontleding van die diskoerse en praktyke asook die rol wat internasionale 
organisasies gespeel het om die teenkorrupsie-bedryf tot stand te bring en aanleiding te gee 
tot die vinnige globale groei. Ek gebruik Foucault se genealogiese metode om die 
bedryfsontwikkeling van teenkorrupsie-aktiwiteit sedert die 1950s na te spoor. Tesame 
hiermee is gebruik gemaak van die konsepte beheerbaarheid (governmentality), dissiplinêre 
mag (disciplinary power), normalisering (normalisation) en die drie vorme van objektifikasie 
soos gedefinieer deur Foucault. Deur gebruik te maak van Foucault se navorsing en metodes 
kan 'n duidelike beeld verkry word van hoe kennis en waarheid gekonstrueer word met die 
doel om regerings-, politiese en ideologiese mikpunte te bereik. Internasionale organisasies 
en westerse betrokkenes het 'n allesomvattende vorm van diskoers en praktyk ontwikkel 
waardeur meer duidelikheid verkry kan word ten opsigte van die kompleksiteite van die 
internasionale politieke ekonomie. Dit vorm ook deel van 'n strategie om die risiko’s en 
gevolge van onvoorspelbare en ‘abnormale’ state, gemeenskappe en kulture te versag en 
verminder. Die rede waarom die teenkorrupsie-bedryf voortdurend verder uitbrei en 
ontwikkel ten spyte van die teleurstellende resultate is dus nie omdat die studieveld misluk 
het om voldoende ondersteuning te verkry of omdat dit so 'n besonder skadelike onderwerp is 
nie. Daar moet kennis van geneem word dat die vermindering van korrupsie nie die primêre 
doelwit is nie, maar dat die teenkorrupsie-bedryf voordurend ontwikkel, geregverdig en 
globaal uitgedra word met die doel om uiteenlopende regerings-strukture, instellings, beleide, 
etiese waardes en praktyke van regerings en gemeenskappe te omvorm en te normaliseer 
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volgens algemeen aanvaarde riglyne. As sulks het die teenkorrupsie-bedryf ‘n onderneming 
geword waardeur gepoog word om ontslae te raak van gebruike wat in konflik is met 
internasionale norme en praktyke. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Corruption has emerged as one of the primary problems that the contemporary world is faced 
with. There is scarcely any government that has not implemented one form of anti-corruption 
reform or another. There are countless organisations, institutions, civil society groups, 
academics, religious groups and private sector actors involved in studying corruption and 
fighting its prevalence. However, the fervour that currently surrounds the fight against 
corruption has not been around for a very long time. The origins of the international anti-
corruption movement can be traced back to the mid-1990s, when a wave of anti-corruption 
discourse swept over the international political scene. As the decade progressed, anti-
corruption consultancies sprang up, anti-corruption initiatives were implemented, anti-
corruption university courses were established, and perhaps most importantly, international 
organisations gained interest in corruption and its alleviation. 
Three organisations that played an integral role in bringing the international anti-corruption 
movement to life are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Transparency International. Since the entry of these organisations into the field, anti-
corruption has grown into a global industry with millions of dollars in project funds and 
countless programmes and initiatives aimed at fighting the worldwide prevalence of 
corruption. In recent years, the United Nations has also started to play a significant role 
through its global convention against corruption. However, despite the increased international 
interest in corruption and despite a substantial increase in investment in the field, anti-
corruption reforms have failed to make significant progress in the alleviation of corruption. 
This failure to address the widespread prevalence of corruption has not deterred the 
expansion of the industry. On the contrary, failure in the alleviation of corruption has served 
only to incite its vigour and vitality.  
In this thesis, I endeavour to conduct a Foucauldian analysis of the anti-corruption industry 
by examining the discourse and practices that stem from the World Bank, Transparency 
International, the IMF, and the United Nations. The institutionalisation of the fight against 
corruption has had a significant impact on the development of the industry as a whole. 
Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power, governmentality and objectification provide one 
with an excellent framework for uncovering the strategies of power and knowledge that 
pervade the contemporary fight against corruption. In linking these concepts to the anti-
corruption industry, the goal in this thesis is to shed light on the construction of the concept 
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of corruption and to clarify the role that the industry plays in the realm of international 
governance and in the administration of states. 
This chapter has five main sections. Section 1.1 is centred on the eruption of corruption 
discourse that occurred during the 1990s and the role played by international organisations in 
this eruption. In section 1.2, the difficulty that the industry has encountered in the alleviation 
of corruption is discussed. Section 1.3 centres on the most prominent criticisms that have 
been levelled against the anti-corruption industry. Section 1.4 is centred on the 
methodological framework that will be applied in the analysis of the anti-corruption industry 
and in section 1.5 an overview of the rest of the thesis is provided.  
1.1) International Organisations and the emergence of the Anti-corruption 
Industry 
Corruption is a historically prevalent phenomenon. It is discussed in the 2,400 year old Indian 
text, The Arthashastra, where an advisor to the Indian king states that: “Just as it is 
impossible not to taste honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is 
impossible for a government servant not to eat up at least a bit of the King’s revenue” 
(Farrales, 2005: 4). Corruption was, of course, not only a problem for ancient India. The 
democracy of ancient Athens was not spared from widespread corruption (4). Similarly, 
ancient Rome struggled with pervasive corruption. Some historians even contend that 
corruption was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Roman Empire (MacMullen, 1988). 
In its different forms and manifestations, corruption has plagued different societies and 
different cultures throughout history (Farrales, 2005: 5).  
Even though it is reported that corruption has been a persistent problem throughout history, it 
was only in recent times that it became a problem of international concern. In the early 1990s 
there was a veritable explosion in discourse centred on corruption. Moisés Naím (1995: 1) 
called this the “corruption eruption.” As the decade progressed, a wave of public dialogue 
about corruption swept over the international scene. For example, the number of articles in 
the Financial Times and Economist mentioning corruption increased from an average of 229 
per year from 1982-1987 to a total of 1,246 in 1995 alone (Glynn, Kobrin & Naím, 1997: 21). 
According to Glynn et al. (1997: 7), the “... world-wide backlash against corruption swept 
like a firestorm across the global political landscape.” In the space of a decade, the topic 
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catapulted from the fringes of policy and academic discourse to become one of the primary 
problems that the developing world is faced with (Bukovansky, 2006: 181). 
One key factor that allowed for this eruption in discourse was the end of the Cold War. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-communist states opened up and underwent 
a process of economic liberation, privatisation and democratisation that revealed the 
corruption that was prevalent during soviet rule, but also provided new opportunities for 
corruption (Glynn, et al., 1997: 10; Kuris, 2012: 1). According to Glynn et al. (1997: 8), the 
wave of liberalisation that ensued exposed the widespread corruption that was previously 
hidden from view. Additionally, the establishment of free and active media stimulated public 
discourse about corruption (Tanzi, 1998: 4). Before the end of the Cold War, there was a 
tendency by the major international powers to ignore the abuses of the countries that 
supported them ideologically (4). Once the Cold War ended, however, western nations and 
donor organisations became more critical of abuses in recipient countries (4). The 
international community now started to level criticisms at states for issues that were not 
considered as major problems during the Cold War era (Theobald, 1999: 498).  
The end of the Cold War played an important role in turning the global attention toward 
corruption, but the anti-corruption industry only began to take shape when international 
organisations became involved. One key role player in this regard is Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO), Transparency International (Sampson, 2010: 274, 275). Through its 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the organisation established the first statistical 
instrument with which the global levels of corruption could be measured (De Maria, 2008: 
185). The CPI was the first uniform international scale which allowed for the comparison of 
different levels of corruption in different countries (Galtung, 2006: 108). This stimulated 
international dialogue concerning the global ramifications of corruption and generated 
immense competition in the developing world to clamp down on corruption and to improve 
performance on the index (106-108).  
It was, however, only when the World Bank became involved that the international agenda 
against corruption began to take form (Wanless, 2013: 39). In 1996, at the annual meeting 
between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, 
who was president of the World Bank at the time, placed corruption firmly on the global 
agenda (39). In his landmark speech, he labelled corruption as a global ‘cancer’ with wide 
ranging implications for economic growth and development (De Speville, 2010: 49).  
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Prior to 1996, the World Bank was hesitant to address corruption directly. The Bank is 
governed by a non-political mandate, which has, up until 1996, precluded the Bank’s 
involvement in anti-corruption (Marquette, 2004: 414). Corruption was seen as a political 
problem, and therefore the World Bank explicitly avoided addressing it directly (Polzer, 
2001: 10).  However, after 1996, World Bank discourse underwent a dramatic turnaround and 
corruption was re-characterised as an issue primarily related to economic development (De 
Speville, 2010: 49). This change in conception allowed the Bank to openly pursue global 
governance reform on the back of the fight against corruption without contravening its non-
political mandate (Marquette, 2004: 213).    
As the World Bank entered into the field, it was followed by a multitude of international 
organisations, business organisations, regional institutions and non-governmental 
organisations (Bukovansky, 2006: 185). The World Bank introduced a large team of 
economists and political scientists into the field and had the capacity to fund and implement 
wide ranging anti-corruption programmes (De Speville, 2010: 50). The drive to fight 
corruption quickly transformed into: “... a burgeoning industry with hundreds of millions of 
dollars in project funds, hundreds of anti-corruption professionals and a continuing stream of 
reports, indicators, conferences, action plans, conventions and evaluations” (Sampson, 2010: 
271). Since its entry into the field, the World Bank has spent approximately US$ 10 million 
annually on corruption sanctions and investigations (Wanless, 2013: 39). Its investigative 
department has launched more than 600 anti-corruption programmes and has implemented 
governance reforms in more than 100 countries worldwide (39). Countries as diverse as 
Argentina, Uganda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guinea, Malaysia and Ecuador have established the 
models of anti-corruption reform as promoted by the international community (Heilbrunn, 
2004: 10; Meagher, 2007: 74). 
However, despite the increased investment in anti-corruption and despite the immense 
international drive to fight corruption, there has only been limited success in the alleviation of 
corruption. The anti-corruption industry suffers from one fundamental problem, which is the 
problem of impact (Sampson, 2010: 264).  
1.2) The trials and tribulations of the fight against corruption 
Anti-corruption reforms have largely failed to have a substantial impact on the prevalence of 
corruption. The World Bank recently admitted that: “Some countries have improved, but 
others have deteriorated, and the world on average has not made sufficient progress on 
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governance and corruption control” (De Speville, 2010: 52). In the Transparency 
International Anti-corruption Source Book it is stated that: “Successful anti-corruption reform 
efforts have been all too rare, and the failures numerous” (Pope, 2000: xx). According to 
Mutebi (2008), there is increasing evidence that anti-corruption programmes and policies 
often fail miserably. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013: 450) echoes this position and state 
that many countries remain immersed in pervasive corruption, despite the implementation of 
countless anti-corruption programmes and initiatives. 
There are only a handful of instances where anti-corruption reforms have had a significant 
impact on the prevalence of corruption. The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) from Singapore 
are considered to be the best examples of successfully implemented anti-corruption 
commissions (Heilbrunn, 2004: 3-5). During the late 1990s and early 2000s hundreds of anti-
corruption commissions modelled on these two examples sprang up around the world (Kuris, 
2012: 2, 3; Meagher, 2007: 73, 74). The World Bank was especially adamant in its promotion 
of the multifunctional approach of ICAC (Kuris, 2012: 3). 
It has, however, proven difficult to replicate ICAC and CPIB successfully and sustainably 
(1). The majority of anti-corruption commissions have either become irrelevant or have been 
closed down (3). Many anti-corruption reforms have become “... entangled in the very 
corrupt networks that they were meant to fight” (Persson, et al., 2013: 454). For example, 
some anti-corruption commissions have been co-opted by political elites and are used to 
undermine political rivals, thereby only worsening the problem of corruption (Heilbrunn, 
2004: 1). According to Heilbrunn (2), the implementation of anti-corruption commissions has 
had a: “... dismal record of effectiveness.”  
Despite these numerous setbacks, the growth of the anti-corruption industry has shown no 
signs of dissipating.  On the contrary, the failure of anti-corruption reform seems to have only 
incited its expansion (Sampson, 2010: 262). Michael and Bowser (2009: 5) estimate that the 
number of practitioners involved in the anti-corruption industry ballooned from 
approximately 250 in the 1990s to approximately 27,000 by 2009. The total value of goods 
and services procured by donor organisations for anti-corruption projects is estimated to have 
increased from US$ 100 million in 2003 to almost US$ 5 billion in 2009 (1). The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which was launched in 2006, already has 
more than 140 countries as signatories (UNODC, 2014b).  
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At this point, one is confronted with various puzzling questions. If corruption has been a 
persistent problem throughout history, why has a global response only emerged in the past 
twenty years? Why was there this frenetic incitement around anti-corruption discourse in the 
mid-1990s? Why were international organisations suddenly so interested in fighting 
corruption? Why have anti-corruption reforms been so ineffective in clamping down on 
corruption and, importantly, why does the industry continue to expand at such a rapid rate 
despite its reported failures?  
There are no simple answers to these questions. Therefore, in this thesis I endeavour to 
problematise the fight against corruption and the involvement of international organisations 
in this fight. This thesis constitutes an investigation into the role played by international 
organisations in facilitating the emergence of the anti-corruption industry and the continued 
role these organisations play in its global legitimisation and expansion. The main goal is to 
investigate the increased institutionalisation of the fight against corruption that has occurred 
over the past twenty years, and in so doing, shed light on the role that the anti-corruption 
industry plays in international governance and in the administration of states. The next 
section discusses some of the most prominent criticisms that have been levelled against the 
anti-corruption industry and elaborates on how Foucault’s work is relevant for a critical 
analysis of the anti-corruption industry. 
1.3) Prominent criticisms 
The lack of success in the alleviation of corruption has spawned numerous criticisms of the 
anti-corruption industry. The majority of these critiques argue that the anti-corruption 
industry is too involved in the promotion of western neoliberal ideals and thereby the 
multidimensional nature of corruption as it manifests in local contexts is ignored. For 
example, Bukovansky (2006: 181) argues that anti-corruption discourse has an irreducibly 
normative character, which is in tension with the rational, economic-centric discourse that 
emanates from international organisations. In the same vein, Brown and Cloke (2004: 289) 
argue that the international fight against corruption is constrained by the fact that insufficient 
recognition is awarded to the varieties of political and cultural contexts from within which 
corruption emerges. Similarly, De Maria (2010: 117) contends that corruption stems from 
deep seated cultural and societal factors; factors that are impervious to the western, 
supposedly universal, scientific anti-corruption remedies. 
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Other criticisms focus specifically on the concept of corruption and how it has been 
misunderstood and misused by the international community. According to Persson, et al. 
(2010: 450), the international community has characterised corruption in Africa as a 
principal-agent problem. The authors contend that, in certain situations, corruption takes on a 
systemic character which is resistant to anti-corruption measures centred on the principal-
agent framework (450). Bratsis (2003) also focuses on the concept of corruption. For Bratsis 
(2003), corruption has become a constructed concept in modern society. The contemporary 
conception is used as a tool to legitimise the distinction between the public sphere and the 
private sphere, and to promote the notion that all societies are governed by this divide 
(Bratsis, 2003).  
Some critics focus specifically on the major organisations involved in the industry. For 
example, Gebel (2012: 109) argues that Transparency International defines human nature as 
rational and self-interested. Gebel (2012) contends that Transparency International will only 
be more effective in its anti-corruption efforts when this conception of human nature is 
adapted to incorporate social and moral aspects of human behaviour. Polzer (2001) employs a 
Foucauldian approach to analyse World Bank discourse. She finds that the World Bank 
disregards the political implications of its own anti-corruption efforts and therefore only 
promotes economically-centred definitions and solutions. Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) 
also employ a Foucauldian approach to illustrate how the concept has become a ‘free-floating 
signifier’ in the anti-corruption discourse that emanates from international organisations. The 
authors argue that different definitions and solutions are pushed by different groups 
motivated by preferred outcomes, whether based on increased expert control, increased 
privatisation, or the promotion of democratic principles and individual human rights (7). 
Thereby, anti-corruption efforts are motivated more by the pursuit of organisational specific 
interest considerations and less by the actual alleviation of corruption (7). 
The social anthropologist, Steven Sampson (2010), takes a novel approach and directs his 
analysis at the operations of the fight against corruption as a global industry. Instead of seeing 
anti-corruption as the result of neo-liberalisation, or characterising failure in the alleviation of 
corruption has the result of a misinterpretation of the concept, Sampson (2010) analyses the 
manner in which the anti-corruption movement transformed from relative obscurity into a 
global industry. For Sampson (2010) this industry drives itself, legitimises itself and can exist 
without having any impact on the prevalence of corruption (Sampson, 2010). Sampson 
(2010) suggests that, instead of accepting the anti-corruption industry as a hegemonic and 
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unstoppable force, one should rather conduct a critical examination of the “consequences of 
the global institutionalisation of anti-corruptionist discourse and anti-corruption practice” 
(261).  
This thesis enters into the space opened up by Sampson. The goal is to conduct a Foucauldian 
analysis of the institutionalisation of anti-corruption discourse and practices. There are only a 
handful of authors that have used Foucault’s work to analyse the anti-corruption industry. 
Analysing the anti-corruption industry from a Foucauldian perspective allows one to 
investigate the role played by knowledge and power in the operation, legitimisation and 
expansion of the anti-corruption industry. Additionally, Foucault’s work allows one to 
investigate the intimate link between anti-corruption knowledge and governmental practices, 
as well as the manner in which the these practices have been localised on the individual 
subject. In the next section, a brief overview of Michel Foucault’s work is provided.  
1.4) Michel Foucault 
Michel Foucault’s work covers many different topics and has had a substantial influence on 
post-modernism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and post-Marxist theorising 
(Mills, 2003: 1). His work has also had an impact on disciplines as wide ranging as social 
research, politics, history, sociology, cultural studies, criminology, social anthropology and 
management studies (May & Powell, 2007: 123; Mills, 2003: 1). Interestingly enough, 
Foucault would never have identified himself directly with any of these disciplines. Foucault 
can be characterised as a “masked philosopher” (May & Powell, 2007: 123). He deliberately 
avoided identifying himself with particular philosophical traditions or specific schools of 
thought (123). According to Mills (2003: 110), this was primarily due to Foucault’s 
reluctance to develop a complete methodology. This reluctance stems from the fact that much 
of Foucault’s work was aimed at criticising social scientific discourse (Graham, 2005: 5). If 
Foucault was to propose a prescriptive methodology for the application of his work, one 
would have been able to subject him to the very same criticisms that he used in his critiques 
of the social sciences (5). 
Foucault’s philosophy has two primary dimensions. His early work was focused on 
employing the archaeological method to investigate the histories of social and medical 
sciences (Gutting, 2013). Foucault’s most notable use of the archaeological method was in 
The History of Madness in the Classical Age (1961), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), The 
Order of Things (1966) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) (Gutting, 2013). Later in 
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his life, Foucault’s focus shifted to the genealogical method which he used to analyse torture, 
incarceration and sexuality. Foucault employs the genealogical approach in Discipline and 
Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality volumes 1, 2 and 3.  
Briefly defined, archaeology involves studying the discursive practices that constitute 
discourse (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 92). For Foucault, discourse is made up of systems of 
statements that are products of discursive practices (Howarth, 2002: 120). These discursive 
practices are governed by “historically contingent formation rules” (120). Foucault (1972: 
138) explains that: “Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, 
themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses 
themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules.” Thus, Foucault does not 
study the content of discourse per se, Foucault studies the rules that characterise the 
emergence of discourse. By investigating these rules, it is not Foucault’s intention to uncover 
the universal structures of knowledge; on the contrary, Foucault studies discourse in order to 
reveal the conditions that characterise the emergence of specific types of discourse within 
specific historical periods (Valero-Silva, 1996: 68).  
Through archaeology one can compare the different discursive formations of different time 
periods without accepting any discursive formation as more valid than any other (Gutting, 
2013). This allows one to uncover the discontinuities that occur as discourse adapts and 
evolves with the passage of time. Archaeology enables one also to demonstrate how certain 
disciplines are characterised by discontinuity, and above all, how the objects of knowledge, to 
which these disciplines attribute universal validity, are grounded in contingent factors and 
thus are not scientific and metaphysical truths (Gutting, 2013). 
Archaeology is an effective method for understanding the formation of discourse within 
specific historical periods, but for the archaeological approach to be successful one needs to 
focus on discourse as it emerges from specific historical epochs, characterised by specific 
cultural, societal or linguistic rules. In other words, one needs to link discourse to the 
historical and cultural context that it emerged from. This means that one can identify, but one 
cannot explain why discourse changes and adapts between historical epochs. For example, 
with archaeology, Foucault can clearly identify how the discourse centred on sexuality 
changed from the classical age into the eighteenth century, but he cannot explain why these 
changes have occurred. Archaeology does not allow for an investigation into the role of 
social, economic and political factors in the adaptation of discourse. Also, and importantly for 
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Foucault, with archaeology one is not able to explain how past forms of discourse have 
impacted the formation of present discourses and practices. It is this issue that Foucault 
sought to address through the method of genealogy. 
With the publication of Discipline and Punish in 1975, Foucault systematically moved away 
from the archaeological approach in favour of the genealogical approach. Although 
archaeology was not abandoned completely, after Discipline and Punish it played a 
subordinate role to genealogy (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 104, 105). Foucault became less 
interested in the rules that characterise the emergence of discourse and more interested in the 
societal factors that make certain types of discourse possible, justifiable and successful.  
Briefly defined, genealogy is a method for uncovering the role played by power in the 
formation of knowledge and discourse. Dreyfus and Rabinow (105) explain that a genealogist 
as a “diagnostician who concentrates on the relations of power, knowledge, and the body in 
modern society.” Foucault (1977: 145, 146) explains that: 
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that 
operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that 
the past actively exists in the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its 
vicissitudes. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of decent … is to identify 
the accidents, the minute deviations … the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; 
it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we 
are, but in the exteriority of accidents. 
With genealogy, Foucault takes his historical investigations to a more fundamental level. He 
is no longer concerned by discourse alone. He sees the relations of power and knowledge, 
localised on the individual subject, as a very important mechanism in the operation and 
manifestation of power in Western society (113). For Foucault, the factors that determine the 
emergence of discourse have historical, cultural, political and economic roots. Through the 
genealogical method, Foucault sought to investigate these roots. In other words, the 
difference between the archaeological approach and the genealogical approach lies in the fact 
that archaeology is centred on the rules that characterise the emergence of discourse while 
genealogy is centred on the relationship between knowledge and power and how 
contemporary societies, cultures and individuals are affected by this relationship.  
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In the article Subject and Power, Foucault (1983: 208) wrote that, his objective is to “create a 
history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” In 
other words, through his genealogical analyses, Foucault’s goal is to establish a history of the 
various different ways the relations of power and knowledge have contributed to the 
formation of the human beings as subjects in the contemporary world (208). Foucault (208) 
explains that there are three general modes through which the contemporary subject is 
formed. He calls this the three modes of objectification (208). The first mode of 
objectification refers to the manner in which the individual subject is objectified through the 
modes of inquiry that strive to become normalised as scientific disciplines (208). Secondly, 
individuals are objectified through the dividing practices that separate acceptable behaviour 
from unacceptable behaviour (208). The third mode of objectification refers to “the way a 
human being turns him- or herself into a subject” (208). In other words, the “mode of relation 
between the individual and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). 
The three modes of objectification is a good framework for understanding how power 
impacts the formation of the subject in the contemporary world, but also to shed light on the 
role that the individual plays in the process. For Foucault (1983: 208), the subject is situated 
in relations of power that are very difficult to unravel. These relations are embedded within 
the social networks that permeate society (224). In this context, power is not contained within 
one aspect of society and it cannot be isolated or confined to one specific location, institution 
or state apparatus. For Foucault, power is not a position to hold, it is not a prize to be 
captured and it is not a commodity to be accumulated (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 185). 
Power operates through a multiplicity of mechanisms and procedures and there is not one 
principal truth that denotes the universality behind its functioning (Foucault, 1983: 224). It is 
therefore not possible to establish an objective description of power and one cannot create a 
general theory of power applicable across all societies, cultures and historical periods 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 184).  
Power is not exercised over others, in an absolute way; power is rather a machine that works 
on the dominant as well as on the subjugated (192). Foucault does not see this power as an 
insidious force on the path toward the corruption of the entirety of the social body. Just as 
Foucault’s intention with archaeology was not to liberate truth from its historical 
confinement, with genealogy Foucault’s objective is not to free the individual from the 
shackles imposed upon him by relations of power. For Foucault, power plays a fundamental 
role in the formation of societal relations. He explains that, without power, society “... can 
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only be an abstraction” (Foucault, 1983: 222, 223).  Therefore, it is not Foucault’s intention 
to traverse power or dispel power from society (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 186). As such, 
Foucault’s goal is not to reveal the truth that power distorts, but rather to gain a better 
understanding of the specific instances where power has become manifest and to uncover the 
diverse forms through which power operates, the institutions it infiltrates, the organising 
mechanisms and disciplinary procedures central to its functioning and to reveal the 
knowledge that constitutes, legitimises and emerges from such practices.  
In other words, Foucault is not interested in establishing a general theory of power. Rather, he 
wants to create an ‘analytic’ of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 186). Foucault (1976: 93) 
understands power as “the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a 
particular society.” This strategical relationship has its own coherence. It is governed by 
internal rules and procedures and it is based on a rationale that stems from specific academic 
disciplines. There is nothing universal about the way in which this strategic relationship 
functions, but it can be subjected to analysis, and this is Foucault’s project (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 187, 188). Importantly, the only way to understand this strategic relationship 
is to approach power in its day to day operations and to analyse power on the level of the 
cultural practices through which it is localised (185).  
The methodological framework that is utilised in this thesis to analyse the anti-corruption 
industry rests on Foucault’s genealogical method. More specifically, Foucault’s three modes 
of objectification, in addition to his concepts of governmentality and disciplinary power, are 
used to analyse the discourses and governmental practices that stem from the industry. These 
concepts are explained in more detail in chapter 2. It is important to note that Foucault’s 
approach does have its limitations. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 261) contend that the very 
strengths of Foucault’s method are intricately connected to its weaknesses. As stated by 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (204) in applying Foucault’s method:   
We have no recourse to objective laws, no recourse to pure subjectivity, no recourse 
to totalisations of theory. We only have the cultural practices that have made us what 
we are. To know what these practices are we have to grapple with a history of the 
present. 
Foucault is interested in unpacking the historical emergence and function of discourse. This 
does not mean that his only interest lies in writing the histories of different forms of 
knowledge. On the contrary, by investigating the genealogy of specific discourses Foucault is 
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tracing the manner in which forms of knowledge, as well as cultural and governmental 
practices, have impacted the formation of the subject in the contemporary word. This means 
that, Foucault’s method is not used to understand history as such. It is a method used to 
understand the historical factors that contributed to the formation of contemporary practices, 
discourses and problems (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118). 
In the next section, a brief summary is provided of the structure of the thesis. 
1.5) Structure lay-out 
Chapter 2 provides an in depth review of the methodology used in the analysis of the anti-
corruption industry. This methodology is based on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, 
discipline, power and knowledge, as well as the three modes of objectification as explained in 
Foucault’s article, Subject and Power. This is not an exhaustive review of all of Foucault’s 
work. The objective of the chapter is to review key elements of his work that is applicable in 
an analysis of the anti-corruption industry. 
In chapter 3, an account of the development of anti-corruption discourse is provided for the 
period from the 1950s up until the present day. This involves applying Foucault’s concept of 
genealogy in tracing the evolution of anti-corruption discourse. 
Chapter 4 links Foucault’s concepts discipline, governmentality, power and knowledge with 
the anti-corruption discourses and practices. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by providing a summary of my argument and linking 
Foucault’s three modes of objectification with the anti-corruption industry. 
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Chapter 2: The Objectification of the Contemporary Subject 
2.1) Introduction: The Historian of Thought 
Michel Foucault was born on 15 October, 1926 in Poitiers, France (Gutting, 2013). In the 
1960s he held a number of different positions at French Universities until he was appointed to 
the Collège de France in 1969 (Gutting, 2013). At the Collège he took his title as Professor of 
the History of Systems of Thought; a position which he held until his untimely death in 1984 
(Gutting, 2013). 
The title that Foucault took at the Collège de France speaks volumes about his broad field of 
interest. The following statement puts this field into perspective. In an interview conducted in 
1982, Foucault (1988: 9, 10) stated that:  
My field is the history of thought. Man is a thinking being. The way he thinks is 
related to society, politics, economics, and history and is also related to very general 
and universal categories. But thought is something other than societal relations. The 
way people really think is not adequately analysed by the universal categories of 
logic. Between social history and formal analyses of thought there is a path, a lane – 
maybe very narrow – which is the path of the historian of thought.  
There is no doubt that Foucault was a student of history, but his intention was not to 
document the truth contained in history as such. Rather, Foucault sought to understand the 
emergence of different systems of thought from different historical epochs and he sought to 
uncover why certain concepts, ideas, and domains of knowledge were accepted at certain 
historical periods only to be superseded in subsequent years. Foucault sought to understand 
the role played by power in deployment and justification of truth and he wanted to uncover 
how disparate and sometimes contradictory forms of knowledge contributed to contemporary 
discourses, practices, sciences and politics.  
Foucault’s method of analysing historical systems of thought does not involve analysing past 
events in the context of contemporary thinking (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118). Foucault’s 
method entails delving into history, not in order to understand the past, but in order to 
understand present circumstances, politics, societies and cultures (118, 119). Foucault’s 
intention was not to liberate truth from its historical confinement and he did not seek to 
overthrow the forces that inhibit, control or propagate truth and knowledge. As a historian of 
thought, Foucault’s end goal was to understand how the relations between knowledge, power 
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and truth have impacted on the formation of the subject in the contemporary world (Foucault, 
1983: 208-210). By studying historical systems of thought, Foucault is not writing the history 
of the past, he is writing the history of the present (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118, 119). 
The goal in this chapter is to discuss some of the central tenets in Foucault’s philosophy. This 
is by no means a complete examination of Foucault’s work. His different historical analyses 
are diverse and multifaceted and it would be very difficult to construct a central methodology 
that stretches through the entirety of his work. It is certainly the case that his interests covered 
various disciplines and his historical investigations delved into topics as diverse as sexuality, 
imprisonment, medical practices and psychology. It is also the case that the methodology he 
employed changed significantly over the years, moving from archaeology in his early years, 
to genealogy in his later years.  
Nonetheless, clarifying some of the most important themes in Foucault’s work will be an 
excellent starting point for establishing a framework through which contemporary discourses 
and practices can be analysed. His notions of governmentality, normalisation, objectification 
and disciplinary power can be very useful methodological tools in an effort to analyse the 
production and propagation of knowledge in contemporary society and for uncovering the 
practices of power that catalyse this production. Therefore, the intention behind this chapter 
is not to search for a golden thread that stretches through the entirety of Foucault’s work, 
rather the intention is to uncover the key themes in Foucault’s work that make a critical 
examination of contemporary anti-corruption discourse and practices prudent and possible. 
This chapter starts off with an overview of what Foucault called the three modes of 
objectification. The three modes of objectification cover three important bases of Foucault’s 
work; the first mode of objectification addresses the social sciences, which is one of the key 
areas that Foucault’s investigations were centred on. The second mode of objectification is 
centred on dividing practices and brings to light the role of classification and normalisation 
within social scientific discourse as well as the manner in which these classifications are 
entrenched within governmental institutions and procedures. The third mode of 
objectification brings the role of the individual subject into focus.  
Section 2.3 is centred on Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power. This is a central concept in 
Foucault’s genealogical analyses of torture and incarceration. Getting to grips with this 
concept assists in understanding how Foucault perceived the operation of power in society. 
Foucault’s definition of power can sometimes become enigmatic and indeterminate, but 
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digging into the specifics of disciplinary power will clarify many of the ambiguities that one 
may be confronted with. The goal in section 2.3 is to discuss the emergence of disciplinary 
power and thereby elaborate exactly on what Foucault perceived power to be and how he 
endeavoured to analyse it.  
The concept of governmentality is the focal point of section 2.4. After Foucault’s death, 
governmentality became one of the most widely used concepts of Foucault’s work. Foucault 
did not provide a methodological connection between the three modes of objectification and 
the other primary themes of his work, but when it comes to governmentality there are clear 
areas of confluence. The critical contribution of the concept lies in the fact that it enables one 
to understand the interrelated relationship between state structures, politics, ethics, 
knowledge and subjects within contemporary society. It not only illustrates how knowledge 
and truth is employed by governmental forces to achieve political and societal ends, it also 
clarifies the central role played by the individual subject in this process.  
2.2) The Three modes of Objectification 
In the article Subject and Power, Foucault (1983: 208) explains that his central concern 
throughout his various books, articles and lectures was not necessarily to investigate the 
operation of power in society. His goal was also not merely to uncover the discourses, 
practices and diverse disciplines that have emerged from and legitimised such operations 
(208). Rather, in the article Foucault (208) states that the principle concern was to uncover 
the manner in which the individual subject is objectivised in contemporary society. 
Foucault (208) provides a three pronged framework for understanding the manner in which 
individuals are objectivised in contemporary society. He calls this framework the three modes 
of objectification (208). According to Foucault’s first mode of objectification, individuals are 
objectified through the modes of inquiry that strive to become part of normal science (208). 
Foucault sees the modes of inquiry centred on studying human beings, their interaction, and 
behaviour as the ‘dubious’ human sciences (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116). The social 
sciences ground cultural norms within scientific discourse and this discourse is propagated 
throughout society on the pretext that it has been attained via legitimate forms of scientific 
inquiry.  
In Foucault’s understanding however, the social sciences are not based on any universal 
knowledge that is attainable through scientific investigation. These modes of inquiry are 
rather based on ever-changing societal norms, discourses and practices (Foucault, 1983: 208; 
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Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116). The social sciences are impacted by social, political and 
economic forces and are therefore intimately involved with the micropractices of power 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 177). Examples of what can be characterised as dubious sciences 
include economics, political science, psychology, sociology and social anthropology.  
The second mode of objectification is what Foucault calls “dividing practices” (Foucault, 
1983: 208). Through the implementation of dividing practices it is endeavoured to normalise 
anything that does not fit into the framework of classification as advocated by the social 
sciences. The social sciences produce categories and specifications of abnormal and normal 
behaviour which are culturally produced but presented as unbiased and neutral knowledge 
(Madigan, 1992: 267). These specifications serve to separate permissible from impermissible 
behaviour, after which normalising practices are employed to isolate, identify, transform and 
rectify any anomalies that may arise (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). Good examples of 
dividing practices are the separation and confinement of the insane in asylums and the 
confinement of lepers outside of cities during the middle ages. 
The third and final mode of objectification is the “mode of relation between the individual 
and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). Simply explained, the final mode of objectification 
involves the practices employed by individuals to become ethical subjects within the political 
and societal matrix they find themselves in. Individuals are not only objectivised by dividing 
practices and social scientific knowledge, but also through the methods they employ to 
govern their own behaviour. Once norms and different types of knowledge have been 
established and propagated throughout society, individuals proceed to turn themselves into 
subjects. As explained by Gutting (2013), individuals are not only controlled “as objects of 
disciplines but also as self-scrutinising and self-forming subjects.” Individuals internalise 
norms and thereby normalise themselves (Gutting, 2013).  
In the next section, the first mode of objectification is discussed as well the differentiation 
that Foucault made between the natural and social sciences. Furthermore, the emergence of 
the social scientific discourses centred on sexuality is discussed in order to illustrate some of 
the factors that were of interest for Foucault in his analyses of the social sciences.  
2.2.1) The Dubious Human Sciences 
2.2.1.1) Natural science versus Social science 
The first category in the objectification of the contemporary subject are the domains of 
knowledge that strive to enter into the realms of normal science, but continually fail to do so 
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(Foucault, 1983: 208). For Foucault, there are two distinct categories of inquiry (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 116). On the one side, one encounters the disciplines that have passed the 
“threshold of scientificity” (116). One can relate this directly to Thomas Kuhn’s conception 
of “normal science” (1983: 116). According to Kuhn, normal science occurs within a broadly 
accepted paradigm, where science takes on a puzzle solving character (Bird, 2011). Within 
this paradigm, scientists collect information, assimilate data and form scientific conclusions 
within the scope of a broadly accepted theory base (Bird, 2011). The scientist may fail to 
solve the puzzle that he is confronted with, or his peers may question the final conclusion that 
is reached, but the overall parameters of the puzzle stay consistent. The category of normal 
science accounts for the majority of the natural sciences including disciplines such as 
theoretical physics and organic chemistry.  
On the other side, one finds the modes of inquiry that have been unable to enter into the 
realms of normal science. For Foucault, any form of knowledge based on human beings 
specifically, whether it is from a biological, psychological or behavioural perspective, is not 
able to develop discourses, disciplines and practices capable of passing the scientific 
threshold as set by the natural sciences. The human sciences are based on societal norms and 
is characterised by internal struggles and constantly changing discourses and practices 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116, 177).  
It is important to note that Foucault sees the scientist, natural or otherwise, as unavoidably 
situated in his social, political and historical circumstances (166). The difference between the 
natural and the social scientist lies in the fact that the natural scientist can study natural 
phenomena with a certain degree of detachment from normative cultural values (163). The 
natural scientist can bracket his historical and cultural circumstances without compromising 
the validity of his scientific inquiry. It may well be the case that background cultural practices 
are responsible for maintaining the legitimacy and feasibility of scientific investigation on the 
whole, but the natural scientist does not need to take account of these factors for his scientific 
inquiry to be successful (162, 163).  
In contrast, the social scientist does need to take account of the cultural and societal factors 
that constitute the foundation upon which his social scientific inquiry is based. As explained 
by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 163): “… if the human sciences claim to study human 
activities, then the human sciences, unlike the natural sciences, must take account of those 
human activities which make possible their own disciplines.” In order to account for these 
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human activities, the social scientist needs to be able to detach his inquiry from his own 
history and culture. For Foucault (1977: 152) however, such a suprahistorical position is 
tantamount to “apocalyptic objectivity.”  
In Foucault’s understanding, the emergence of any social science is fundamentally situated 
within the background historical, social, political and economic practices that gave rise to its 
emergence (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 163, 164, 182). In other words, the historical 
development of any social scientific discipline is fundamental in the establishment of the 
categories and specifications that make social scientific theory possible in the first place. For 
this reason, social scientists are not able to account for their own legitimacy and it is not 
possible for the social sciences to explain the societal, political and institutional matrix within 
which social scientific discourse emerges, thrives and ultimately decays (102, 182).  
In other words, social scientists are not able to come to a sufficient understanding of the 
factors that govern the acceptance or rejection of any particular social scientific discipline as 
valid science or as pseudo-science. Even if a social scientist succeeds in ignoring the social 
and cultural factors that gave rise to the historical development of the disciplines, this does 
not mean that the social scientific discipline has moved any closer to discovering the truth 
that underlies societal relations. This only means that an orthodoxy has been established 
(163).  In the words of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 163):  
[N]ormalcy for any particular social science would mean that it had successfully 
managed to ignore the social background which made its objects and disciplinary 
methods possible, and one might suppose that such a systematically self-limiting 
science would only come up with highly restricted predictive generalisations. 
An important point at this stage is that Foucault is not advocating for the abolishment of the 
social sciences in favour of the natural sciences. He is also not arguing that the objects that 
the social sciences are centred on are insignificant or unimportant. The classification of 
certain natural sciences as normal science does not mean that the theories and disciplines 
within these sciences do not adapt or change. Foucault is focused on the social sciences 
because these are, to a greater extent than the natural sciences, intimately connected to social, 
economic and political factors. Foucault does not see all forms of social scientific inquiry as 
the product of power (177). Foucault does however, see “micropractices of power” at work 
within social scientific discourse (177).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20 
 
Foucault’s intention here is not to liberate the social sciences from the ambit of power or to 
merge the social and natural sciences. Furthermore, he certainly does not seek to establish a 
framework that will enable social scientific inquiry to discover the truths of human culture 
and society. Rather Foucault seeks to understand the reason for the acceptance of certain 
social sciences as legitimate knowledge during certain historical periods and to discover why 
these sciences have the “objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies they do” (102). In other 
words, Foucault is seeking to uncover the rules that govern the acceptance or rejection of 
social scientific knowledge as truth or falsity. Furthermore, Foucault wants to isolate the 
connections between knowledge and power and how this is manifested in society (177). 
Foucault is interested in how truth and knowledge is produced, used, co-opted and 
transformed by political forces and how laws, procedures and cultural rituals follow suit. 
Foucault analyses the games of truth that surround knowledge and how this relates to and is 
justified by the operation of power in society. As explained by Foucault:  
Truth is of this world; it is the product of multiple constraints ... Each society has its 
own regime of truth, its general politics of the truth ... There is a combat for the truth, 
or at least around the truth, as long as we understand by the truth not those true things 
which are waiting to be discovered but rather the ensemble of rules according to 
which we distinguish the true from the false (Quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 
117). 
This type of inquiry enables one to understand the functions of different types of knowledge 
and different types of discourse and how this relates to the broader deployment of power in 
society (117). By focusing on the social sciences, one can investigate the very operation of 
truth in contemporary regimes of power (133). In this conception, the truth attained through 
social scientific inquiry is not a universal, objective truth. Rather, truth is moulded, shaped 
and constructed. Focusing the analysis on the very disciplines that purport to uncover this 
truth gives one access to the very relations of power from which such disciplines gain their 
relevance and legitimacy.  
The next section is centred on the emergence of social scientific discourse focused on 
sexuality. This is a good starting point to come to grips with the manner in which Foucault 
sought to analyse specific social scientific disciplines and the manner in which these are 
connected to modes of power in society.   
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2.2.1.2) The emergence of the social science of sex 
Social science, including the discourses centred on sexuality, has not always existed in its 
current form. When social science emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it 
found its form within the context of administration and processes of government (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 134). The political and technical rationality of the time placed geographic, 
historical and demographic conditions within the confines of the social sciences (134). For 
example, the social scientific discipline of demography, which first emerged during this 
period, analysed birth-rates, infant mortality rates, frequency of sexual relations, the average 
marital age, population statistics, fertility rates, prostitution levels, the impact of 
contraceptives and so forth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 170; Foucault, 1976: 25, 26). 
Demographers analysed these aspects not only to build scientific knowledge; the health, 
wellbeing and vitality of populations were seen as vitally important factors in the governance 
of states (Foucault, 1976: 25).  
With the emergence of the social sciences, the population of a state became a resource, which 
had to be managed, maintained and moulded (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 139). As such, 
governments were no longer focused solely on governing the people under their control as 
subjects or citizens (Foucault, 1976: 25). The focus was shifted to entire populations; 
populations that were affected by their own particular variables, relations and diverse 
phenomena (25). The health, welfare and efficiency of the population came to be perceived as 
the ends of the government of the state (Fimyar, 2008: 6). In this context, administrative 
intervention was “aimed at the optimisation of the health, life and productivity of the 
population” (6). 
In Foucault’s (1976: 25) understanding, the phenomenon of sex was at the centre of the 
political and economic problem of population. This resulted in a “... veritable discursive 
explosion” of discourse centred on sex (17). Even though speaking about sex became more 
secretive and censored, the propagation of knowledge surrounding sexuality reached 
unprecedented levels; as stated by Foucault (17, 18): 
Toward the beginning of the eighteenth century, there emerged a political, economic 
and technical incitement to talk about sex. And not so much in the form of a general 
theory of sexuality as in the form of analysis, stocktaking, classification, and 
specification of quantitative or causal studies. 
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The eruption of sex as an issue of public interest went hand in hand with the emergence of a 
“multiplicity of discourses” which, in turn, served to produce wide ranging mechanisms, 
procedures and policies within different societal and governmental institutions (33). As stated 
by Foucault (24), an entire “web of discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions 
settled upon it.” Over time, these discourses became formalised and codified within specific 
social scientific disciplines such as demography, medicine, biology and psychology (33).  
As the discourse centred on sex became more and more medicalised, psychologists sought 
new interpretations to make sense of and address the multitudes of newly discovered 
maladies and ailments. Behaviour that was previously considered as a transgression of norms, 
laws or religious rules were now seen as symptoms of underlying medical or psychological 
conditions, perversions or diseases (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173). For the psychologist, 
sexuality penetrated the entire life of the individual (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173; 
Foucault, 1976: 44). For this reason, if the individual’s sexuality was found to be 
maladjusted, his entire life had to be researched, analysed, classified and objectified.  
The result of the increased proliferation of discourse was an eruption of newly discovered 
sexual maladies. Psychiatrists coined new types of conditions such as “mixoscopophiles, 
gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts, and dyspareunist women” (Foucault, 1976: 
43). There were zooerasts, zoophiles and auto-monosexualists (43). Even though many of 
these conditions have long since fallen out of medical knowledge, during the time period, 
they were seen as very real maladies, in need of appropriate medical or psychological 
treatment. Another example is that of homosexuality, which was revealed as a diagnosable 
medical condition. As stated by Foucault (1976: 43), “the homosexual was now a species.” It 
was now possible to study homosexuality objectively and scientifically. It was no longer a 
cultural or social phenomenon. It was no longer something to be condemned morally or 
religiously. Homosexuality was now biological. It was possible to analyse its causes and to 
manage its impacts and effects. 
Once the perverted was identified and classified, steps had to be taken to reach rehabilitation. 
As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 173) “once a diagnosis of perversion was 
scientifically established, corrective technologies - for the good of the individual and of 
society - could and must be applied.” The fact that sex was directly tied to health and vitality 
of populations means that its dysfunction became a society-wide issue requiring 
governmental intervention to address. As such, sex was directly connected with 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23 
 
administration, regulation, surveillance and the practices of the state (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1983: 173; Foucault, 1976: 24, 25).  
In other words, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sex became a point of 
interconnection between the biological and medical sciences and governmental mechanisms 
introduced to manage populations. As social scientific disciplines emerged, there was an 
eruption of formalised and codified knowledge centred on studying the phenomenon of sex. 
Various perversions and maladies were coined and these were thought to threaten the health 
of society as a whole. This means that sex became an administrative matter and its 
quantification, measurement and oversight was of relevance in governmental as well as 
political procedures. As stated by Foucault (1976: 24): 
[Sex] was in the nature of public potential; it called for management procedures; it 
had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses. In the eighteenth century sex 
became a ‘police’ matter ... not the repression of disorder, but an ordered 
maximisation of collective and individual forces ... A policing of sex: that is, not the 
rigor of a taboo, but the necessity of regulating sex through useful and public 
discourses. 
At this point, it is important to note that it is not Foucault’s intention to remove sex from the 
ambit of governmental discourse. Foucault is also not interested in leading us on a path of 
self-discovery and sexual enlightenment. Foucault does not see the truth behind sexuality as a 
natural given or that sex has been contained and constrained by power (105). What Foucault 
is interested in is the connection between the practices of power and the discourses that seek 
to uncover and reveal truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 177).  
For Foucault, the very revelation of sex as a society-wide biological and medical 
phenomenon enabled it to become enmeshed within the practices of power (178). In other 
words, the emergence of a seemingly objective knowledge of sex did not enable society to 
free itself from the constraints imposed upon it by power. Foucault (1976: 105, 106) explains 
that:  
[Sex] is the name that can be given to a historical construct; not a furtive reality that is 
difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the 
intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special 
knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another in 
accordance with a few major strategies of power and knowledge.  
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In Foucault’s understanding, the phenomenon of sex has been constructed in history and 
culture. Sex is a “historical fiction” which serves as a link between normative practices of 
power and the biological sciences (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 179). By incorporating 
governmental technologies and procedures to rectify the sexual ailments that plague society, 
sex was fundamentally entrenched within the relations of power. Social scientific discourse 
has not freed sex from power; on the contrary, the very attempt of attaining an objective 
understanding of sexuality has pushed it further into the realms of power.  
This leads one directly to the central questions that Foucault is concerned with when it comes 
to sex. If sex is a historically constructed concept, what is its function in contemporary 
society? What are the factors that animate the discourse surrounding it? What impact does it 
have on general society and how does it manifest and spread itself? What are the political 
factors that co-opt and propagate this discourse and how are individuals transformed by the 
knowledge and practices that emanate from it? Why was sex, in the first instance, 
appropriated by governmental forces? How are individuals objectified and classified by this 
discourse? And importantly, why does a discipline, which is constituted by constant re-
evaluation, revision and adaptation, need to promote itself as truth and objective knowledge?  
By employing his genealogical approach and focusing on objectification through social 
scientific knowledge, Foucault allows one to analyse the rules and factors that impact on the 
formation of knowledge. Foucault is interested in the games of truth that surround social 
scientific knowledge and how this relates to the deployment of power in contemporary 
society. By focusing his investigation on the historical processes that played a role in the 
formation of social scientific knowledge about sex, Foucault is in no way claiming that he has 
uncovered the truth that lies behind sex. Rather, Foucault claims that the concept of truth is 
produced and used by discourses centred on sex. This production of truth is tied not to 
objective knowledge, but to certain strategies of power (Foucault, 1976: 105, 106). The 
nature of such strategies of power will come to light in the following sections. 
2.2.2) Dividing Practices 
Dividing practices is Foucault’s second mode of objectification and he uses the term to 
explain how the human being is objectified by processes of classification and division 
(Foucault, 1983: 208). The concept designates the demarcation of phenomena as abnormal or 
normal within the spheres of knowledge, culture and society and the subsequent steps taken 
to incorporate any anomalies that are encountered. Dividing practices play an important part 
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in the formation of social scientific knowledge. It is through social scientific classification 
that categories of normality, abnormality, sickness and health are established (Madigan, 
1992: 266, 267). These dividing practices form the foundation upon which academic 
knowledge about social phenomena can be built.  
Dividing practices do, however, stretch further than the social sciences alone. Dividing 
practices not only rest on the classification of certain individuals, behaviours and moralities 
as abnormal within social scientific discourse (267). Dividing practices are also at play within 
governmental institutions (267). These practices involve the implementation of institutional 
apparatuses aimed at entrenching divisions in society as well as the practices followed to 
address anything that does not fit in with the established categories. In other words, once 
these divisionary categories are established and entrenched, practices are employed to 
normalise the anomalous elements that do not fit into the framework of classification as 
advocated by the human sciences (266, 267). This normalisation entails “the deployment of 
force and the establishment of truth” since it involves the shaping and propagation of 
discourse in addition to the implementation of institutional and governmental practices 
(Foucault, 1995: 184). 
It is also important to note that dividing practices not only entail an academic, spatial, 
institutional or legal separation. In Foucault’s understanding, dividing practices involve the 
dispersal of bodies within space and within themselves (Foucault, 1983: 208). Dividing 
practices penetrate into the emotional, moral and ethical spheres. Therefore, these practices 
not only frame the manner in which people think about societal characteristics, but also 
impact on what can be specified as moral or immoral.  
Dividing practices may be informed by social scientific inquiry but their justification, 
implementation and propagation rests on a whole host of factors related to the governance of 
states. In the context of sexual deviance, for example, once an individual’s sexuality was 
discovered to be abnormal, that person was removed from society in order to undergo 
psychiatric and medical treatment. The very behaviour in question was, in the first instance, 
medicalised through scientific discourse. Subsequently, however, this behaviour was 
stigmatised and addressed by governmental intervention in social life. The removal of the 
maladjusted individuals from society was not only done in order to address their respective 
maladies. The process of removing the abnormal from society was driven by governmental 
procedures in order to ensure the health and wellbeing of society as a whole.  
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A good example of a dividing practice being employed to achieve a governmental outcome 
was the establishment of the General Hospital in Paris during 1656 (Madigan, 1992: 267). 
The General Hospital detained beggars, vagabonds and the insane in order to prevent 
“mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders” (Madigan, 1992: 267; Foucault, 
1984: 129). Despite what the name suggests, the General Hospital was not a medical 
establishment (Foucault, 1984: 125). The hospital was constructed with the intention to 
reduce begging and to remove the unemployed from French society (129). In other words, 
abnormality was entrenched and codified within medical discourse in order to achieve the 
political and governmental end of reducing begging and vagabondage.  
The distribution and acceptance of dividing practices and social scientific categories is, 
however, not a uniform process. The difficulties that plague the social sciences inevitably 
result in a steady stream of anomalies (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 182-183). There always 
seems to remain certain phenomena that are incongruent with reigning social scientific 
discourse (182-183). The manner in which these anomalies are dealt with is an integral 
component in the dispersal and success of the contemporary social sciences. Foucault’s 
concept of normalisation refers to the practices employed to discover, integrate and control 
anomalies in the social sciences (195). Ball (1990: 2) explains this concept as “the 
establishment of measurements, hierarchy, and regulations around the idea of a 
distributionary statistical norm within a given population - the idea of judgement based on 
what is normal and thus what is abnormal.”  
It is important to note that persistence of anomalies does not spell the end of social scientific 
disciplines (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 182-183). On the contrary, the existence of anomalies 
serves as a catalyst leading to ever increasing investment in research, monitoring, 
measurement and quantification. The promise that anomalies will eventually yield to social 
scientific procedures serves to vindicate the establishment of large government agencies, 
research facilities and inflated grant proposals through which “the social sciences nourish 
themselves and spread” (182-183). Importantly, the fact that the social sciences often fail to 
achieve their objectives does not hamper their expansion, failure is rather used as an 
argument for the need for even further investment, training and research (182-183). 
The drive contained in contemporary forms of knowledge to continuously break up and 
classify anomalies leads contemporary norms to gravitate towards perpetual totalisation and 
specification (258). The fact that social scientific disciplines are plagued by internal 
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discontinuity means that ever greater principles are sought, in order to subsume more and 
more phenomena (258). There is a strategic directness within contemporary normalisation 
which serves to continuously break up anomalies into constituent parts until no action can fall 
external to the network of normality (258). Reason then “becomes regulative, the demand for 
greater and greater systematisation for its own sake” (258). Importantly however, 
normalisation does not lead to normal science. Normalisation leads to totalising discourse. 
Discourse in this context, is about “what can be said and thought, but also about who can 
speak, when, and with what authority” (Ball, 1990: 2). 
For Foucault, since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, normalisation has become a 
fundamental aspect of an assortment of practices, techniques, discourses and knowledges 
prevalent in modern day society (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). In Foucault’s (1995, 184) 
understanding, the drive behind normalisation became “one of the great instruments of power 
at the end of the classical age.” Arguably, one of the best modern day examples of dividing 
practices and normalisation can be found in education systems. As explained by Ball (1990: 
3, 4): 
The use of testing, examining, profiling and streaming in education, the use of entry 
criteria for different types of schooling, and the formation of different types of 
intelligence, ability and scholastic identity in the processes of schooling are all 
examples of such ‘dividing practices’. 
Educational institutions act as a conduit for the dispersal of particular types of discourse and 
knowledge. Reigning educational methods in connection with different organisational 
practices, different models of teacher-student relationships, different syllabi and curricula, 
different methods and practices of teaching all shape different subjectivities and identities 
which are learned and carried over through the passage of time (5). Educational institutions 
are subjected to reigning discourse but, at the same time, these institutions serve as a central 
node in the dissemination and propagation of discourse (4). As stated by Foucault (1971: 46): 
“Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the 
appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them.” Formal 
education frames the type of discourse that is appropriate for dissemination and thereby the 
access to and legitimacy of different types of knowledge is controlled (Ball, 1990: 4).  
Students are classified, normalised and stigmatised through the creation of advanced groups 
and remedial groups where the academically superior are separated from the pupils that 
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require special attention (5). In this way certain abilities and capacities are promoted whilst 
others are discouraged. Dividing practices in education are also intertwined with 
sophisticated educational sciences such as “educational psychology, pedagogics, the 
sociology of education, cognitive and developmental psychology” (5). Through the 
educational sciences, a rich vocabulary of technocratic concepts stream into educational 
practices which serve as an explanation for the perceived pathologies existent in 
contemporary education. This knowledge provides education with modes of containment, 
control and classification which are often linked to progress and improvement (5). Through 
this process of driving improvement and reformation, the student is moulded and 
“constructed” (6).  
The point here is that the processes of division and classification that are immanent in the 
social sciences are central to the establishment of the very institutional and social principles 
that govern modern day society (2). Social scientific classification is not the straightforward 
creation of discourse centred on the investigation and clarification of the objectively 
understandable bits and pieces in social life. On the contrary, dividing practices provide the 
framework through which different types of discourse are either accepted as legitimate or 
rejected as illegitimate. Thereby, dividing practices shape the content and structure of 
discourse, whilst simultaneously facilitating the propagation of knowledge and power to ever 
greater reaches of society.  
The categories and specifications employed by social scientific disciplines to divide, 
objectify, analyse and normalise societal characteristics all ultimately stem from normative 
cultural values, political ideologies and economic exigencies. Therefore, whether dividing 
practices are centred on sexuality, mental illness or education, these practices are directly tied 
to the historical and cultural development of societies. Dividing practices facilitate the 
dispersal and propagation of discourse and, importantly, the lack of success within these 
discourses to eradicate the anomalies that pervade social phenomena creates an incentive and 
a pathway for the continuous expansion and normalisation of social scientific thought. In this 
context, discourse is about the “practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak … Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them 
and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention” (Foucault, 1974: 49).  
Dividing practices are political tools enacted not only to fix issues as identified through social 
scientific discourse, but to entrench, institutionalise and normalise the very categories that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
divide proper behaviour from improper within the structures of society. Individuals are 
objectified and objectify themselves by the polarity that is created between what is 
considered legally, morally and scientifically acceptable and what is not. The individual is 
however, not necessarily subjugated by reigning forms and power and the discourse that goes 
with it. The role of the individual in the creation and dispersal of dividing practices and social 
scientific discourse should not be discounted. As stated by Ball (1990: 6), individuals are 
constructed through objectification but also through subjectification and the practices aimed 
at achieving “self-understanding”. Individuals appropriate discourse and knowledge and play 
a central role in driving normalisation.  
The next section is centred on the manner in which individuals adapt and mould their 
behaviour in relation to reigning discourse, power and knowledge, and the manner in which 
individuals drive their own objectification. 
2.2.3) The Technologies of the Self 
The third and final mode of objectification is what Foucault calls the “mode of relation 
between the individual and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). The three modes of 
objectification have an interrelated relationship and the mode of relation between the 
individual and himself plays a very important role in this interaction. Foucault’s focal point is 
objectification because this is the entry point through which he wants to analyse the 
functioning of contemporary technologies of power. Power is a productive process, with 
knowledge, discourse and cultural rituals stemming from this process (Foucault, 1995: 194). 
The locus of this process is the individual subject, but he is not necessarily subjugated by 
power (182). Individuals internalise and grapple with disparate discourses and practices and 
in such a way they drive their own objectification and normalisation.  
Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self refers to the methods employed by individuals to 
adapt their behaviour in accordance with prevailing discourse, moral codes, norms and 
values. More specifically, technologies of the self refers to the manner in which moral codes 
are appropriated, how individuals are invited or incited to adjust their behaviour in 
accordance with such codes and the actual practices they employ in order to become ethical 
(Foucault, 1985: 28). Importantly, technologies of the self also refer to the ultimate objectives 
that individuals strive toward by behaving in an ethical manner. Foucault (1985: 27) refers to 
this as the ‘telos’ of moral behaviour.  
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For Foucault (1985: 28), any moral action inherently implies practices of the self. In 
Foucault’s words, moral action is: “... a process in which the individual delimits that part of 
himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the 
precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral 
goal” (28). In other words, moral action, by necessity, requires the individual to work on 
himself and to test, monitor, improve and transform himself into something that he was not 
previously (28). 
In an interview conducted in 1983, Foucault stated that the relationship between the 
individual and himself is characterised by four major aspects (Foucault, 1984: 352). This 
framework is also discussed in more detail in volume two of the History of Sexuality 
(Foucault, 1985: 26). The first aspect relates to the question concerning which part of 
ourselves is concerned with moral conduct (Foucault, 1984: 352). Foucault calls this the 
“ethical substance” (353). The ethical substance constitutes the prime material that ethical 
conduct is centred on, or in other words it is the type of behaviour that ethics is concerned 
with (Foucault, 1984: 353; Foucault, 1985: 26). The ethical substance can be physical 
behaviour, moral deliberation, and interpersonal relationships and so on. It can be related to 
conduct or intention, emotions, desires or aspirations. For example, conjugal fidelity can be 
seen as ethical due to the mastery of base desires that this implies and the strength that the 
individual portrays to overcome such base temptations (Foucault, 1985: 26). In this example, 
the material that ethical conduct is centred on is not the physical action that constitutes being 
unfaithful, but rather the failure to win the battle over base desires (26). 
Foucault calls the second aspect the “mode of subjection” (Foucault, 1984: 353). The mode 
of subjection is the way in which individuals are “invited or incited to recognise their moral 
obligations” (353). The mode of subjection involves the manner in which the individual 
recognises the rules that he is obliged to implement and the way his current behaviour relates 
to those rules (Foucault, 1985: 27). Moral precepts can be propagated in various different 
ways, as explained by Foucault (1984: 353):  
Is it, for instance, divine law, which has been revealed in a text? Is it natural law, a 
cosmological order, in each case the same for every living being? Is it rational rule? Is 
it the attempt to give your existence the most beautiful form possible? 
In other words, one can comply with rules and moral codes, because one seeks to be part of a 
cultural group that espouses such codes, or one can see it as part of a spiritual tradition that is 
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one’s responsibility to maintain, or one can follow moral codes because it is perceived to be 
universally relevant moral imperatives and so forth (Foucault, 1984: 353; Foucault, 1985: 
27).   
Foucault (1984: 355) calls the third aspect the “self-forming activity.” The self-forming 
activity constitutes the means by which individuals transform themselves to become ethical 
subjects (355). The ethical work that individuals do is not aimed only at compliance with 
given rules, but also “to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s 
behaviour” (Foucault, 1985: 27). This relates to how individuals alter, adapt and mould their 
actions (Foucault, 1984: 354, 355). With regards to sexuality, for example, self-forming 
activity refers to the practices followed to “moderate our acts, or to decipher what we are, or 
to eradicate our desires, or to use our sexual desire in order to obtain certain aims like having 
children” (Foucault, 1985: 354). In all these instances, sex is justified in a moral sense for 
different reasons and there are different factors associated with these justifications.  
The fourth aspect is the type of person that one aspires to become by acting ethically 
(Foucault, 1984: 355). Foucault (355) states: “For instance, shall we become pure, or 
immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves and so on?” For Foucault, this is the “telos” of 
moral behaviour (Foucault, 1985: 27). Any moral act gravitates towards its own 
accomplishment, but this stretches further than mere compliance with specific moral precepts 
(27, 28). It is directed to a certain “mode of being” (27, 28). There are a variety of different 
possibilities, as Foucault (1985: 28) explains: 
[C]onjugal fidelity can be associated with a moral conduct that aspires to an ever 
more complete mastery of the self; it can be a moral conduct that manifests a sudden 
and radical detachment vis-a-vis the world; it may strain toward a perfect tranquillity 
of soul, a total insensitivity to the agitations of the passions, or toward a purification 
that will ensure salvation after death and blissful immortality. 
Moral actions are aimed thus at something beyond immediate compliance. By behaving 
morally, according to Foucault, individuals strive to work on themselves in order to transform 
into something that they were not previously. This occurs in the context of the socio-politico 
background that they find themselves in, but it also depends on the type of moral precepts 
that are at play as well as the modes of subjectivisation that are employed (27, 28, 29). 
All in all, the point here is that, for Foucault, the manifestation of power in society does not 
take the form a hegemonic force that dominates and subjugates all in its wake. Individuals 
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play an integral role in driving objectification. Lemke (2000: 5) quotes Foucault, who states 
that there is “… always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between 
techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or 
modified by himself.” For any norm, value or mode of thought to be dispersed throughout 
society, it has to be internalised and appropriated by individuals. Knowledge, for example, 
has to gain a foothold and it has to resonate throughout society to retain its legitimacy. It has 
to be rational within the social, economic and political milieu of a specific societal setting. 
Similarly, cultural rituals such as the spectacle of public torture have to be coherent and 
legitimate within the societal context that it occurs. This legitimacy not only depends on the 
norms and knowledge that surrounds it, but also on the way individuals appropriate such 
practices. 
To summarise, the three modes of objectification provide one with an excellent starting point 
for understanding the manner in which power and knowledge impact the subject and also the 
reciprocal role that the subject plays in this process. The modes of objectification illustrate 
how social scientific discourse finds its roots within dividing practices; practices which 
provide the foundation upon which the social sciences are constructed. Additionally however, 
dividing practices allude to the institutional practices employed in order to implement these 
categories into the working structure of society as well as the efforts employed to stem the 
incessant stream of anomalies that the social sciences are confronted with. The combination 
of these elements, in addition to the role played by the individual, provide a fertile ground 
upon which knowledge and power is dispersed to further and further reaches of society.  
This does however lead one to question the nature of power specifically. Power plays an 
essential role in Foucault’s philosophy, yet the concept can sometimes become convoluted 
and indeterminate. The goal in the next section is to unpack Foucault’s investigation into 
torture and incarceration and the manner in which these are tied to the emergence disciplinary 
power. This discussion will assist in coming to a more complete understanding of Foucault’s 
understanding of power and how he endeavoured to analyse it.  
2.3) The Power of Discipline: From Torture to Incarceration 
2.3.1) Torture 
In his book Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault investigated the emergence of 
incarceration as the primary method for punishing criminals during the eighteenth century. 
Incarceration did not emerge spontaneously. It was founded within a specific type of punitive 
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rationality (Foucault, 1984: 337). This rationality emerged as a reaction to the punitive 
practices that were prevalent in prior ages and served to legitimise the widespread acceptance 
of incarceration as the primary method for punishing criminals in Europe during the time 
period. Before the advent of incarceration however, public torture was almost universally 
applied in Europe as the primary method for punishing criminals. Criminals were forced to 
endure horrendous torments, such as being drenched in boiling oil, drawn and quartered, 
placed on the rack and dismembered (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 144).  
In part one of Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1995: 3) discusses in explicit detail the torture 
of Robert-François Damiens, who was convicted for regicide in 1757. Foucault (1995: 3) 
quotes a passage from Pièces Originales, where the torture is discussed. Damiens was to be: 
[T]aken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of 
burning wax weighing two pounds ... the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, 
thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he 
committed the said regicide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh 
will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur 
melted together and then his body will be drawn and quartered by four horses and his 
limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds 
(Foucault, 1995: 3). 
Horrendous punishments such as the one explained above stem from the fact that, in feudal 
Europe, breaking the law was not only seen as a straightforward legal transgression. Breaking 
the law was seen as an attack on the will of the king. The law was considered to be the 
epitome of the power of the sovereign (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 145). Any violation was 
seen as an “act of war, as a violent attack on the body of the king” (145). For this reason, the 
sovereign was justified to respond with excessive force (145). As discussed by Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (145): “In this ritual of violence, the criminal was physically attacked, beaten down, 
dismembered, in a symbolic display of the sovereign’s power.” In such a way, the power of 
the law and of the sovereign was re-asserted (145).   
This “carnival of atrocity” took place as a public ritual of punishment (145). This ritual of 
punishment was, however, not a simple physical display of the power of the sovereign and it 
was not merely a public example aimed at instilling obedience in the general populace. The 
ritual of public torture was underwritten by extensive and formalised legal proceedings, codes 
and procedures (145). As stated by Foucault (1995: 34), there was an entire “legal code of 
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pain.” Torture as punishment did not occur indiscriminately, there were detailed rules that 
governed it as a punitive practice (34). These rules, for example, covered the “number of 
lashes of the whip, the positioning of the branding iron, the duration of the death agony on 
the stake or on the wheel, the type of mutilation to be used” (34). There was a framework 
linking different types of torture with different crimes and there was an entire judicial and 
legislative process surrounding torture.  
Local magistrates were involved in extensive penal investigations into the validity of 
accusations (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 145). These investigations were characterised by a 
network of different proofs and evidence. There were, for example, clear legal distinctions 
between legitimate proof, conjectural proof, approximate proof, manifest proof and semi-full 
proof (Foucault, 1995: 36). These different distinctions not only had a theoretical function, 
they were linked directly to different judicial outcomes (36). Complete proof, for example, 
resulted in any sentence that was deemed sufficient by the magistrate (36). In the cases where 
there was only partial proof, the magistrates were likely to enact any severe punishment 
which did not result in death (36). If the investigators only found imperfect or slight proof, 
the result would be further investigation or the imposition of a fine (36).  
This process of collecting and assimilating evidence and determining the truth behind the 
accusation was an important part in the functioning of the judicial procedures in feudal 
Europe (36, 37). As stated by Foucault, (1995: 37): “Written, secret, subjected, in order to 
construct its proofs, to rigorous rules, the penal investigation was a machine that might 
produce the truth in the absence of the accused.” The ritual of public torture only came into 
the picture after the judicial investigative procedures were completed.  
Torture was employed in order to validate the evidence that was acquired through the 
preliminary judicial investigation. Right before death was inflicted, the accused was coerced 
into confessing to the crimes that they were accused of (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 144). 
Through the confession, the accused committed himself to the procedures of the preliminary 
investigation (Foucault, 1995: 39). As discussed by Foucault (38):   
To a certain extent, it transcended all other evidence; an element in the calculation of 
the truth, it was also the act by which the accused accepted the charge and recognised 
its truth; it transformed an investigation carried out without him into a voluntary 
affirmation. Through the confession, the accused himself took part in the ritual of 
producing penal truth. 
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In Foucault’s (40) understanding, torture was cruel, but it was not savage, uncontrolled or 
barbaric. Torture wasn’t the expression of pure and unadulterated power and it was not “… 
some uncontrolled act of animal rage” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 145). Torture was a 
regulated practice conducted in accordance with defined and codified local procedures 
(Foucault, 1995: 40). There were extensive measures and procedures in place to precisely 
control the application of torture as a punitive practice (145). Torture was not the last resort 
expression of an exasperated legal system losing restraint and forgetting all its moral 
principles (34, 35). On the contrary, a whole “economy of power” was invested in torture 
(35). Power, in this context, is not a physical display of strength or dominance; it is rather the 
calculated application of pain on the body of the condemned (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 
145). The foundation of which is underwritten by extensive forms of rational debate, 
discourse and deliberation. 
To summarise, the ritual of public torture formed an integral part of an extensive judiciary 
process, which was underpinned by legal and administrative procedures, specialised 
knowledge, governmental mechanisms, as well as an entire systemised web of different types 
of proofs, evidence and accusations. In other words, torture was not simply a straightforward 
method for punishing criminals. Torture, as a punitive practice, occupied an important space 
in the governance of medieval society. By looking at torture through Foucault’s genealogical 
lens, it is possible to analyse it as a historically significant practice, characterised not by its 
brutality, but by the extensive forms of discourse, practices and knowledge that served to 
legitimise and justify its existence. Thus, even though flaying criminals, for example, is not 
acceptable in the western legal systems of today; Foucault shows how it was possible for 
something that seems so horrendous in today’s terms to be part of a formalised legal and 
judicial system characterised by its own specific historically situated rational coherence.  
2.3.2) Incarceration 
In the eighteenth century, the punitive practice of public torture was transposed and replaced 
by an entirely new interpretation of punishment (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 147). The model 
of detention and incarceration appeared and rapidly spread throughout Europe (152). 
Suddenly and almost universally, incarceration replaced public torture as the preferred 
method of punishment (150). As stated by Foucault (1995: 232): 
[P]eople were still aware of its novelty; and yet it appeared so bound up and at such a 
deep level with the very functioning of society that it banished into oblivion all the 
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other punishments the eighteenth-century reformers had imagined. It seemed to have 
no alternative, as if carried along by the very movement of history.  
The reinterpretation of punishment was first pushed by the “humanist reformers” (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 147). The reformers argued that, in the violence of torture, “tyranny, 
confronts rebellion; each calls forth the other ... Instead of taking revenge, criminal justice 
should simply punish” (147). The ideals of these reformers were never truly implemented and 
their plans were waylaid by the advent of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars 
(147-151). Even so, the humanist rationality of punishment served as the foundation upon 
which incarceration flourished in subsequent years (147-151).  
Social contract theory was the theoretical justification for this reinterpretation of punishment 
(147). Within social contract theory, the formation of society is seen as the result of 
individuals coming together through a “contractual arrangement” (147). In this context, crime 
is not seen as a deliberate attack on the will of the sovereign (148). Rather, crime is a breach 
of the social contract. From this perspective, punishment is seen as the right, and the 
obligation, of society as a whole and incarceration was aimed at redressing “the wrong done 
to society and bring the offender back to his rightful and useful place in society” (148). In 
other words, punishment is seen as a deterrent to future crimes and as method for 
reincorporating the criminal back into a functioning member of society. 
The humanist reformers sought to create an extensive framework of knowledge, within which 
each specific crime and method of punishment had a place (149). The reinterpretation of 
punishment did not only happen on theoretical terms. The reformers were driven to transform 
the institutional functioning of punitive punishment. For this to be successful, new technical 
forms of knowledge and methods for control and surveillance had to be developed (149). A 
greater degree of classification and objectification of crimes and criminals followed and the 
penitentiary system served as a focal point for the establishment of a corpus of knowledge 
about criminality (148, 149, 194). The factor that was of interest for the psychologist and the 
criminologist was the criminal as a scientific object (149). To this end, the criminal was 
identified, isolated, analysed and objectified as a ‘quasi-natural species’ (194-195). 
The purpose of punishment was no longer the revenge of the sovereign on the body of the 
condemned and it also did not serve as a validation for the truth as attained through judicial 
procedures (152). The purpose of punishment was supervision, confinement and training 
(152). The criminal was characterised as a specimen to be transformed, moulded and 
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rehabilitated for the good of the specific individual as well as of society as a whole (194, 
195). Punishment became a “corrective technique” and it was not used to expunge the crime, 
but rather to “transform the criminal” (Foucault, 1995: 127). 
This interpretation of punishment is still the norm in contemporary western states. 
Contemporary forms of punitive punishment are completely removed from causing physical 
harm. The closest comparison in western states to the torture practices of the Middle Ages is 
capital punishment. What is interesting, however, is that capital punishment occurs in 
complete contrast to what happened during the public spectacles of torture of the Middle 
Ages. There are two key differences between medieval torture and contemporary capital 
punishment. Firstly, capital punishment is not a public spectacle. Only a handful of 
individuals are allowed to attend. Secondly, capital punishment is not torture. As explained 
by Foucault (1995: 11):  
Today a doctor must watch over those condemned to death, right up to the last 
moment ... When the moment of execution approaches, the patients are injected with 
tranquillisers ... [in order to] take life away, but prevent the patient from feeling it; 
deprive the prisoner of all rights, but do not inflict pain. 
It is important however, to understand how Foucault saw the contrast between the different 
forms of punishment. To refer back to the previous section, Foucault did not see torture as the 
epitome of barbarism and he did not see the emergence of contemporary forms of punishment 
as a natural evolution from the horrendous practices of torture to more humane and moral 
forms of punishment. Rather Foucault sees the emergence of incarceration as a manifestation 
of widespread “practices of disciplining both individuals and populations” (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 153).  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault sought to uncover the widespread societal practices of 
discipline and control that served to justify, rationalise and promote the entire institutional 
apparatus that developed together with the emergence of incarceration. It was not Foucault’s 
objective to uncover precisely the truth or the history behind the practices of torture and 
incarceration. Foucault saw incarceration and torture as two distinct punitive practices, 
supported and justified by specific discourses and disciplines, promoted and propagated by 
particular governmental mechanisms aimed at achieving different societal outcomes. 
Foucault was interested in incarceration precisely because he wanted to uncover the complex 
social function that it served (143).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 38 
 
This social function stems from what Foucault calls disciplinary power. In Foucault’s 
understanding, disciplinary power emerged as part of a technology for governing individual 
conduct (Foucault, 1984: 338). This disciplinary technology first emerged together with the 
development of modern industrialised states and is tied in with broader socio-economic 
changes that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (338). The exact factors 
that lead to the emergence of disciplinary power are multifaceted and complex. Furthermore, 
it was not Foucault’s intention to uncover the exact origin of knowledge or power (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 106). Rather, Foucault was interested in uncovering the manifestation of 
power and its overall directionality.  
Disciplinary power is specifically settled on deviance (Gutting, 2013). Its focal point is 
reform and adjustment to the societal norms and standards of the contemporary world 
(Gutting, 2013). To this end, disciplinary power is “essentially corrective” (Foucault, 1995: 
179). As stated by Foucault (170):  
Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards 
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant 
power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a 
modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy. 
This type of power does not take the place of other forms of power in society, it infiltrates 
and colonises them and ramifies down to the smallest contours and details (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 153). It is driven to achieve certain societal outcomes, but these outcomes 
are not defined, promoted or championed by specific individuals or institutions (Gutting, 
2013). Discipline is a governmental technique that may ramify through various institutions 
such as armies, prisons, hospitals, schools and law enforcement but it cannot be reduced to 
the operation of one specific institution alone (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153).  
In Foucault’s juxtaposition of torture as a mode of punishment versus incarceration as a mode 
of punishment, he is not interested in uncovering the most effective, moral or rational type of 
punishment. Ultimately, the two different modes of punishment are embroiled in contrasting 
economies of power. Power, in this instance, is not a state structure and it is not an institution. 
Power is rather: “... the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a 
particular society” (Foucault, 1976: 93). The role of knowledge within this strategical 
relationship is very important. For Foucault, neither power nor knowledge can exist 
independently of the other (Foucault, 1995: 184). Knowledge and power are both part of the 
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same process (Ball, 1990: 5). As explained by Ball (5): “Knowledge does not reflect power 
relations but is immanent in them.” Thus, one cannot analyse the practices of power without 
simultaneously analysing the correlative and constitutive domains of knowledge that goes 
with it.  
Although Foucault did not specifically make a methodological connection between 
objectification on the one side and disciplinary power on the other, one can clearly see the 
areas of confluence and how the different themes overlap on key points. The role of division, 
normalisation and classification can be connected directly to discipline as a technology of 
power. Within the sphere of incarceration there is, for example, a type of discourse that is 
considered as legitimate. There are classifications and definitions of criminality. There are 
specialised social scientific disciplines like criminology and psychology, and there are 
recognised practices of treatment, isolation, separation and reintegration. There is an entire 
rationale behind the prevalence of incarceration as a mode of punishment. This rationale is 
grounded within the interrelated relationship between knowledge and power.  
The manifestation of power in societal practices is grounded in meticulous rituals, debates 
and discourses. It is tied to political governance, state structures and legal codes and 
procedures. Modes of punishment such as torture or incarceration did not emerge because 
these are the most natural or ethical forms of punishment and when one is studying punitive 
practices one is not studying the essential characteristics of a universal practice. The 
emergence of these forms of punishment are tied to political and historical developments and 
the socio-economic changes that occur through the passage of time. These changes and 
developments are not tied to humanity’s march of progress towards universal enlightenment, 
on the contrary these changes are grounded in particular economies of power. In order to 
come to an understanding of power, one has to focus on the meticulous rituals, discourses and 
diverse practices that emanate from it (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 188). 
Power is not a hidden and enigmatic force that is unstoppable in its drive to usurp every 
aspect of human behaviour. Power can also not be equated to domination. Oppression, 
coercion and domination might be different instruments in the exercise of power, but these 
are not the foundation of power relationships (Lemke, 2000:3). Power is very much contained 
in its day to day operations. Power does not have essential characteristics that can be 
subjected to objective analysis. Power is not a ubiquitous force that secretly animates what 
we think and feel. It is not something concrete that could simply be isolated and removed. 
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The ultimate aim of power is not to normalise, objectify and subjugate all in its wake. In 
Foucault’s conception, power does not corrupt, power creates. Power and knowledge are the 
constitutive elements that allow for societal relations to emerge, disperse and become 
entrenched in the day to day functioning of society (Foucault, 1995: 194). Foucault (1995: 
194) explains that:  
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, 
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.  
Foucault’s intention was not to overthrow power or to liberate us from its influence. 
Foucault’s intention was to provide us with an analytic of power; an analytic with which one 
can move toward understanding power in its contemporary manifestation and the manner in 
which the lives of individuals are impacted by this manifestation. Additionally, analysing 
power is about shedding light on the role played by the individual in the appropriation and 
propagation of the relations of power. By studying objectification, one is studying the 
interrelated relationship between technologies of power and technologies of the self (Lemke, 
2000: 2). The next section is centred on Foucault’s concept of governmentality. The concept 
ties all three modes of objectification together, and it places the three modes of objectification 
into the context of Foucault’s broader project.  
2.4) Governmentality 
The goal in this section is to shed light on Foucault’s concept of governmentality. As has 
already been discussed, power is not a hegemonic force and it does not fall under the control 
of specific institutions, state structures or individuals. According to Foucault, power is 
dispersed throughout society. Foucault’s concept of governmentality will assist in 
establishing a more complete picture of how the modes of objectification are relevant in an 
analysis of contemporary society and also to understand the role played by power in driving 
objectification. 
Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ in his lectures of 1978 and 1979 at the Collège de 
France (Lemke, 2000: 2). This concept is a key term in his overall philosophy as well as in 
his analyses of power (3). Foucault’s understanding of government is broader than the 
modern notion of political government. He understands government as the “conduct of 
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conduct” which stretches from self-governance, to the governance of the family, to political 
governance and the governance of the state (2). In other words, the concept extends from 
“governing the self” to “governing others” (2). Foucault sees the development of the 
contemporary state and the emergence of the contemporary subject as a fundamentally 
interrelated process and he uses the concept of governmentality “to analyse the connections 
between what he called technologies of the self and technologies of domination, the 
constitution of the subject and the formation of the state” (Lemke, 2000: 2, 3; Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983: 143). 
The general meaning of governmentality is aimed at analysing different mentalities of 
government (Fimyar, 2008: 4, 5). The concept merges governing, on the one side, and 
mentality on the other. Thereby, the fundamental linkage between the practices of 
government and the forms of knowledge that underpin the legitimacy of such practices is 
emphasised (5). In other words, governmentality is a guideline for analysing the complex 
relationship between different modes of thinking and different types of government (4). It 
emphasises and serves to explain the intimate relationship between “political reason and 
technologies of governance” (4).  
In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault’s initial focus was on tracing the shift that 
occurred in Western Europe away from problems of territory toward problems of population; 
away from external threats to the state toward internal threats in relation to the populace (4, 
5). Foucault explains this shift as passing from an art of government, which was informed by 
traditional virtues such as liberty, justice, wisdom, prudence, to an art of government 
grounded in its own rationality and its own processes which legitimised this rationality 
(Foucault, 2007: 364). The concept designates the entry of political economy into the 
different forms of knowledge related to the management of populations and territories (De 
Giorgi, 2006: 69). Foucault (1991: 102) defined governmentality as: 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
For Foucault (102), governmentality signifies the long term tendency that has led to the pre-
eminence of a certain type of power within western states. This type of power involves the 
implementation of a variety of governmental practices and the development of a complex 
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series of different types of knowledge (102). Within the context of governmentality, the 
government of a state means to “maximise the productive potentialities of the population, to 
enhance its welfare and to set up appropriate mechanisms for the scientific measurement of 
results – social statistics, census, national accounting and so on” (De Giorgi, 2006: 69). In 
other words, the governmentalisation of the state can be explained as the creation of a host of 
different practices that are constituted by organisational, constitutional, fiscal, and juridical 
strategies aimed at managing the health, habits and socio-economic behaviour of the 
population, as well as establishing the direct linkage between these practices and social 
scientific discourse (Rose, 1999, 18). 
Thus, the concept refers to the manner in which power is rationalised through the social 
scientific discourses that form an integral part of its practices and its institutions (Fimyar, 
2008: 6). For this reason, one cannot analyse government without analysing the forms of 
knowledge that provides its rational foundation (Lemke, 2000: 2). The concept highlights the 
“interdependence between governmental practices and mentalities of government that 
rationalise and often perpetuate existing practices of ‘conduct of conduct’” (Fimyar, 2008: 6). 
In other words, governmentality is a concept used to designate a manifestation of power 
which has resulted in the establishment of various governmental mechanisms centred on the 
governance of populations as well as the emergence of various forms of knowledge that serve 
to collect information pertaining to the societal aspects that these governmental mechanisms 
are centred on. These forms of knowledge underscore and legitimise the rationality of 
government and serve as a mechanism in their dispersal globally.  
This link between governance on the one side and knowledge on the other was latent 
throughout Foucault’s discussions of the social sciences, dividing practices and the 
objectification of the self, but the significance of this link was never explicated. As with the 
medicalisation of sexual perversion or the stigmatisation of vagabondage and begging, the 
establishment of certain social scientific disciplines is tied centrally to governmental 
legitimisation and enforcement. The concept of governmentality designates the analysis of 
the complex governmental relationship within which truth, and its link to cultural, political, 
economic and social spheres, is produced and subsequently employed to pursue governmental 
objectives and strategies (4). 
The central tenet of governmentality is the fact that it signifies a specific form of power that 
is underpinned by a type of rationality which defines what counts as objectives to be 
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achieved, as well as the appropriate methods to achieve such objectives (Lemke, 2000: 5). 
Governmentality is the “systematised, regulated and reflected modes of power that go beyond 
the spontaneous exercise of power over others, following a specific form of reasoning, which 
defines the telos of action or the adequate means to achieve it” (5). In other words, 
governmentality, and the different forms of knowledge associated with it, is a mode of power 
that defines what counts as problems, what counts as solutions and what counts as the 
acceptable steps to take in order to reach those solutions. In this way, governmentality drives 
and perpetuates its own prevalence.  
In the context of governmentality, power and knowledge are inseparable. When it comes to 
the government of the state, one does not have discourse, truth and objective science on the 
one side and institutions, state structures and political authority on the other. The link 
between power and knowledge is the fundamental characteristic that enables specific 
manifestations of power to emerge and entrench themselves in society. In this context, 
objectification is not a form of power and it is not the ultimate objective that power is driving 
towards. Objectification is a tool in the exercise of power in contemporary society and it 
facilitates and catalyses the governmentalisation of the state.  
Modern forms of knowledge such as psychology and criminology render human beings as 
objectifiable, analysable and classifiable objects of social scientific knowledge (Madigan, 
1992: 267). As previously argued, these disciplines establish parameters and classifications 
that demarcate normal and abnormal behaviour, which is entrenched within certain 
governmental structures such as punitive institutions. Scientific classification inevitably leads 
to the revelation of a set of anomalies that do not fit into the framework of normality as 
espoused within social scientific discourse. The existence of these anomalies acts as a catalyst 
for increased research and the propagation and normalisation of social scientific discourse 
throughout various sectors of society. These sciences are promoted and justified on the basis 
that the knowledge contained within them is directly tied to the universally acceptable 
parameters of the natural sciences, whilst in actual fact these sciences are driven by political 
ideologies, cultural biases and economic exigencies.  
The locus of this entire process is the individual subject, but individuals are not mindless 
actors that accept any form of discourse that they come across. Discourse and knowledge 
emerge out of struggles and disagreements. It is not the uniform acceptance of true 
knowledge. Individuals play a key role in the appropriation of different systems of rules that 
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delineate the legitimate forms of discourse from illegitimate. In order to understand the 
contemporary subject, one thus has to come to grips with the manner in which the subject is 
situated within the relations of power that permeate society as well as the manner in which 
individuals are key apparatuses in the propagation of power. 
The concept of governmentality provides one with the semantic connection which stresses the 
importance of the individual subject in the legitimisation and dispersal of power in society, 
but in addition to this the concept explains the fundamentally western trend that has emerged 
during the past couple of hundred years that saw the establishment of a specific type of power 
that has achieved pre-eminence in the global political environment. This type of power 
centres on the governance of population and that establishment of a whole host of different 
mechanisms and discourses that justify and propel this form of governance globally. As 
explained by Fimyar (2008: 4):  
Governmentality studies also explore the relations between the forms and rationalities 
of power and the processes of subjectivation (formation of governable 
subjects/citizens) and subjectification (formation of individual existence) by 
problematising, or calling into question, the particular aspects of who can govern, 
what governing is and what or who is governed and how. 
The concept provides one with the framework through which the normatively accepted 
understanding of the state can be deconstructed and problematised (4). This deconstruction 
allows one to unpack the role and nature of discourse and knowledge in the governance of 
individuals and populations. It allows one to tie modes of governance in with the different 
forms of knowledge that underscore their rationality and, fundamentally, it allows one to 
deconstruct the truths that have been fostered into existence through the historical and 
cultural development of societies. Without these truths, contemporary forms of government 
cease to retain their legitimacy and relevance.  
2.5) Conclusion 
The aim in this chapter was to provide a brief overview of some of the important themes in 
Foucault’s work. As stated in the introduction, Foucault’s work is diverse and multifaceted 
and the intention was not to provide an exhaustive summary of everything. The intention was 
to highlight the key themes that would make a critical analysis of contemporary anti-
corruption discourse and practices prudent and possible.  
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The modes of objectification is a good framework for understanding the manner in which the 
individual is objectified in contemporary society. Social scientific knowledge, for example, is 
centred on specific societal phenomena that are perceived to be a key problems of concern 
not only for scientists but also for governmental and political actors. The knowledge that is 
produced about phenomena is fostered into academic disciplines, which are entrenched 
within governmental institutions and procedures designed to combat the specific malaise that 
the social scientific discourse is centred on. No matter how much these social scientific 
disciplines struggle to eradicate the constant stream of anomalies that they are confronted 
with, the very existence of these anomalies serves to vindicate the programmes of 
intervention as well as academic study into the phenomenon involved.  
The role of dividing practices is paramount in the establishment and dispersal of social 
scientific knowledge. For any social scientific discipline to gain traction, there has to be 
categories of understanding. Before a social scientific knowledge can establish itself, there 
has to be a division between what is normal and what is abnormal, between the healthy and 
the sick, between the corrupt and the ethical and so forth. The dividing practice is not merely 
the division between theoretical concepts. Dividing practices also involve the very 
implementation of the divisions fostered by social scientific discourse. For example, when it 
comes to mental illness, for the good of the individual and the good of society, the 
psychologically disturbed have to be separated and isolated from the rest of society. Their 
abnormalities have to be addressed and normalised within an isolated setting. In this way, 
dividing practices are fundamentally ingrained within the establishment of social scientific 
discourse and the institutional arrangements that follow.  
The individual is the object and the subject of this process. The knowledge that is found in 
social scientific discourse is based on the individual’s thoughts, emotions, interactions and 
behaviours. The individual might be objectified by dividing practices and social scientific 
discourse, but he is not necessarily subjugated. Social scientific knowledge emerges out of 
the interaction between individuals within society. The truths contained in social scientific 
discourse is not discovered in the external world and then applied on ailing and 
malfunctioning societies. Truth is systematically constructed and fostered into existence. It is 
subject to the historical development of societies, which is influenced by a variety of factors 
including cultural and economic dynamics. In other words, the individual plays a 
fundamental role in the establishment and dispersal of social scientific knowledge. The 
individual is not a blind actor that unthinkingly accepts any knowledge that crosses his or her 
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path. Individuals grapple with and internalise knowledge and thereby drive their own 
normalisation.  
At this point, one is driven to ask, what drives the directionality of knowledge? It is clear that 
there are coherent practices that have developed over time to become entrenched within the 
very way that people live and think in society. Knowledge is not merely based on a set of 
random phenomena and social scientists do not arbitrarily select which phenomena to 
investigate. This is where Foucault’s link between power and knowledge comes in. 
Knowledge cannot exist independently from the relations of power and vice versa. 
Disciplinary power, for example, is fundamentally ingrained with a particular conception of 
deviance. Without this conception and without the entire social scientific discipline that 
grounds this conception, disciplinary power would not have developed in the way that it has. 
Power, in this context, is grounded in meticulous rituals and procedures. When it comes to 
medieval torture, for example, there were countless practices and discourses that grounded 
the legitimacy and rationality of it as a mode of punishment. There were codes and rules that 
designated appropriate punishments for specific crimes and transgressions. These practices 
were rationalised through knowledge, but this knowledge was not tied to objective discourse. 
Rather, the discourse that rationalised torture as a mode of punishment was tied to cultural 
and social characteristics which emerged through the historical development of medieval 
society. Thus, torture as a mode of punishment, emerged out of a specific cultural and 
societal context, and the knowledge that surrounds it does not stem from objective or 
scientific thought, but rather it emerged as a necessary requirement for the mode of 
punishment to retain its legitimacy and relevance. Therefore, the punitive practice of torture 
emerged in order to serve a societal function that stretched further than punishment alone. 
Torture formed part of an economy of power that played an integral role in the structure and 
governance of medieval society.  
Ultimately, however, one has to be able to understand why power and knowledge have 
developed in the way that they have as well as the impact that this development has had on 
societies and individuals. But, more fundamentally, one needs to uncover the direction that 
power is working towards. Foucault’s concept of governmentality is an excellent tool to assist 
in this regard. Governmentality ties the modes of objectification together by highlighting the 
fundamental interconnectedness between modes of thought and modes of governance.  
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It is important to remember that Foucault was first and foremost a historian of thought. 
Through his various analyses and investigations he sought to come to grips with the manner 
in which man is constituted and constitutes himself as a thinking being. Thought, as Foucault 
understands it, is broader than the “universal categories of logic” (Foucault, 1988: 9, 10). In 
other words, the manner in which the characteristics of human thought has been unpacked in 
contemporary analyses of logic does not adequately take into account the role played by 
social history in framing discourse and knowledge. In this context, human beings are not 
wholly subjugated by hegemonic forces of power, but they are also not completely free to 
pursue self-determination. Similarly, the knowledge that is created and dispersed by human 
beings is not the sole product of power, but in saying that, knowledge is also not entirely 
centred on uncovering and presenting the objectively understandable aspects of human 
interaction and society. There is a versatile equilibrium between the practices of power and 
the practices of the self.  
Governmentality, as a methodological tool, allows one to investigate the reciprocity that 
exists between the governance of the state, the governance of the self, and the government of 
others. It allows one to understand the role played by power in framing the type of knowledge 
and discourse that is rational within a particular societal setting and how this knowledge is 
used and employed to further the reaches of power. Now, from the perspective of the 
historian of thought one does not delve into history to uncover the truth of how individuals 
and societies lived in the past. One does not seek objective knowledge about how ancient 
societies were structured, how individuals engaged with each other or how their political 
systems were organised. The orientation of the historian of thought is always contemporary. 
One delves into history to understand how past politics, discourses and governmental 
practices impacted the development of the contemporary situation. Governmentality, in the 
context of the three modes of objectification and disciplinary power, constitutes a 
methodological lens through which one can analyse the fundamentally interrelated 
relationship between power, knowledge and individual subject within contemporary society.  
Before one can use Foucault’s work to analyse the anti-corruption industry, however, it is 
important to trace the historical development of anti-corruption discourse. The next chapter 
provides a genealogical account of the development of anti-corruption discourse and its 
consolidation in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 3: The Genealogy of Anti-corruption discourse  
3.1) Introduction 
The goal in this chapter is to provide an account of the development of anti-corruption 
discourse from the perspective of the historian of thought. As stated in Chapter 2, it is not 
Foucault’s intention to uncover the truth contained in history; his intention is to uncover the 
manner in which historical circumstances have influenced the emergence of contemporary 
knowledge and practices, and how these have had an impact on the formation of the 
contemporary subject. Foucault is interested in uncovering the manner in which disparate and 
sometimes contradictory forms of knowledge contributed to contemporary practices, sciences 
and politics. In other words, Foucault delves into history, not in order to understand the past, 
but to understand the present; with the end goal being to come to grips with the role that 
power plays in the deployment and justification of truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118, 
119).  
Importantly, however, before one can move toward analysing the role of power in the 
contemporary world, one needs to analyse the historical development of the forms of 
knowledge and governmental practices that underscore the emergence of this form of power. 
To this end, genealogy is a key conceptual tool that Foucault uses to analyse the history of 
particular forms of discourse and practices that these are associated with. Foucault (1995: 
152) explains that, the role of genealogy is to record “… the history of morals, ideas and 
metaphysical concepts.” The examination of descent allows one to investigate the multitude 
of causes and effects that influenced the development and formation of a certain concept 
(146). The genealogical perspective is opposed to the traditional historical method as history 
is not viewed in terms of continuous development and progress (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 
106). On the contrary, for the genealogist, underneath all knowledge and truth lies 
interpretation (107). Therefore, it is the task of the genealogist to record the history of 
interpretation (107).  
Before one can subject the contemporary anti-corruption industry to a Foucauldian analysis, 
it is important to trace the historical development of anti-corruption discourse. To this end, 
this chapter provides a genealogical account of the evolution of anti-corruption discourse and 
its consolidation through the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. Additionally, the 
primary criticisms that have been levelled against the industry are also addressed. The goal is 
to trace the development of anti-corruption discourse since the 1950s in order to come to 
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grips with the themes and theories that permeate contemporary anti-corruption knowledge 
and practices. This will allow for a more in-depth Foucauldian analysis of the anti-corruption 
industry, which will follow in Chapter 4. 
The discourse centred on corruption has evolved and adapted over the passage of time, but if 
one looks back over the past 60 years, two instances of increased proliferation can be 
identified. It could be said that anti-corruption discourse has disseminated in two waves. The 
first wave was during the 1950s and 1960s when widespread decolonisation and 
democratisation sparked a debate about the extent of corruption and its potential impact on 
newly democratised states. This time period saw the corruption discourse undergo significant 
changes as a multitude of different interpretations emerged; interpretations that varied 
depending on the academic disciplines they stem from, and the specific types of corruption 
they seek to address.  
The second wave of anti-corruption discourse occurred in the 1990s, when, as the Cold War 
subsided, the gaze of the international community turned back to corruption (Kuris, 2012: 1). 
As explained in Chapter 1, this was followed by an eruption of anti-corruption discourse and 
the issue catapulted to the forefront of the global agenda. As such, corruption was elevated to 
one of the primary explanatory factors for the widespread problems that persisted in the 
developing world, as well as states that were part of the former Soviet Union (Le Billon, 
2003: 424, Bukovansky, 2006: 182; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). Anti-corruption discourse 
was consolidated in the 1990s with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. As the 
industry developed, the theories centred on the subject became more standardised as the 
actors involved in the field sought a workable definition that could be applied in a diverse 
range of constituencies. The result was that Joseph Nye’s (1967: 419) definition became the 
primary manner in which corruption is defined and understood. Nye (419) defined corruption 
as: “... behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private 
regarding.” As such, with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry and through the 
proliferation of neoliberal discourse (which, as will be demonstrated, undergirds Nye’s 
definition), the international consensus around the problem of corruption was entrenched and 
corruption was cast as a public sector problem with a detrimental impact on economic 
development. 
It can be said that the criticisms against the anti-corruption industry have mirrored the 
development of the mainstream anti-corruption discourse. On the one side, contemporary 
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anti-corruption discourse has been criticised for being overly ambiguous in defining the 
concept and, on the other side, anti-corruption discourse has been criticised for utilising the 
neoliberal definition, which is said to be a normative oversimplification. The goal in this 
chapter is not to reconcile these different critical perspectives into a unified anti-corruption 
critique; rather the goal is to sketch a pathway toward analysing the role that anti-corruption 
discourse and practices play on the international political scene. In other words, the goal is 
not to criticise anti-corruption industry or to lay bare its failure to address the prevalence of 
corruption; the objective is to utilise Foucault’s genealogical methodology to analyse the role 
that the anti-corruption industry plays in the sphere of international governance. 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 2.2 focuses on the main arguments 
that characterised anti-corruption discourse in the period from the 1950s up until the early 
1990s. The objective in this section is to sketch the development of the discourse around the 
subject and highlight some of the main themes that constitute the foundation of contemporary 
anti-corruption discourse. Section 2.3 is focused on the plurality of the concept of corruption. 
The concept has remained ambiguous and indeterminate despite the fact that anti-corruption 
discourse was consolidated in the 1990s. The concept refers to a wide range of different 
behaviours; behaviours that are linked to a multitude of different impacts, causes and 
motivations. This has made the implementation of anti-corruption programmes, as well as 
measuring the impact of such programmes, highly problematic. This is one aspect of the anti-
corruption industry that has been subjected to criticism. Additionally, the industry has been 
criticised for its ties to neoliberal ideology. Section 2.4 highlights these criticisms in more 
detail.  
Section 2.5 is centred on the emergence of the fight against corruption as a globally 
entrenched industry. Sampson (2010) has gone some way to explain the manner in which the 
anti-corruption industry has come to be established and how this industry has expanded 
despite the criticisms that have been levelled against it. For Sampson (2010), anti-corruption 
has become industrialised on the international political landscape, which has made it largely 
autonomous in its growth and expansion. Sampson’s (2010) argument places the broader 
field into perspective and opens the way for a Foucauldian analysis of anti-corruption 
discourses and practices. 
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3.2) The evolution of Anti-corruption Discourse 
Foucault (1977: 145) states of history that it “is the concrete body of development, with its 
moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitations [and] its fainting 
spells.” One can think of the history of corruption in a similar way. There have been times 
when the topic occupied a preeminent space on the international agenda and there have been 
extended periods where it faded, almost entirely, out of view. The theories centred on 
defining the concept has gone through remarkable changes over the past fifty to sixty years. 
Similarly there have been a multitude of different approaches implemented to curb its 
prevalence.  
Academic study into the topic first gained international attention during the 1950s and 1960s 
(Farrales, 2005: 6). This was a period of widespread decolonisation and many newly 
independent states underwent a process of democratisation (6). The implementation of 
democratic practises highlighted the extent of corruption in developing states and the issue 
was thereby catapulted into international political and academic discussions (6). The debates 
that raged during this time can be classified into two different schools of thought; the 
‘moralists’ on the one side and the ‘revisionists’ on the other (6, 7). According to the 
moralists corruption can be seen as a problem of ethical and moral deficiency (Theobald, 
1999: 492). Revisionists, on the other hand, characterise the problem as a side effect of 
economic development, and as unique to the socio-economic development of specific states 
(Farrales, 2005: 6, 7). 
From the moralist perspective, authors such as Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins argue that 
corruption, in any manifestation, is inevitably detrimental to economic growth, social 
cohesion and political development (Theobald, 1999: 492). The authors state that corruption 
in Africa: “... flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds which it so much resembles, 
taking the goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of plants which have been 
carefully, and expensively, bred and tended” (492). For Wraith and Simpkins, corruption in 
Africa is a “jungle of nepotism and temptation” (Leys, 1965: 216). From this perspective, the 
prevalence of corruption is attributable to the breakdown or absence of social values and 
norms, and stems from excessive greed for wealth and material gain (Theobald, 1999: 492). 
The authors contrast the widespread corruption in Africa with the relative absence of 
corruption in England (491, 492). Wraith and Simpkins want to sketch the path that England 
followed to eradicate corruption during the preceding 200 years in order to come to grips 
with the issues that prevented African states from doing the same (491, 492). In this work, 
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African countries are depicted as lagging behind their European counterparts in ethical and 
social development. 
From the revisionist perspective, authors such as Samuel Huntington (1968) argue that 
corruption is an inevitable symptom of the process of modernisation and industrialisation. In 
this perspective the prevalence of corruption is bound with different political, social and 
economic realities that are linked with the historical development of specific societies 
(Theobald, 1999: 492). In some cases, it is even argued that corruption has the potential to 
have positive effects on economic development (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). Huntington 
(1968: 68), for example, argues that corruption can play a role in stimulating economic 
activity by bypassing unnecessary regulations and red tape.  
Despite these differences, both the moralists and the revisionists see corruption as a symptom 
of “backwardness”, whether due to political, social or economic circumstances (Brown & 
Cloke, 2004: 280). It is seen as a distinctive trait of “… immature societies who need tutoring 
by those institutions and peoples who had already learned to live by the norms of the modern 
developed state” (2004: 2). The developed states of the western world are depicted as the 
ideal toward which the developing states should aspire. Therefore, whether it has to do with 
social values or economic growth, it is thought that corruption would be systematically 
traversed as states progress through modernisation (280). During this era, corruption was seen 
as a growing pain on the path toward industrialisation and economic growth. 
The revisionist perspective was challenged during the 1970s by authors such as Rose-
Ackerman (1978) and Anne Krueger (1974). These authors argue that corruption is an 
individual choice rather than a structural component in the modernisation process (Farrales, 
2005: 7). From this perspective the act of corruption is seen as a calculated decision made in 
the pursuit of individual benefit (7). Corruption is seen as an economic choice which is 
motivated by the same factors as any other economic choice, personal interest (Bracking, 
2007: 10). In this context, corruption is thought to be driven by the inherently self-interested 
nature of individuals and the existence of rents and incentives catalyses corrupt behaviour 
(10). Furthermore, in contrast to the revisionist perspective, it is argued that corruption has 
primarily negative consequences and it comes at the expense of society as a whole. 
Arguments such as the principal-agent theory and Klitgaard’s corruption equation originated 
from this perspective. According to the principal-agent theory, corruption may occur when 
there are diverging interests between principals and agents (Kurer, 2005: 226). In this 
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conception, corruption takes place when the civil servant betrays the interest of the public in 
pursuit of their own self-interest (226). In other words, corruption may occur when the 
interests of principals and agents are not aligned and when the actions of agents cannot be 
adequately monitored by the principals (Shapiro, 2005: 271). The principal-agent theory 
places emphasis on the “rational choices of individuals” (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 2). 
From this perspective, it is highly likely that agents will engage in corruption if there is 
minimal oversight of their behaviour, if there are sufficient incentives to engage in 
corruption, and if there are minimal risks involved.  
For Klitgaard (2008: 3), corruption is an economic crime and its occurrence depends on 
economic calculations made by the parties involved. Klitgaard (3) explains that “[t]he corrupt 
individual will proceed if the benefit minus the moral cost minus the probability of being 
caught times the expected penalty is greater than zero.” Klitgaard (3) distilled this 
explanation into a formula for corrupt systems: C = M + D – A.  A system is prone to 
corruption (C) when individuals have monopolistic power (M) over specific services or 
goods, as well as the discretion (D) to determine exactly what the payment of the good of 
service will be (3). At the same time, there are no adequate procedures in place to hold 
individuals accountable (A) for their actions (3). In other words, “Corruption equals 
monopoly plus discretion minus accountability” (3). This equation, together with the 
principal-agent theory has been a core component of contemporary anti-corruption discourse 
(Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 2; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 2).  
Other theories contrasting the principal-agent approach have also emerged. The concept of 
patrimonialism has been used to explain the persistent corruption in African politics 
(Bracking, 2007: 8). Patrimonialism was first conceived by the sociologist Max Weber in 
1947 to explain situations where the line between private and public is blurred, non-existent 
or not clearly delineated (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002: 7; Theobald, 1999: 492). In a 
patrimonial system “a government office is treated as a type of income-generating property” 
(Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002: 7). It can be defined as a system of government within 
which state administrative personnel are solely accountable to the political leadership and 
“government jobs are treated as income producing personal assets” (40). Weber contrasted 
this with western “rational-legal systems of public management, characterized by a graded 
hierarchy, written documentation, salaried, full-time staff and political neutrality” (7). 
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In recent times, many developing states have put into place structures that resemble the 
rational-legal state administrations of western countries, but the foundations of this 
administrative system is characterised by patrimonial rule (8). This system of government has 
come to be called “neopatrimonialism” (40). These systems are characterised by 
decentralisation and an informal hierarchy of rules and norms (7). Within many African 
states, neopatrimonialism is not at the periphery of governmental administration; it is at the 
very centre (9). As explained by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (9): “[t]hese hybrid systems 
represent an effort by elites to adjust to and manipulate the rational-legal arrangements they 
inherited from the colonial powers” (9). In this context, corruption forms part of the fabric of 
political governance. It is a day to day occurrence and many individuals partake in corruption 
because there is no alternative. 
This idea that corruption can become embedded within society has led some authors to 
suggest that anti-corruption discourse centred on the principal-agent model is ineffective in 
situations where corruption is widespread and pervasive (Persson, et al., 2013: 450, 458). In 
this context, corruption is a “... qualitatively different problem, embedded in political and 
economic systems in ways that both reflect its impact and help sustain its force” (Johnston, 
1997: 86). In short, the argument goes that when corruption is systemic and it constitutes a 
normal part of life, people may be unwilling or unable to implement reforms or sanctions 
(Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Individuals may not want to report corrupt behaviour if there are 
not adequate whistleblowing procedures in place and if reporting corruption may be riskier 
than engaging in corruption. In other words, it is argued that anti-corruption solutions based 
on the principle-agent theory become ineffective in situations where there are no “principled 
principals” willing to hold corrupt individuals accountable (Persson, et al., 2013: 450).  
The collective action theory has become an alternative approach for dealing with the problem 
of systemic corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Even though the collective action theory 
has been around since 1965, when it was first conceived by Mancur Olson, the topic has only 
recently transitioned into a policy issue relevant for anti-corruption (Pieth, 2012: 9). In 
contrast to the principal-agent theory, the collective action theory does not depict corruption 
as merely a choice made by individuals in pursuit of their own personal and economic 
interest. Rather, collective action theory stresses that corruption occurs within a broader 
context, which may serve to justify or incentivise an individual’s engagement in corrupt 
behaviour (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 3). Marquette and Peiffer explain that: 
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Collective action theory highlights the relevance to individuals’ decisions of group 
dynamics, including trust in others and the (actual or perceived) behaviour of others. 
When corruption is seen as ‘normal’, people may be less willing to abstain from 
corruption or to take the first step in implementing sanctions or reforms. This theory 
highlights the challenges of coordinated anticorruption efforts. 
Anti-corruption measures from a collective action perspective take the form of partnerships 
between private and public actors and “multi-stakeholder initiatives” (Pieth, 2012: 9). It 
entails cooperation and coordination between various state and non-state actors. In other 
words, collective action theory highlights the collective and systemic nature of corruption, 
and it stresses the difficulty of alleviating corruption in societies where norms and values 
reinforce and entrench persistent corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 3). 
To summarise, discourse centred on corruption has evolved and adapted through the passage 
of time. The period from the 1950s to the early 1990s was characterised by numerous 
different approaches, interpretations and definitions. Some of these approaches have areas of 
confluence, while others contrast each other starkly. This made anti-corruption literature 
highly diverse and multifaceted, but it has also had the effect of making the field ambiguous 
and indeterminate. The diversity of the discourse was consolidated during the 1990s with the 
emergence of the anti-corruption industry, as I will demonstrate in section 3.5 of this chapter. 
This consolidation did not, however, result in conceptual refinement. This means that, despite 
the emergence of a more uniform international field centred on corruption, the concept 
remains difficult to clarify and authors are divided on the scope of behaviour included in its 
ambit. The next section is centred on the plurality of the concept of corruption. 
3.3) Conceptual Plurality 
As stated in the previous section, the multifaceted nature of anti-corruption discourse was 
consolidated during the 1990s, when the fight against corruption emerged as a global 
industry. At the core of this consolidation was a refined definition of corruption. As the anti-
corruption industry emerged, a workable definition of corruption was required. This 
definition had to be universal to the extent that it could be applied in a diverse range of states 
and cultural constituencies. Thereby, Joseph Nye’s definition of corruption, which was 
coined in the 1960s, became one of the primary ways in which corruption was understood 
(Farrales, 2005: 17).  
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In his article, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’, Joseph Nye 
(1967: 419) defined corruption as: “... behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private regarding.” This definition is based on three primary 
assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that private versus public interests exist independently and 
are mutually exclusive (Bratsis, 2003: 11). Secondly, it is assumed that public officials can 
only fulfil their role properly if they remove themselves from the private sphere (11). Thirdly, 
it is assumed that corruption primarily comes to the fore in the public sphere. According to 
Bratsis (15) this definition means that:  
Private interests and public interests are both perfectly fine, as long as they stay in 
their proper places. Once we have the contamination of the public by private, 
politicians and politics itself becomes dirty, tainted, infected and thus corrupt. 
It is important to note that Nye’s definition is not the only definition utilised in the anti-
corruption field. According to Farrales (2005: 24, 25), however, this definition has become 
the primary way in which the actors involved in the field define corruption. The majority of 
organisations involved in the field specifically refer to the actions of public figures, 
politicians and bureaucrats when they talk about corruption (Everett, et al., 2006: 3). 
Organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund almost 
exclusively refer to the public sector when they talk about corruption, with corruption 
alleviation efforts firmly grounded in anti-state rhetoric (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 287; Everett, 
et al., 2006: 6, 7). Importantly, however, the consolidation of the anti-corruption discourse 
did not result in a more refined concept. It is indeed the case that the broader discourse 
around the subject moved from plurality to consolidation, but the concept itself has remained 
open-ended. As stated by Johnston (1997: 89):  “Despite the fact that most people, most of 
the time, know corruption when they see it, defining the concept does raise difficult 
theoretical and empirical questions.”   
The concept refers to a host of different behaviours linked to a diverse range of motivations 
and settings. The main types of corruption include bribery, fraud, abuse of power, 
embezzlement, favouritism, nepotism, extortion, misappropriation of funds and insider 
trading (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001: 8; Bracking, 2007: 4). Additional forms of corruption 
include petty, bureaucratic, political, grand, systemic, private-to-public, fiscal and official 
(Everett, et al., 2006: 3). Caiden et al. (2001) even go so far to suggest that there are sixty 
different acts that can be labelled as corrupt.  
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These different acts are linked to different motivations and occur in different situations and 
locations. For example, petty corruption refers to exchange of small amounts of money or 
minor favours (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 102). It would be petty corruption if a police officer 
is bribed to avoid a traffic offence. Grand corruption refers to corruption involving high-
ranking officials and involves large sums of money (102). It is grand corruption, for example, 
when a government official receives a large kickback for the allocation of a tender to a 
specific company. Active corruption refers to the act of offering a bribe, and passive 
corruption involves the act of accepting a bribe (102). These different acts are not only 
associated with financial gain. An individual can engage in corruption without expecting 
financial profit as there can be interpersonal, political or ideological motivations (Brown & 
Cloke, 2004: 282). 
The reported impact of corruption is similarly broad. Corruption is said to have a major 
impact on economic growth and development (Everett, et al., 2006: 1, 2). It is stated that 
corruption has detrimental effects on governmental revenues, governance structures and rule 
of law (3). Corruption is thought to especially affect the “poorest and most marginalised 
sectors of society” (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). It is said that corruption undermines “good 
governance” and it distorts “standards of merit” (Everett, et al., 2006: 3). Some additional 
reported impacts include increased public investment, decreased efficiency of institutions and 
public services, lower quality infrastructure and ineffective public administration (Everett, et 
al., 2006: 3; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). Furthermore, it is argued that corruption “promotes 
the illegal export of resources, encourages conspicuous consumption, and generates distrust” 
(Everett, et al., 2006: 3). Corruption is also said to “breed cynicism” and “criminality” 
(Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). Some authors even suggest that there are illegal, as well as 
legal, forms of corruption. Kaufmann and Vicente (2005: 2) contend that:  
Legal lobbying contributions by the private sector in exchange for passage of 
particular legislation - biased in favour of those agents - or allocation of procurement 
contracts may be regarded as examples of interaction of both private and public sector 
representatives where the second makes use of her publicly invested power at the 
expense of broader public welfare. 
Thus, the concept is linked to a variety of different settings, locations, institutions and 
organisations; all of which have an influence on underlying motivations and eventual impacts 
(Everett, et al., 2006: 5). Much of this plurality can be attributed to the diversity of the 
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discourse leading up to the 1990s. As discussed in section 2.2, when international interest 
was first sparked about corruption in the 1950s and 1960s, there was an influx of new 
theories and arguments. As such the discourse around the subject became highly 
multifaceted, which means that corruption, as a concept, became encumbered referring to an 
endless array of different behaviours. Even though the discourse was consolidated in the 
1990s, the concept has remained indeterminate. This means that contemporary anti-
corruption discourse is characterised by conceptual plurality on the one side and definitional 
uniformity on the other. 
It is these two aspects that have generally attracted the majority of the criticism against anti-
corruption. In the next section these criticisms are highlighted. 
3.4) Corruption, Neoliberalism and Critique 
The criticisms against anti-corruption have generally come in two categories. On the one 
side, the concept is criticised for being overly ambiguous and indeterminate. On the other 
side, critics argue that the reigning definition of corruption is oversimplified and linked to 
normative neoliberal ideology. In the first line of criticism authors such as Brown and Cloke 
(2004: 277) argue that there remains “considerable problems in defining what exactly is 
meant by the term corruption itself.” According to Sampson (2010: 262), corruption is a 
“slippery concept, summarising a whole gamut of attitudes and practices.” Similarly, Everett, 
et al. (2006: 1) contend that the problem of corruption and its solution is very difficult to 
uncover due to the numerous impacts and causes that is found in the literature. Marquette 
(1999: 1215) echoes this position and argues that “no matter how many times it is prodded, 
poked at or pulled apart, more questions than answers seem to arise from the literature”. For 
Everett, et al. (2006: 1) something that adds further complexity to the already over saturated 
discourse is the fact that “the ethical dispositions of those working in the anticorruption field 
are complex, sometimes contradictory, and often hidden.” This means that the concept is used 
in a variety of different contexts and is linked to a variety of different behaviours.  
This has indeed been cited as a significant problem for the anti-corruption field. Conceptual 
ambiguity is not merely a peripheral issue; different interpretations of the problem have 
fundamental implications for the eventual outcomes of research projects, as well as the 
impact of alleviation efforts (Kurer, 2005: 222). For Brown and Cloke (2004: 282), the 
indeterminate nature of the concept has meant that it is used “as a basic descriptor for a 
myriad of behaviours loosely linked by some sense of breaking laws, illicit personal 
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enrichment or the abuse of power/privilege.” According to Sampson (2010: 266) this has 
made corruption a phenomenon which is immensely difficult to measure, record, research and 
document accurately. 
According to Everett, et al. (2006: 7) this ambiguity enables different groups to problematise 
various different phenomena in different ways. The concept has thus become a “free-floating 
signifier”, with different definitions and solutions being pushed by different groups motivated 
by preferred outcomes rather than the reduction of corruption (7). In other words, the 
plurality of the concept has enabled different individuals, organisations and activists to 
characterise the problem in a very interest specific manner, and to further their specific goals.  
In the second line of criticism, critics claim that the drive to fight corruption is a direct 
extension of western neoliberal norms and values and that the anti-corruption field takes the 
promotion of market economics at face value. Indeed, many of the anti-corruption initiatives 
that have been implemented since the early 1990s have direct ties to neoliberal theory 
(Ivanov, 2007: 28). With the emergence of the second wave of anti-corruption discourse, and 
the establishment of an industry dedicated to fighting corruption, the discourse centred on the 
subject became consolidated around Nye’s definition of corruption. It is the fact that this 
consolidation occurred on the basis of a neoliberal definition of corruption that has attracted 
the majority of the criticism against the industry.  
Bratsis (2003: 17), for example, argues that the contemporary anti-corruption discourse takes 
the division between the private sphere and the public sphere “as a quality immanent in all 
societies” (Bratsis: 2003: 17). This division between the public sphere and the private sphere 
is, however, a characteristic element of the historical development of western states, which 
means that it stems from cultural and societal norms (Brown & Cloke, 2004; Bukovansky, 
2006: 183; De Maria, 2010: 117; Robbins, 2000: 425). Critics argue that this normative 
dimension is not taken into account by the reigning internationally focused anti-corruption 
discourse (Bukovansky, 2006: 183; De Maria, 2010: 117; Brown & Cloke, 2004).  
For Bukovansky (2006: 183, 184), the fact that the normative component is negated allows 
anti-corruption activists to evade key questions around the ethicality of the fight against 
corruption and therefore the “… ends of modernity, particularly economic growth and a 
governing structure that maximizes individual rights, are taken as given and unproblematic.” 
For De Maria (2010: 118, 119), corruption is targeted “not so much for the injustices it 
extracts from ordinary people, but for the structural problems it could cause private 
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investment.” For Brown and Cloke (2004: 282) the increased interest in anti-corruption has 
originated from the “development mainstream which unthinkingly accepts the neoliberal 
mantra of pursuing liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as goals in their own right, 
despite mounting evidence of their role in accentuating the opportunities for corruption.” 
Brown and Cloke (285) continue to state that the contemporary approach is “limited to 
explaining how the activities of public servants distort the efficient functioning of markets.” 
Similarly, De Maria (2010: 119) criticises anti-corruption as part of the strategy of Western 
donors to facilitate democratisation, as well as economic liberalisation. These arguments 
against anti-corruption have led authors such as Bracking (2007: 3) to assert that the 
campaign against corruption may very well be “one of the final episodes in a redundant 
development intervention paradigm, illustrating as it does the weaknesses in conception, 
delivery, resources and context that accompany the expert-led, sanitised, technocratic and 
medicalised view of the development subject and process.”  
For Bukovansky (2006: 182), it is important, however, to consider the manner in which the 
contemporary fight against corruption has been framed. The international anti-corruption 
consensus evokes an explicit appeal to the “moral underpinnings” of a successful market 
economy (182, 183). Anti-corruption is promoted as a “global moral project” (Sampson, 
2010: 265). The prevalence of corruption elicits widespread moral condemnation from 
international actors and the solutions proposed are not merely justified for their potential 
economic gains, but also for the inherent ethicality that is attached to the fight against 
corruption. This makes the fight against corruption different in the sense that neoliberal 
economics is promoted not only for its functionality and utility, but also for its intrinsic 
morality.  
This explicit appeal to the ethicality of market economics is illustrated by the manner in 
which organisations such as Transparency International and the World Bank have 
characterised the problem. Arguably one of the best examples is the manner in which the 
previous World Bank president, James Wolfenson, focused the world’s attention on the 
“cancer” of corruption and revealed the widespread consequences it has on economic growth 
and development (De Speville, 2010: 49). More recently a similar argument was echoed by 
the current World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, who stated that: “In the developing world, 
corruption is public enemy number one” (World Bank, 2013). At the 2016 Anti-Corruption 
Summit, Mr Kim also cited the “zero tolerance” that the World Bank has for corruption, and 
he called for more cooperation to address the “scourge of corruption” (World Bank, 2016). 
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Similarly, Transparency International refers specifically to moral aspects of the fight against 
corruption in its strategies to counter corruption (Gebel, 2012). The organisation defines 
ethics as “[b]ased on core values, a set of standards for conduct in government, companies 
and society that guides decisions, choices and actions” and integrity as compliance with 
“relevant national laws” and ethical standards (Gebel, 2012: 114). For Transparency 
International, ethics is nothing more than compliance with a certain set of laws and standards. 
In other words, Transparency International’s conception of human nature frames morality and 
integrity in terms of rules and rule following behaviour (Gebel, 2012).   
On the basis of the above, one could argue that within organisations such as Transparency 
International and the World Bank, human nature is defined as mechanistic, rational and self-
interested (Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). Corruption is taken as a 
technocratic problem which can be eradicated though the implementation of “toolkits” 
formulated along the line of “one-size-fits-all” approaches (Bratsis, 2006: 29; Persson, et al., 
2013: 451). In this context, corruption is seen as something that can be solved by establishing 
disincentives for corrupt behaviour (Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). The 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have anti-corruption strategies 
centred on economic growth, structural adjustment, efficiency and the promotion of 
individual “economic rights and freedoms” (Everett, et al., 2006: 6). In this context, fighting 
corruption is about institutional reforms and the establishment of rules, economic policies, 
laws and codes of behaviour, as well as oversight mechanisms, in order to ensure compliance 
(Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). The goal is to increase the risk of, and 
penalty for, engaging in corrupt behaviour. The solution to the problem of corruption is 
thought to lie in proper management and proper governance (Bratsis, 2006: 29). In this way, 
it is thought that the “public interest could be realized” if greed is kept in check through the 
implementation of specific policies and procedures (29).  
Thus, despite the specific moral undertones that characterises anti-corruption discourse, the 
neutral language of economics is used to understand the issue at hand and to formulate 
solutions (Bukovansky, 2006: 183). This means that there is an ahistorical understanding of 
political phenomena built into the contemporary conception of corruption (Bratsis: 2003: 17). 
Furthermore, the fight against corruption is promoted as a universally applicable, impartial 
and apolitical project (17). The contradiction here is that technical economic centric solutions 
are promoted on the basis that these are tied to the morally acceptable solutions of fairness, 
equality and individual freedom, whilst simultaneously avoiding the ethical and political 
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dimensions of corruption. These solutions, whether they have to do with privatisation or 
democratisation, are all “underpinned by one or more ethical perspectives, whether the 
adherents of these solutions are aware of this or not” (Everett, et al., 2006: 9). This means 
that normative neoliberal ideals are used to legitimise the fight against corruption, but that the 
same attention to normative factors is not given to the societal and cultural characteristics of 
the countries within which anti-corruption initiatives are implemented.  
In other words, the fight against corruption is caught in a paradox. On the one side, 
corruption is labelled as a universal malady; a global moral problem. This elicits widespread 
moral condemnation from activists, economists and politicians alike (Brown & Cloke, 2004; 
De Maria, 2010). On the other side, corruption is defined as a normatively neutral concept 
and its solution is perceived to lie in structural adjustment and economic liberalisation. It is 
for this reason that critics argue that the international consensus on corruption does not allow 
for the incorporation of complexities that emerge from different cultural, political and social 
circumstances (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289; De Maria, 2010: 117). For Bratsis (2003: 17), 
this makes it all but impossible for the socially embedded characteristics of the concept to be 
taken into account, and there is very little space to consider the multifaceted way in which 
corruption can manifest within different local contexts.  
As argued by Ivanov (2007: 28) there is a gap between “global and local discourses”, which 
anti-corruption activists and NGOs have “struggled to bridge.” For Brown and Cloke (2004: 
280): 
There is precious little recognition of the complexity of the formation of regional and 
national political cultures, the importance of the interactions between the global and 
the local and, in particular, of the continuing role of strategic interests in determining 
what and who are labelled as corrupt. 
Bracking (2007) also follows this line of criticism and argues that the failure to bridge the gap 
between local and international perspectives has led to the establishment of an interventionist 
paradigm which has seen the dissemination of policies, ideologies and governance structures 
from western states to the rest of the world. Any approach that takes the debate closer toward 
a more variable and responsive interpretation is side-lined for the more simplified economic 
centric understandings (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 285). This causes an ethical problem which is 
related to the imposition of normative standards on cultures and societies that played no role 
in the formation of those standards (Bukovansky, 2006: 184). Furthermore, for Bukovansky 
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(184), the avoidance of this problem not only has moral ramifications, but also raises 
questions regarding the legitimacy of standards that are externally imposed. As stated by 
Bukovansky (184): “… a standard must be embraced as right or fair by a social actor to be 
considered legitimate.” It is unlikely that standards without local legitimacy will be 
effectively enforced and implemented (184).  
There are clear similarities between contemporary anti-corruption discourse and the debates 
that raged in the 1950s and 1960s. There remains a tendency to promote western states as the 
ideal form of political and economic progress, despite the fact that the development of 
western states is generally recognised as inimitable (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). This 
tendency to promote western states as the “pinnacle of political development” stems from the 
unerring drive to search for universal solutions (280). For this reason, uniform and 
standardised anti-corruption measures are implemented in countries as diverse as Nigeria and 
Bulgaria, regardless of the fact that these countries are characterised by fundamentally 
different socio-political circumstances (Ivanov, 2007: 28). For Bratsis (2003: 18) this search 
for universal solutions is fuelled by the belief that: 
The public and private are essential attributes of human societies, that political 
development and advancement entail the realization of this fact and the formation of 
institutions, laws, and attitudes that end the systematic corruption prevalent in these 
underdeveloped societies. 
It is in this sense that the fight against corruption has been criticised as a global effort to 
stigmatise legal and economic policies of non-western states rather than an attempt to solve a 
global problem (Kennedy, 1999: 465). Kennedy (465) emphasises that the anti-corruption 
field: 
Even at its most reasonable core remains an ideological project, an effort to leverage 
the rhetorical advantages of a shared moral opprobrium for a series of specific legal or 
institutional changes without having to specify who will win and who will lose as a 
consequence. 
As shown by the preceding discussion, the criticisms against the anti-corruption industry 
have primarily characterised the fight against corruption as an endeavour to propagate and 
globalise western norms and values, centred on the ideological separation between private 
and public life. Criticisms have also been levelled at the ambiguity of the concept and the 
way in which it can be used as a catch all variable by different parties with their specific 
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interests in mind. The problem with these criticisms, however, is that anti-corruption is 
condemned either for being too ambiguous or too focused. If, for example, local cultural 
characteristics is incorporated into mainstream neoliberal anti-corruption discourse, the field 
will undoubtedly become saturated with a diverse range of perspectives and theories. This 
will only serve to increase the ambiguity of the literature. On the other side, for the ambiguity 
surrounding corruption to be reduced, one would inevitably require a definition that is broad 
enough to be applicable in different contexts, but also focused enough for it to be useful in 
the implementation of anti-corruption programmes. Such a definition, especially for a 
contentious issue like corruption, will inevitably have ties to social norms and values. In other 
words, just as contemporary anti-corruption discourse seems unable to bridge the gap 
between its universalising dialogue and local contexts, so too there is an uneasy balance 
between anti-corruption criticisms that centre on oversimplification on the one side, and too 
much ambiguity on the other. 
The social anthropologist, Steven Sampson (2010), has taken a novel approach to this issue. 
Instead of criticising anti-corruption as the result of neo-liberalisation, or characterising 
failure in the alleviation of corruption as the result of an indeterminate concept, Sampson 
(2010) analyses the manner in which the fight against corruption transformed from a 
relatively obscure and peripheral movement in the early 1990s into a globally entrenched 
agenda with its own array of consolidated discourses and practices. This is discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
3.5) The Anti-Corruption Industry: From grassroots concern to global 
movement 
The arguments and criticisms that have been discussed in the preceding section all point 
toward some general questions around the viability of the fight against corruption. The anti-
corruption industry has shown a very real aptitude for continued expansion, despite the 
problems that it has been confronted with. Furthermore, the field has withstood some 
substantial criticisms; criticisms that are mainly centred on the field’s links to neoliberal 
discourse, the conceptual ambiguity that characterises the literature, as well as the lack of 
success in the alleviation of corruption. 
This leads one to question the reason behind the anti-corruption industry’s influence and 
legitimacy despite its continued failure to address the global prevalence of corruption. What 
are the factors that have enabled anti-corruption to develop so rapidly into a globally 
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entrenched movement? Why have international actors been allowed to promote anti-
corruption as an unbiased drive to fight a universal malady, when corruption is so clearly a 
normative concept? Why has the discourse centred on the topic multiplied and dispersed at 
such a prolific rate since the 1990s despite the fact that the core arguments employed today 
have an uncanny resemblance to the ones of the 1950s and 1960s?  
Steven Sampson (2010) has gone some way to answer a number of these questions. Sampson 
provides important insights into the characteristics of contemporary anti-corruption, and he 
has opened up a previously unanalysed avenue of critical anti-corruption analysis. For 
Sampson, the fight against corruption has become a homogenised and self-sustaining 
industry. This industry justifies and legitimises its own policies and practices and it can 
seemingly coexist with corruption without having an impact on its prevalence (Sampson, 
2010). In the context to the other perspectives offered, Sampson moves one step further in his 
critical analysis of corruption in order to come to grips with the successful growth and 
expansion of the fight against corruption. For Sampson, the key question does not concern the 
reason for anti-corruption’s apparent failure to reach its objective; rather, one should ask what 
the institutionalisation of the fight against corruption means for the actual alleviation of 
corruption. The goal in this section is to provide a brief overview of Sampson’s argument.  
Sampson provides a framework for what he calls a “generic industry”. This framework 
stipulates some of the steps that international movements have gone through before these 
became industrialised on the global political landscape. One can trace similar developments 
in other industries such as the development industry, the human rights industry and more 
recently the climate change industry (Sampson, 2010: 263). Sampson does not posit that this 
framework is universally applicable, but it nonetheless offers some valuable insights into the 
transformation of the fight against corruption from relative obscurity in the early 1990s into a 
globally entrenched movement not much more than a decade later. 
Firstly, Sampson (268) argues that there has to be an expressed “grassroots concern” about a 
specific issue and it has to be on the agenda of a number of actors. As the actors involved 
engage in advocacy work, lobbying and raising awareness the issue starts to gain more and 
more international traction (268). As a consequence, a multitude of initiatives emerge and 
frameworks are established (268). Sampson (265) argues that there came a point in the 1990s, 
when corruption was revealed as one of the primary global developmental issues (265). This 
resulted in an eruption of anti-corruption discourse, which was followed by wide ranging 
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declarations, commitments and agreements (Naím, 1995: 1; Sampson, 2010: 268). As a 
result, statements were made, conventions established, monitoring coalitions were set up and 
civil society became involved (268). 
As the issue becomes elevated on the international agenda, influential international 
institutions and organisations start to weigh in and publicly express their concerns and 
reservations. With regards to corruption, a good example is the manner in which the World 
Bank became involved in the field following James Wolfensohn’s now famous ‘cancer of 
corruption’ speech (De Speville, 2010: 49; Wanless, 2013: 39). The World Bank was 
followed by a number of other international organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the United Nations. Following the entry of international organisations, partnerships 
are formed between agencies, NGOs, civil society groups and companies (Sampson, 2010: 
266). These different actors work to form international strategies and plans of action with the 
goal of expanding the field and getting more and more actors involved (266). Organisations 
start to promote their own strategies and actors are encouraged to follow a ‘zero tolerance’ 
approach (272). Organisations such as the United Nations establish global conventions in an 
attempt to universalise the agenda. For example, the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) quickly expanded since its inception in 2006 and already has 140 
countries as signatories (UNODC, 2014b). 
As more and more actors become involved, the agenda starts to attract its own budget line 
(Sampson, 2010: 268). The agenda thereby becomes self-sustaining as more resources are 
made available for the implementation of programmes and procedures (268). The influx of 
resources is followed by the entry of secondary actors, such as aid agencies and consultancies 
with their own perspectives and agendas (268). Anti-corruption, for example, grew to a 
multibillion dollar field in the space of a decade and the number of active anti-corruption 
practitioners ballooned from approximately 250 in the early 1990s to more than 45 000 by 
2009 (Michael & Bowser, 2009: 1, 5). The flood of new actors and resources allows the field 
to enter into previously unexplored areas and sectors (Sampson, 2010: 268). With regards to 
corruption, new areas include corruption and crime, corruption and security, corruption and 
healthcare, corruption and climate change, corruption and sport, and corruption and education 
(Sampson, 2010: 268; Transparency International, 2016a).  
As this agenda becomes more formalised a “corpus of key texts emerges” (Sampson, 2010: 
268). These texts constitute the foundation of discourse centred on the subject (269). The 
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emphasis is on providing simplified definitions, highlighting best practices, as well as 
elaborating on the best measures for the quantification of the problem (269). These texts 
serve to consolidate the different theories centred on the subject into a more unified 
knowledge regime, with standardised concepts and solutions (270). An example is the 
Transparency International Plain Language Guide. According to Transparency International 
(2009), the guide offers “a set of standardised, easy-to-understand definitions.” It is in this 
way that the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse, centred on the neoliberal definition, 
took place in the 1990s. 
The emergence of uniform definitions go hand in hand with the establishment of resource 
centres and databases with the aim of making relevant information readily available. In recent 
times, a multitude of resource centres have emerged, including the U4 Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre, The International Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, the Global 
Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre and the Ethical Alliance Resource Centre. These 
centres provide anti-corruption activists with access to research, publications, training 
services and consultancy services. In this way, uniform tool-kits and best practices are easily 
accessible to any individual interested in engaging with the field (Sampson, 2010: 270). 
Thereby the field becomes saturated by technocratic arguments, standardised classifications 
and a one-size-fits-all approach (Persson, et al., 2013: 451). 
Together with the establishment of standardised toolkits and definitions, is the emergence of 
global comparative and monitoring mechanisms (Sampson, 2010: 269). Since the 1990s, 
numerous indexes have emerged measuring and comparing the global levels of a variety of 
issues, including transformation, development, democracy and political freedom. The 
Freedom House Index, for example, analyses individual countries in the areas of political 
rights and civil liberties, including the efficacy of the electoral process, the extent of political 
participation, the functioning of government, freedom of expression, as well as rule of law 
(Freedom House, 2016). The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) evaluates 
more than a 120 developing states on the quality of political management, market economics 
and democracy (Transformation Index BTI, 2016). There is also the Global Competitiveness 
Index, the Human Development Index and the Press Freedom Index. With regards to 
corruption, Transparency International publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on 
an annual basis (Sampson, 2010: 269). The CPI measures the “perceived levels of public 
sector corruption” in 167 countries globally (Transparency International, 2016b). 
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For Sampson (2010: 271), one of the final signs that an industry has become entrenched is 
that an “academic critique” emerges, questioning the effectiveness of its programmes, its 
applicability and “political correctness”. Some of these criticisms have been highlighted in 
section 2.4. For Sampson (271), however, these criticisms have had “little impact on the 
evolution of the anti-corruption industry.” On the contrary, criticisms seem to unite anti-
corruption activists in their response. The resulting effect is that it has become more and more 
difficult to formulate a position that stands against anti-corruption without being perceived as 
justifying its widespread prevalence and thereby belittling the grievous impact that corruption 
has had globally. According to Polzer (2001: 5), arguing that “… the discourses about 
fighting corruption are partial, biased or even self-serving runs the risk of appearing to say 
that corruption is not really as damaging as it is portrayed.” 
The different debates, criticisms and arguments surrounding anti-corruption thereby serve to 
“consolidate the anti-corruption industry” (Sampson, 2010: 262). In this way, the fact that the 
concept remains highly indeterminate becomes “hidden as the industry emerges” (266). As 
explained by Kennedy (1999: 455):  
However difficult it might be to define corruption, in polite society one must be 
opposed to it. Opposition to corruption, much like opposition to terrorism or genocide 
or weapons of mass destruction, seems to unite the international class of 
commentators. 
The fact that the indeterminate nature of the concept is often overlooked makes it immensely 
difficult to evaluate and quantify the actual impact of anti-corruption initiatives. For Sampson 
(2010: 276), this means that: 
A well-organised programme, with many events, reports, coalitions formed and 
training modules conducted, with the setting up of action plans, formulation of anti-
corruption strategies and self-evaluations, such a programme will be considered 
‘successful’ even though ‘reduction of corruption’ itself will be next to impossible to 
measure over the short term. 
In other words, determining the success or failure of anti-corruption initiatives does not 
necessarily rely on reducing the levels of corruption. Anti-corruption initiatives can be 
deemed successful even if it is very difficult to gauge their actual impact on the prevalence of 
corruption. The quantification of the phenomenon through global indices, the technical 
specialisation in the field, the immense dispersal of discourse on the subject, the involvement 
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of influential global actors, as well as the involvement of countless secondary NGOs, 
consultancies and activists are all key factors that serve to entrench the agenda against 
corruption on the global political landscape. These factors have played an important role in 
the transformation of what was nothing more than a movement in the early 1990s, into a 
specialised field filled with technocratic experts, professional analysts, consultants and 
activists (269). All the different specialists and organisations involved “coordinate with each 
other, harmonising their terminologies, statistical categories, understandings and view of 
appropriate solutions” (269). Thereby, there is convergence around the “conventional” 
approaches and definitions (269). In this way, any alternative perspectives are marginalised 
and dispelled as “unprofessional” or “confrontational” (277).  
As a result, the mainstream understanding of corruption is entrenched and other approaches 
are stigmatised (277). In so doing, the discourse, programmes and interests that define the 
fight against corruption has gained an existence which is divorced from the problem of 
corruption (262). In the words of Sampson (266), the “vibrant anti-corruption industry seems 
to lead a life of its own.” The industry facilitates its own expansion and it justifies its own 
theories and practices. 
3.6) Conclusion 
The goal in this chapter was to provide a genealogical account of the manner in which anti-
corruption discourse has evolved over the past 60 years, but also to highlight the main 
criticisms that have been levelled against the industry. The first wave of anti-corruption 
discourse was in the 1950s when the attention of the international community was turned to 
the widespread reported corruption in newly democratised states. This sparked immense 
academic interest in the subject and new theories and arguments came to life. As such the 
discourse around the subject became highly multifaceted, which meant that corruption, as a 
concept, became encumbered referring to an endless array of different behaviours linked to 
different settings and different motivations. The plurality of the discourse was consolidated in 
the 1990s with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. Importantly, however, the 
consolidation of the discourse did not result in conceptual refinement. The concept remains 
ambiguous and includes a host of different behaviours linked to different motivations and 
situations. This means that contemporary anti-corruption discourse is characterised by 
conceptual plurality on the one side and definitional uniformity on the other.  
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It is this aspect that has created a schism between critics who have either argued against 
conceptual ambiguity or against the simplicity and normativity of the neoliberal definition of 
corruption. The criticisms noted in this chapter do, however, point out some of the 
shortcomings of the fight against corruption, even if none have had a particular impact on the 
development of the industry. The anti-corruption industry seems to echo the arguments of the 
1950s in justifying interventionist methods to address governance reform and facilitate 
development. One can see the same tendency of legitimising the fight against corruption from 
a moral basis, and of depicting the western world as the ideal toward which developing states 
should aspire. The solutions proposed are, however, framed in, what is purported to be, a 
normatively neutral manner. This has allowed different parties to pursue interest-specific or 
ideological objectives under the pretext that these objectives are tied to the value-free fight 
against a global problem. This means that anti-corruption is a globalised moralising 
endeavour that presents itself as an apolitical project in search of solutions to a seemingly 
collective global malady. Importantly, as illustrated by Sampson’s argument, the anti-
corruption industry has the influence to legitimise this approach on the arena of global 
politics and to keep expanding despite its contradictions and despite its shortcomings.  
The lack of success of the criticisms against the industry is not due to the fact that these 
criticisms are unfounded or ill-conceived, but because anti-corruption as an industry has 
become entrenched and consolidated in the arena of global politics to the extent that it can 
drum out opposing voices by its sheer size and influence. Therefore, the plurality of the 
concept becomes an insignificant issue in the light of the countless articles stressing the 
important new areas that need to be addressed and the new forms of corruption that hamper 
developmental progress. In this sense, local and variable definitions and interpretations are 
overlooked not only due to the endless search for universal solutions, but also because of the 
need to promote a uniform and workable definition that can be used globally. 
All in all, Sampson has evaluated the fight against corruption from a new perspective, which 
has brought into perspective the lack of impact that the primary criticisms have had, as well 
as the manner in which the discourse was consolidated through the emergence of the anti-
corruption industry. The next chapter enters into the space opened up by Sampson. There are 
only a handful of authors that have analysed the anti-corruption industry on the basis of 
Foucault’s work. The goal is to contribute to the anti-corruption debate by analysing the role 
that the anti-corruption industry plays in the sphere of international governance, with a 
specific emphasis on the role of international organisations. Analysing the anti-corruption 
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industry from a Foucauldian perspective allows one to investigate the role played by 
knowledge and power in the operation, legitimisation and expansion of the anti-corruption 
industry. Additionally, Foucault’s work allows one to investigate the manner in which the 
processes and practices that stem from the industry have been localised on the individual 
subject.  
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Chapter 4: The role of the Anti-corruption Industry in International 
Governance 
4.1) Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, investigating corruption from the perspective of the 
historian of thought entails evaluating the manner in which anti-corruption discourse has 
evolved, adapted and transformed over the past sixty years. Additionally, however, taking 
this perspective involves uncovering the role that the relations of power play in the anti-
corruption industry. Sampson (2010) provides a good explanation of how the fight against 
corruption became industrialised on the international scene, following the eruption of anti-
corruption discourse in the 1990s. His explanation also provides a good framework for 
understanding the continued expansion of this industry, despite the multiple criticisms that 
have emerged and despite the lack of success in the alleviation of corruption. Some pertinent 
questions still remain unanswered, however. If corruption is a timeless, universal problem, 
why was it only in the 1990s that an international movement was established to combat its 
prevalence? What are the factors that accounted for the consolidation of the anti-corruption 
discourse? Why was it only during the mid-1990s that international financial institutions 
became involved in fighting the prevalence of corruption? More importantly, what role does 
the anti-corruption industry play in the realm of international governance and in the 
administration of states?  
The objective in this chapter is to utilise Foucault’s work in analysing the role that the anti-
corruption industry plays in the governance of contemporary societies. This analysis involves 
uncovering the manner in which corruption was transformed into a quantifiable object of 
study within social scientific discourse, as well as the role played by power in the institutional 
arrangements that were subsequently implemented. This entails analysing how anti-
corruption discourses and practices link up with Foucault’s notions of power, discipline, 
governmentality and the three modes of objectification. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 4.2 consists of two subsections and 
is centred on the factors that allowed for the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse 
around a central understanding of corruption in the 1990s. This involves discussing the 
manner in which anti-corruption discourse became more quantified and economic centric, as 
well as the way in which international financial institutions altered their conception of 
corruption on the back of this quantification. In short, this section draws parallels between 
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Foucault’s first mode of objectification, which is centred on the social sciences, and the 
construction of corruption as a problem of economics.  
Section 4.3 consists of two subsections, and analyses the links between the anti-corruption 
industry and Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power and governmentality. The 
consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s and the transformation of corruption 
into a problem of economics had an impact on the governance of the international realm and 
on the administration of states. The objective in this section is to unpack this impact and how 
it relates to Foucault’s understanding of power.  
4.2) The Social Science of Anti-corruption 
4.2.1) The quantification of corruption 
The objective in this section is to illustrate how corruption was transformed into a 
quantifiable concept in the 1990s. As discussed in the previous chapter, anti-corruption 
discourse has evolved and adapted over time. The development of this discourse is 
characterised by two waves; the first starting roughly in the 1950s and the second in the 
1990s. During the first wave, anti-corruption discourse proliferated and expanded as 
numerous academics entered into the field. The discourse became broad in scope with a 
variety of different perspectives and theories. In contrast, the second wave of anti-corruption 
discourse was characterised by consolidation. With the establishment of the anti-corruption 
industry, and the entry of international organisations into the field, the international 
consensus regarding corruption was entrenched. As such, during the second wave of anti-
corruption discourse, corruption became a public sector problem which was viewed as having 
a detrimental impact on economic growth.  
Before international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF could get 
involved in the anti-corruption industry, however, corruption had to be a quantifiable 
concept. One had to be able to measure its global prevalence, and one had to be able to 
quantitatively analyse its impact on economic growth. To this end, the establishment of 
Transparency International and its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) left a permanent mark 
on the anti-corruption industry (Ivanov, 2007: 32). The CPI played a fundamental role in 
vitalising the anti-corruption agenda during the 1990s (Galtung, 2006: 106).   
The CPI was first launched in 1995 and it is an index that ranks the perceived prevalence of 
corruption in 167 countries globally (Transparency International, 2016b). Bukovansky (2006: 
193) explains that the CPI “is a poll of polls which gathers information on perceptions from 
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polls conducted by various research institutes.” The methodology of CPI is based specifically 
on the perception of corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2015: 1). 
The figure below shows the result of the 2015 CPI. Countries are rated on a scale from 0 to a 
100, with 100 being ‘very clean’ and 0 ‘very corrupt’ (Transparency International, 2016b). 
 
FIGURE 4.1: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015 
Up until the early 1990s, the global levels of corruption was not gauged within a statistical 
framework to the extent of the CPI. With the advent of the CPI, however, individual countries 
could now be benchmarked and ranked from the most to the least corrupt (Sampson, 2010: 
274). CPI was the first uniform international scale which allowed for the comparison of 
different levels of corruption in different countries (Galtung, 2006: 108). This stimulated 
international dialogue concerning the global ramifications of corruption and generated 
competition in the developing world to improve performance on the index (106-108). 
Importantly, statistical surveys such as Transparency International’s CPI created a space of 
intelligibility that supported reigning definitions of governance and corruption, while 
simultaneously punishing non-conformity (Bracken, 2007: 14). According to Ivanov (2007: 
28), economists “seized on such quantifications” to perform “regressions showing that 
corruption obstructs growth, exacerbates inequality, and expands the unofficial economy.”  
Based on the six different corruption perception indices, including the CPI, Gupta, Davoodi 
and Alonso-Terme (1998: 29) conducted a cross-country regression analysis and found that 
high levels of corruption has a negative impact on poverty and income equality by “reducing 
economic growth, the progressivity of the tax system, the level and effectiveness of social 
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spending, and the formation of human capital.” Gupta et al. (1998: 29) also found that 
corruption has a direct impact on poverty and income inequality by exacerbating unequal 
educational opportunities and “perpetuating unequal distribution of asset ownership.” 
According to Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003: 9), a World Bank (2000: 169) study 
found that:  
When Gini coefficients for income per capita (measures of income inequality) were 
graphed against the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), lower levels of corruption were seen to be statistically associated with lower 
levels of income inequality. 
Chetwynd et al. (2003: 3) argue that corruption hampers domestic and foreign investment, 
limits tax income, strains entrepreneurship, negatively impacts infrastructure projects, and 
distorts the “composition of public expenditure.” Economists also found that there is more 
corruption in countries which “restrict the freedom of international trade” and that corruption 
obstructs growth, worsens inequality and fosters the expansion of the informal economy 
(Ades & Tella, 1994; Mauro, 1995; Gupta et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000).  
Figure 4.2 below is from a study conducted by Shao, Plamen, Podobnik and Stanley (2007) to 
show the direct quantitative relation between GDP per capita and performance on the CPI 
from 2001 to 2005 (Shao et al., 2007: 159, 160). Graphs (a) to (e) show the comparison 
between GDP per Capita and performance on the CPI from 2001 to 2005 and graph (f) shows 
the comparison between GDP per capita and the World Bank Control of Corruption Index 
(CCI). This figure illustrates the manner in which economists and analysts use the CPI to 
quantitatively illustrate the correlation between economic growth and corruption (Chetwynd 
et al., 2003: 3).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 76 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2 (SHAO ET AL., 2007: 157) 
Following the success of the CPI, perception based indices became important tools in 
“projecting economic growth, estimating the effectiveness of the government administration, 
making decisions for strategic investment, and forming international policies” (Shao et al., 
2007: 157). The impact of CPI on investment can be seen in figure 4.3 below, which shows 
the correlation between performance on the CPI and direct investments per capita in US 
dollars received from the United States during 2004 (164). This correlation indicates that CPI 
became more than a mere analytical tool to measure the impact of corruption on economic 
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growth. The prevalence of perceived corruption also has a direct impact on foreign 
investment. 
 
FIGURE 4.3 (SHAO ET AL., 2007: 164). 
It is very important to emphasise the significance of the quantifiable connection that was 
made between corruption and economic growth. The quantification of corruption through the 
CPI ushered in a fundamental change in the manner in which international financial 
institutions approached corruption. Before the advent of CPI, there was never an 
internationally accepted statistical framework allowing for the analysis of the correlation 
between corruption and economic factors. Furthermore, it was only once this economic 
connection was empirically illustrated that organisations such as the World Bank could 
incorporate it into their discourse (Polzer, 2001: 10). Once this was possible, the way was 
open for the World Bank and the IMF to amend their discourse around the subject and 
thereby open the path to enter into the anti-corruption debate.  
It is important to note that the objective here is not to question the validity or accuracy of the 
economic studies into the relations between the CPI and economic growth. The point is also 
not to assess whether or not corruption has economic ramifications. Rather, the goal is to 
unpack what this quantification has meant for the industry and how it allowed international 
financial institutions to change their discourse and thereby alter the trajectory of their 
involvement in the anti-corruption industry. It was the transformation of corruption into an 
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economic problem that allowed for the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the 
1990s. This led to the appropriation of Nye’s definition of corruption by the primary actors 
involved in the industry, as discussed in chapter 3.  
There are direct parallels that can be drawn between the consolidation of anti-corruption 
discourse in the 1990s and Foucault’s analyses of the discourses centred on sexuality of the 
18th century. According to Foucault (1976: 17, 18) there was a “veritable discursive 
explosion” of discourse centred on sex in the eighteenth century (17, 18). The proliferation of 
sex as an issue of public interest went together with the emergence of a multitude of different 
policies and institutional procedures (33). Over time, these discourses became formalised and 
codified within specific social scientific disciplines such as demography, medicine, biology 
and psychology (33). As these disciplines became consolidated, more and more conditions 
and maladies were discovered (43). Novel sexualities and abnormalities emerged as 
psychologists and academics grappled with newfound problems and anomalies. Many of 
these conditions have long since fallen out of medical knowledge. Importantly, however, 
during the time period these conditions were seen as very real medical problems diagnosed in 
accordance with reigning social scientific disciplines and procedures. These conditions called 
for the appropriate medical or psychological treatment. As such, through the immense 
proliferation of discourse, sex was ‘constructed’ as a problem of medicine and social science 
during the 18th and 19th centuries (105, 106).  
The ramifications of this construction was not limited to academic discourse alone. The 
construction of sex had a very real impact on societies and individuals. The discourse called 
for institutional changes. Processes and policies had to be implemented. Governmental 
departments became involved and played a role in isolating individuals found to be 
maladjusted. The link between social scientific discourse centred on sex and governmental 
procedures made the drive to fix the societal problem of sex a power-infused political project. 
Behaviour that was previously seen as transgressions of norms, laws or religious rules were 
now seen as symptoms of underlying medical or psychological conditions, perversions or 
diseases (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173). These classifications were consolidated and 
entrenched in reigning social scientific discourses, as well as medical and institutional 
practices. As such, sexual variance became abnormality and divergence became disease. In 
Foucault’s understanding, the phenomenon of sex is a “historical fiction” which serves as a 
link between normative practices of power and the biological sciences (179). 
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If one looks at anti-corruption discourse from this perspective, it is evident that there are clear 
similarities between the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse and the emergence of 
social scientific discourses centred on sexuality. There was an “eruption” of anti-corruption 
discourse in the 1990s and corruption quickly became a central issue on the global 
development agenda (Naím, 1995: 1; Bukovansky, 2006: 181). Similar to the discourses 
centred on sex, anti-corruption discourse became more formalised and was consolidated into 
a unified knowledge regime with standardised concepts and remedies (Sampson, 2010: 270). 
This went hand in hand with an influx of new authors and academics. Anti-corruption was 
included in university courses and the discourse became more social scientific in character. 
New areas opened up for anti-corruption research, as corruption was revealed to be relevant 
in the areas of security, healthcare, climate change, sport, and education among others 
(Sampson, 2010: 268; Transparency International, 2016). The same as with sex, there was a 
proliferation of behaviours that could now conceivably fall under the classification of 
corruption (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 277; Caiden et al., 2001; Sampson, 2010: 262). As such, 
new forms of corruption were identified, isolated and criminalised.  
Significantly, for both corruption and sex, the emergence of a consolidated regime of 
knowledge occurred following a change in conception. Sex was transformed into a medical 
phenomenon; a problem concerning social scientific discourse and medical practices. 
Corruption, on the other hand, changed from being considered as a political problem in the 
years leading up to the 1990s, into a problem of economics (Polzer, 2001). This change of 
conception was done on the basis of the quantification of the corruption through CPI, which 
allowed for tracking the annual performance of different countries on the index and linking 
this performance with economic growth. 
Similar to what occurred with regards to sex in the eighteenth century, the development of the 
anti-corruption industry has had an impact on the manner in which states are administered. 
The anti-corruption industry calls for legislative and institutional changes. The industry 
drives the implementation of specific policies and programmes and anti-corruption has 
become embedded in the governance of states. The similarities between the discourses 
centred on sex of the eighteenth century and anti-corruption discourse raises important 
questions. Is corruption a constructed concept? More importantly, if this is the case, what role 
has power played in this construction? The next subsection is centred on the manner in which 
the World Bank and the IMF altered their anti-corruption discourse following the 
quantification of corruption. 
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4.2.2) The Construction of Corruption: The evolution of World Bank and IMF discourse  
The World Bank’s involvement in the anti-corruption field officially began in 1997, when its 
Executive Board approved its anti-corruption strategy (Khan, 2002: 1). The World Bank 
brought with it large a team of economists, political scientists and the capacity to fund and 
implement numerous anti-corruption initiatives (De Speville, 2010: 50). Since its entry into 
the field, the Bank has been involved in extensive research on corruption and the promotion 
of anti-corruption governance reforms globally (Marquette, 2004: 415; Samson, 2010: 275). 
The Bank has also released its own indices and rankings which roughly corresponds with that 
of Transparency International (Ivanov, 2007: 34). Since its involvement started in the mid-
1990s, the World Bank has spent approximately US$ 10 million per year on corruption 
sanctions and investigations (Wanless, 2013: 39). Furthermore, its investigative department 
has launched more than 600 anti-corruption programmes and has implemented governance 
reforms in more than 100 countries worldwide (39).  
The first decisive shift in World Bank discourse happened at the 1996 Annual General 
Meeting between the IMF and the World Bank (Polzer, 2001: 9). It was on this occasion that 
James Wolfensohn delivered the now famous “cancer of corruption” speech and committed 
the Bank to fighting the global prevalence of corruption (Sampson, 2010: 275; Polzer, 2001: 
9). The speech marked the World Bank’s acknowledgement of Transparency International’s 
work in anti-corruption, and it signalled the start of the inclusion of “government 
effectiveness and legitimacy in its loan policies” (Sampson, 2010: 275).  
Before its Annual General meeting in 1996, the World Bank expressly avoided the topic of 
corruption. The concept was “taboo” in World Bank discourse (Polzer, 2001: 2). According 
to James Wolfensohn, corruption was referred to as the “c-word” in World Bank discussions 
(Ivanov, 2007: 31). The reason for this is the fact that the Bank is governed by a non-political 
mandate, which precludes any involvement in political matters (Polzer, 2001: 9). This means 
that, working in the anti-corruption field was expressly forbidden by the Bank’s legal 
department (9). In other words, the World Bank could not get involved in anti-corruption 
earlier because the concept was still considered to be too political (10). Transparency 
International, for example, was “refused funding by some sections of the World Bank” 
because corruption was seen as outside the ambit of the Bank’s mandate (9). 
In Wolfensohn’s speech, however, he stated the following: “I visited a number of countries 
and I decided that I would redefine the “C” word not as a political issue but as something 
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social and economic” (Ivanov, 2007: 31). After this re-characterisation, the way was open for 
the Bank to make sweeping statements about corruption. For example, the World Bank states 
on its website that corruption is the “single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the 
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends” (Bukovanksy, 2006: 191). In 
other words, following Wolfensohn’s speech, the World Bank’s discourse underwent a 
fundamental turnaround; moving from complete avoidance of the issue to subsequently 
ranking corruption as the single most significant impediment to global economic growth. 
The involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the anti-corruption industry 
follows the same general timeline as the World Bank. The IMF did not address corruption 
directly in the years leading up to the 1990s. It was only from around 1995 that economists 
and academics working at or in association with the IMF started publishing papers centred on 
the links between corruption, investment and economic growth (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). 
Once these linkages were made there was a flush of new articles. Ades and Di Tella (1997) 
discussed the ‘New Economics of Corruption.’ Mauro (1995) discussed the relation between 
the prevalence of corruption and economic growth. Rose-Ackerman (1997) discussed the 
impact that corruption has on the global political economy. Tanzi (1995) elaborated on the 
connections between corruption, governmental practices and financial markets. Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1998) discussed the impact of corruption in public investments on economic 
growth.  
This increased proliferation of anti-corruption articles went hand in hand with the increased 
attention that the IMF was paying to governance related issues (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). In 
1996, the IMF adopted the ‘Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth’ declaration, which 
was centred on the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, accountability in the 
public sector, and addressing the problem of corruption (189). The IMF Board adopted the 
‘Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues’ in 1997, which further clarified the IMF’s 
involvement in governance related issues (189). Abed and Gupta (2002: 7, 8) sums up the 
IMF’s approach when it comes to corruption and governance:  
The IMF is contributing to strengthening governance in membership countries 
through various means. The first is by supporting economic policies and structural 
reforms that limit the scope for ad hoc decision making, for rent seeking, and for 
preferential treatment of individuals or organisations. This approach is founded on the 
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IMF’s mandate to promote macroeconomic stability, and limits its role to those 
aspects of governance that could have a significant macroeconomic impact. 
In other words, the IMF’s involvement in anti-corruption is solely based on the 
macroeconomic ramifications of corruption (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). In this context, the 
quantification of corruption, as discussed in section 4.2.1, played a very important role in the 
evolution of IMF and World Bank anti-corruption discourse. As stated by Polzer (2001: 17), 
the empirical approach to analysing corruption has had a “central place in the project of 
depoliticising corruption.” Importantly, however, the turnaround in the IMF and World Bank 
discourses was not only a direct reaction to the increased levels of perceived corruption as per 
the CPI. It is indeed the case that the CPI allowed for a quantitative link between corruption 
and economic growth to be made, which, in turn, opened the door for these organisations to 
enter into the corruption debate. Additionally, however, the concept still had to be moulded to 
fit into the respective mandates of these organisations. 
Simply because perception based indices showed that corruption has a quantitative economic 
impact, does not mean that international financial institutions were able to enter into the anti-
corruption industry with immediate effect. The concept had to be adapted and depoliticised. 
In other words, similar to how sex was constructed as a medical concept in the eighteenth 
century, corruption had to be constructed as an economic concept in the mid-1990s.  
The concept required fixed parameters before it could be used within World Bank discourse 
(Polzer, 2001: 10). Polzer (12) explains that there are very clear restrictions of the type of 
knowledge that is accepted as legitimate by the World Bank. According to Polzer (12):  
The spheres of knowledge accepted by the Bank are universalising, empirical, 
quantitative, institutional, and based on the assumption of the calculating and 
rationally maximising individual. Alternative views, such as moral, cultural or 
political understandings of corruption, are considered to be naive, specious or 
malicious arguments made by interested parties such as corrupt businessmen or 
politicians. 
This means that a broad consensus around the concept had to be established, before the 
World Bank and the IMF could become involved. This was about building and legitimising 
the type of discourse, data and information that could justifiably “contribute toward finding 
the ‘truth’ about corruption” (12). It was on the basis of the quantification of corruption that 
the World Bank and the IMF repackaged their discourse around concept and “reinvented” 
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their respective approaches (Ivanov, 2007: 31; Polzer, 2001: 12). According to Ivanov (2007: 
37), this entailed constructing corruption “as a measurable problem requiring global, 
technocratic solutions, including a smaller role for the state and a larger one for civil society.” 
It is in this way that the concept was depolitised and moulded into a technocratic problem of 
economics (31). Krastev (2000: 39) echoes this sentiment, and argues that the major actors in 
the anti-corruption movement share a “definite social construct of what corruption is about 
and how to challenge it.”  
It is important to emphasise that this construction did not happen on the basis of a new 
definition. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nye’s definition, which was coined in the 
1960s, remains the basis of the contemporary understanding of corruption. What was altered, 
however, was the manner in which this definition was understood and utilised in the anti-
corruption industry. The World Bank and the IMF only became involved after corruption was 
depoliticsed to the sufficient extent that its alleviation could be pursued without contravening 
their respective non-political mandates. As such, the relabeling of corruption became a “pillar 
of the neoliberal agenda against corruption” (Ivanov, 2007: 34). It is in this same line of 
thought that Bratsis (2003) makes the suggestion that the construction of corruption has 
enabled the use of the concept as a political tool to delegitimise the political systems and 
governance structures of states that do not fit in with the dominant international consensus.  
It is at this point that the link between Foucault’s work and the contemporary anti-corruption 
industry is most evident. In terms of the first mode of objectification, Foucault focuses on the 
social scientific discourses that strive to become part of normal science, but fail to do so 
because these social scientific discourses are founded upon social and cultural norms. 
Foucault is interested in the games of truth that surround social scientific knowledge and how 
this relates to the deployment of power in contemporary society. For example, by 
investigating the scientific discourses centred on sexuality, Foucault does not want to uncover 
the true meaning or significance of sex. Rather, for Foucault, the concept of truth is produced 
and used by discourses centred on sex; a production which is not tied to objective knowledge, 
but to certain strategies of power (Foucault, 1976: 105, 106). In the Birth of Biopolitics, 
Foucault (2004: 19) states the following: 
The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, 
delinquency and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how 
these objects were for a long time hidden before being finally discovered, nor of showing 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 84 
 
how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in 
the light of reason finally having reached its zenith. It was a matter of showing by what 
conjunctions a whole set of practices - from the moment they become coordinated with a 
regime of truth - was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, 
sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something. 
In the context of anti-corruption, once it was possible to measure the level of corruption 
through an internationally accepted statistical framework, and once this framework was 
linked up with economic analyses, the discourse around the subject became consolidated to 
the sufficient extent that a homogenous regime of knowledge could emerge, with corruption 
as an economic concept at its core. Once this consolidation occurred and once the influential 
international financial institutions entered into the field, anti-corruption discourse became, in 
Foucault’s (2004: 19) words, “coordinated with a regime of truth.” This regime of truth went 
hand in hand with the emergence of a whole set of practices and policies that served to shape 
the development and legitimisation of an entire industrial field centred on the fight against 
corruption.  
Thus, if one looks at corruption from this perspective, it is not the question of economists and 
academics finally uncovering the truth about how corruption has a fundamental and empirical 
linkage to economic growth. From a Foucauldian point of view, it is not about the emergence 
of a pioneering industry tasked with fighting a global malaise. Rather, it is the question of 
how the anti-corruption industry has fostered into existence a domain of knowledge that 
serves as a justificatory principle for its own practices, objectives and discourses. As stated 
by Krastev (2003: 117) 
It was the radical transformation of the social sciences’ discourse on corruption that 
made the current global anti-corruption campaign possible. The new anti-corruption 
consensus brought to life the new anti-corruption science. And the new anti-
corruption science manufactured the data that have justified the new anti-corruption 
consensus. 
Similar to the way in which sex became the point of interconnection between the biological 
sciences and the practices enacted to govern populations, corruption has become a point 
where the divide between economics and politics is at its most tentative. Using a Foucauldian 
perspective to investigate the anti-corruption industry is thus about uncovering how the 
discourse around the subject has been constructed, as well as the role that broader forms of 
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power play in the justification and institutional deployment of this construction. As such, the 
re-characterisation of corruption was not only significant within anti-corruption discourse; it 
had a very real impact on the manner in which the fight against corruption was 
institutionalised globally.  
As the World Bank and the IMF entered into the field, an entire industry came to life; anti-
corruption agencies were established, international frameworks and conventions were 
launched, and policies were implemented. In short, governments amended their practices 
around the area of governance and corruption. In other words, this is not only about tracing 
the historical development of discourse. Using Foucault’s work is also about linking the 
development and emergence of discourse with governmental, ideological and political 
strategies and practices. In the next section, the connection between Foucault’s notions of 
governmentality, disciplinary power and the anti-corruption industry is discussed in more 
detail. 
4.3) Discipline and Governmentality in the fight against corruption 
As discussed in the previous section, it was only with the advent of statistical models 
showing the relation between corruption and economic growth that the space was opened up 
for the World Bank and the IMF to alter their discourse around the topic of corruption. To 
this end, the advent of the CPI transformed the manner in which the international community 
approached corruption. There was now an instrument that allowed for the measurement of the 
global levels of corruption and the direct comparison of different states and regions. Thereby, 
the link between CPI and economic growth gave the World Bank and the IMF the 
opportunity to construct corruption as a problem of economics. This facilitated the emergence 
of an entire field of intelligibility and a regime of knowledge surrounding corruption, with 
economic discourse at its core. Importantly, the construction of corruption as a problem of 
economics has had an impact on the manner in which states govern their citizens. 
As discussed in chapter 2, Foucault’s objective in Discipline and Punish is to uncover the 
societal practices of discipline and control that rationalised and justified the institutional 
apparatus that emerged together with incarceration as a mode of punishment. Thus, his 
intention is not to shed light on the objective truth that lies behind incarceration and he is also 
not interested in uncovering the most moral, effective or rational type of punishment. 
Foucault is interested in the complex role that different modes of punishment play in society 
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and the manner in which this function is tied to strategies of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1983: 143). 
Therefore, when it comes to analysing the anti-corruption industry from a Foucauldian point 
of view, one is not attempting to uncover the hidden truth that lies behind its discourses and 
practices. One is attempting to come to grips with the societal role that anti-corruption plays 
and the link between this role and broader strategies of power. Foucault (1976: 25) shows 
with his analysis of sexuality that the emergence of sex as a societal problem is tied to the 
emergence of governmental strategies aimed at managing populations. For Foucault, the 
establishment of discourses that are proclaimed to be neutral and objective does not mean that 
these discourses are free from the effects of power. On the contrary, the emergence of a 
scientific discourse centred on sex allowed for it to become further enmeshed in the practices 
of power. Thus, despite the fact that anti-corruption is labelled as the neutral and unbiased 
fight against a universal problem, its discourses and practices are used to further, not only 
economic, but also political and ideological ends. 
The fight against corruption can thus be seen as a method that international actors use to 
manage uncertainties, to mitigate risks and to instil a specific framework of governance 
globally. According to Zanotti (2006: 150, 151), since the end of the Cold War, the 
international arena has become increasingly multifaceted and complex. This has resulted in 
international organisations devising new strategies to mitigate the risk that is posed by this 
complexity and to maintain international order (150, 151). Zanotti (151) states that: “In the 
face of the impossibility of devising strategy and controlling all variables, international risk is 
managed by domesticating and normalising states that are perceived as potential sources of 
threat and instability.” Zanotti (163, 164) continues:  
In the post-cold war era, international organisations respond to the unpredictable, 
multifarious and polymorphous microphysics of threats through a microphysics of 
interventions. International order is pursued through the multiplication of disciplinary 
and regulatory mechanisms aimed at transforming behaviour. International power 
functions as a network where international actors are the connective elements rather 
than the passive victims or the perpetrators. 
After the end of the Cold War, international organisations embarked on new ways to 
incorporate and normalise divergent countries into the international fold. Countries that were 
perceived as politically unstable, economically inefficient, ideologically abnormal or as 
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plagued by pervasive corruption had to be managed in order to alleviate the potential risk that 
these countries pose to international order and stability. In this sense, international 
organisations can be seen as nodes in the dissemination of the relations of disciplinary power.  
In this context, the emergence of the anti-corruption industry is not another step in the 
evolution of a more ethical international economic sphere, and the fight against corruption is 
not only centred on the alleviation of corruption. On the contrary, the anti-corruption industry 
plays a role in the governance of the international realm. It plays a role in the rationalisation 
and propagation of a set of discourses, policies, institutions and governmental procedures 
designed to normalise the relations between western states and states that function with 
different internal rules, norms and practices.  
In other words, the process of classifying countries within the sphere of a perception-based 
statistical framework opened the way not only for the reformation of discourse around the 
subject; it also allowed for wholesale institutional change and the implementation of specific 
policies and programmes aimed at reforming cultural norms and values. Under the umbrella 
of corruption alleviation, countries not only had to be made more accessible to international 
business, but also more amendable to international norms, values, discourses and practices. 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is a very good example of a 
method that is used by international actors to normalise internationally accepted modes of 
governance globally and to discipline states that are non-compliant. UNCAC is not 
necessarily based on an economic view of corruption. The United Nations is not bound by a 
non-political mandate, such as the World Bank and the IMF. International measures such as 
UNCAC do, however, entrench the economic conception of corruption globally even if the 
UN is not explicitly in pursuit of the same objectives as the IMF and the World Bank. 
UNCAC was launched almost ten years after the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, 
and therefore is fundamentally based on the discourses and practices that preceded it.  
The next section looks specifically at the linkages between Foucault’s concept of disciplinary 
power and UNCAC. 
4.3.1) The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
International organisations steer the conduct of national governments through the 
establishment of international agreements, rules, regulations and laws that pertain directly to 
the manner in which these states govern their citizens (Zanotti, 2006: 152, 153). According to 
Zanotti (152), these organisations endeavour to change the internal processes of “disorderly” 
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states so that these states become manageable and understandable, and so that the risk of 
unpredictability is mitigated. In terms of the anti-corruption industry, a good example of this 
is UNCAC. The UN General Assembly adopted UNCAC in October 2003 (Hechler, 2013: 1). 
The convention has played a significant role in the global institutionalisation of the anti-
corruption industry, and it was one of the first internationally binding agreements on 
corruption (Webb, 2005: 191). The figure below shows how prolific the international 
adoption of UNCAC has been. UNCAC has a total of 140 signatories and 170 state parties 
(UNODC, 2014b). Figure 4.4 shows the states that have ratified the convention in blue, the 
states that are signatories in orange and the states that have declined to sign the convention in 
red. 
 
FIGURE 4.4: UNCAC (UNODC, 2014A) 
Under UNCAC, corruption is characterised as a major threat to security, stability and 
development (Hechler, 2013: 1). UNCAC requires the states that have ratified the convention 
to comply with its four pillars, which are: corruption prevention, criminalisation of 
corruption, international cooperation, and asset recovery (UNODC, 2014a).  
The first pillar refers to the implementation of measures aimed at uprooting corruption before 
it can take hold (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 107). UNCAC requires states to establish an 
institutional and legislative environment within which corruption is prevented (UNODC, 
2014a). In this context, states are expected to ensure that public services are transparent and 
that there are measures and safeguards in place to ensure that governments operate 
transparently and efficiently, and that new appointments are based on merit (UNODC, 
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2014a). UNCAC requires the establishment of independent anti-corruption agencies, with the 
task of holding public officials accountable (UNODC, 2014a). It is also stated that “public 
servants should be subject to codes of conduct, requirements for financial and other 
disclosures, and appropriate disciplinary measures” (UNODC, 2014a). Additional elements 
include greater transparency in the financing of political parties, as well as the adoption of 
anti-corruption measures for private sector corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4; Brunelle-
Quraishi, 2011: 107, 109).  
With regards to the second pillar, signatories of the convention are required to criminalise 
corruption offences that are not classified as crimes under domestic laws (UNODC, 2014a). 
Hechler (2013: 1) states that the offences that are classified as corruption include “the 
acceptance of an undue advantage by foreign and international public officials, abuse of 
function, illicit enrichment, bribery and embezzlement within or among private sector 
entities.” UNCAC goes beyond other international anti-corruption initiatives of its kind by 
criminalising not only the basic forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement), but also 
“trading in influence and the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption” 
(UNODC, 2014a).  
In terms of the third pillar, signatories are required to cooperate with international partners in 
the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4). This 
includes mutual legal assistance, the transfer of evidence, the extradition of offenders, as well 
as tracing the proceeds of corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4; UNODC, 2014a). The 
convention also requires the cooperation of signatories in the areas of human resources, 
financial assistance, training and research (Hechler, 2013: 1).  
The fourth pillar is centred on recovering the proceeds that have been gained through corrupt 
activities (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4). UNCAC requires signatories to “take measures to 
restrain, seize, confiscate, and return the proceeds of corruption” (Brun, Gray, Scott & 
Stephenson, 2011: 2). The process of recovering assets starts with the collection of evidence, 
intelligence and tracing assets in foreign and domestic jurisdictions (Brun et al., 2011: 6). 
This is followed by securing the assets, undergoing the court process, enforcing the court 
orders, and then returning of the assets (6). UNCAC is the first international anti-corruption 
treaty to include the recovery of the assets in its mandate (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 122).  
In terms of Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, UNCAC can be characterised as the 
dispersal of a collection of practices that are designed for disciplining states, populations and 
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individuals. To refer back to chapter two, disciplinary power is “essentially corrective” and is 
centred on adjustment to the norms and standards of the contemporary world (Foucault, 1995: 
179; Gutting, 2013). According to Zanotti (2006: 152), international organisations use a 
variety of methods to redesign governmental institutions “along disciplinary lines” and to 
make “modalities of domestic government readable to international organisations and 
bilateral partners.” In this light, UNCAC is an instrument that international organisations use 
to change the internal processes of disorderly states with the goal of mitigating the risks that 
these states pose to global stability, as well as for fostering compliance with international 
norms of governance. 
The establishment of anti-corruption agencies is a very good example of how the internal 
processes and procedures are altered with the objective of normalising state behaviour. The 
establishment of an anti-corruption agency is a core component of the first pillar of UNCAC 
(UNODC, 2014a). Anti-corruption agencies have an array of different functions, but 
generally these functions fall into four categories: prevention, investigation, education and 
policy coordination (Kuris, 2012: 1). Kuris (1-3) summarises what a successful anti-
corruption agency should achieve:  
A successful anti-corruption agency should demonstrate independence, build capacity, 
establish support coalitions, and work to change the rules of the game and the hearts 
and minds of the players. Popular pressure supporting anti-corruption reforms is an 
integral component in the alleviation of corruption and in situations where scandals or 
economic decline can be attributed to corruption it becomes much easier to garner 
public support. 
In states where corruption is perceived as systemic, the issue at hand is that corrupt behaviour 
is ingrained within the internal processes of the state and the behavioural norms of the 
populace. As such, this socio-political environment is governed by rules of behaviour that do 
not conform to international standards. In this context, the objective of the anti-corruption 
agency is to contrast itself with local systems by establishing a reputation for working 
efficiently, transparently, effectively and with the interest of the general public in mind. 
According to Iyer (2011) the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ) in Ghana, for example, was able to establish a reputation as the defender of the 
public. According to Iyer (12): 
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CHRAJ was able to build a reputation for itself as an institution of integrity, willing to 
take on political heavyweights in pursuit of its mandate to tackle corruption, uphold 
administrative justice and defend human rights. It also built a popular constituency by 
working with and catalysing the creation of civil society organisations while ensuring 
media coverage to keep the public abreast of its investigations. 
In other words, for anti-corruption agencies to be successful, there has to be emphasis on 
capacity building, training, education and catalysing the emergence of a civil society engaged 
in fighting corruption. Additionally, it is about building a popular support base by pursuing 
senior governmental officials. Importantly, anti-corruption agencies use the opportunities 
presented by crises to force corruption onto the agenda. According to Kuris (2012: 3) anti-
corruption agencies can catalyse society-wide change by “igniting popular pressure” and by 
taking advantage of a “political opportunity, often presented by a scandal or economic crisis.”  
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) offers a good example of how anti-
corruption agencies enlist international and local support, as well as media coverage, to 
entrench a localised anti-corruption agenda. The KPK was established in Indonesia following 
the collapse of the 32 year Suharto regime (3). The KPK is a powerful agency responsible for 
corruption prevention, investigation, research, prosecution and for working with government 
to establish sound anti-corruption policies (3). The KPK was established following sustained 
international and domestic pressure (3). According to Kuris (7, 8): 
The KPK worked furiously to tap all its sources of support. The commissioners 
actively defended themselves in the media, strongly proclaiming their integrity … 
KPK appealed directly to the public to demonstrate its support. Civil society partners 
planned a campaign of defence. The KPK’s international partners applied pressure as 
well, including international media, NGOs, business leaders, and representatives of 
foreign governments and multilateral organisations. 
In other words, the goal of an anti-corruption agency is not necessarily to eradicate all 
instances of corruption in a particular society; it would, for example, never have the capacity 
or the resources to investigate all instances of petty corruption. The goal of an anti-corruption 
agency is foremost to reform institutions, to restructure norms of behaviour, and, in the words 
of Kuris (2012: 1-3), to reshape the “rules of the game and the hearts and minds of the 
players.” In this way, the anti-corruption agency endeavours to garner public and political 
support with the objective of establishing a society where there is zero tolerance for 
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corruption, and where its prevalence is seen as an absolute impediment to political cohesion, 
economic growth and social stability.  
Therefore, with regards to the first pillar of UNCAC, the objective is to infiltrate a system 
with an organisation that can systematically work to reshape internal rules of behaviour 
through implementing educational initiatives, launching investigations, prosecuting, 
catalysing popular discontent, and lobbying governments to introduce new policies and 
procedures. The implementation of anti-corruption agencies is done within the broader 
international context of the anti-corruption industry, which provides the required support and 
influence so that the credibility and legitimacy of the agency’s actions is maintained and 
supported. Additionally, the other pillars of UNCAC serve to further enforce the local 
implementation of anti-corruption programmes and procedures. 
The second pillar, the criminalisation of corruption, entrenches a normative conception of 
corruption within an internationally accepted legal framework. The criminalisation of a whole 
multiplicity of behaviours serves to embed reigning international anti-corruption definitions 
and practices; which entails criminalising behaviour that is perceived as abnormal, unethical 
or inappropriate within the context of the international anti-corruption knowledge regime. 
The third pillar of UNCAC, international cooperation, builds on the international consensus 
against corruption by making signatories accountable to one another in the international 
sphere. Countries are not only expected to pursue corrupt individuals within the confines of 
their own border, they also have to assist in international investigations and prosecutions. 
And finally, the fourth pillar of the convention, asset recovery, gives UNCAC more authority 
in the application of its principles by giving it the power to punish. In other words, through 
the establishment of UNCAC, the United Nations has created a convention that not only 
holds countries accountable to each other on the international arena, but also localises a set of 
rules within legislative and institutional environments of sovereign states. 
To summarise, UNCAC drives the reformation of institutions, policies and legislations. It is 
an intervention that has been designed to identify and criminalise a multifarious host of 
behaviours; behaviours which have been classified as corrupt within the context of a 
normative neoliberal framework. To use Zanotti’s (2006: 163, 164) words, UNCAC can be 
depicted as a “microphysics of interventions.” Zanotti used this phrase to refer to the 
practices of international organisations in general, but this phrase is also applicable to 
UNCAC. It is practice of discipline and control with the objective of reforming governmental 
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practices and for propagating the norms of international governance globally. This means that 
international organisations strive to create international order, not by containing perceived 
threats, but by classifying, disciplining and normalising these threats. It is in this way that 
international organisations endeavour to transform states into “orderly, predictable, 
disciplinary and disciplined administrations” (152).  
It is important to note that, it is not only through legislative disciplinary mechanisms that the 
anti-corruption agenda is embedded in local administrations. Anti-corruption is not only 
centred on the establishment of international conventions or legal frameworks. The World 
Bank and the IMF are, for example, precluded from making overtly political prescriptions. 
Even though these organisations are intimately involved in the industry, they are still 
governed by non-political mandates and can therefore not establish conventions such as 
UNCAC. Similarly, Transparency International, as an NGO, is primarily involved in 
advocacy work, conducting perception based surveys, raising awareness, conducting research 
and publishing reports. These organisations do, however, use anti-corruption as a method for 
exerting influence and for applying pressure on states that are perceived as lax in the 
implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. In other words, even though the IMF and the 
World Bank take a more overtly economic approach, in comparison to the approach of the 
UN, the discourses and practices of all these organisations play a role in fostering the 
rationality of international anti-corruption governance. Thus, even though the World Bank 
and the IMF express themselves as non-political actors, their actions are undoubtedly 
political, as will be shown in the next section. Similarly, even though the UN seeks to address 
corruption by amending the political practices of states, its actions are a reflection of and 
serves to reinforce the anti-corruption practices of the industry as a whole. 
The next section expands on the manner in which the World Bank and IMF use anti-
corruption, not only as a method of control, but also to entrench the governmentality of the 
fight against corruption. 
4.3.2) Governmentality and the fight against corruption 
Since the entry of World Bank and the IMF into the anti-corruption field, these organisations 
have used their stance on corruption as a method for controlling states that are perceived as 
non-compliant with international norms, guidelines and practices. As stated by Polzer (2001: 
17), while empirical studies into the economic ramifications of corruption is “presented as a 
liberation from the uncertainties of politically manipulated perceptions, it is also a new means 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 94 
 
of control.” Thus, on the one side, the World Bank and the IMF have played an important 
role in the construction of the anti-corruption discourse and in rationalising the conception of 
corruption as a problem of economics. On the other side, these organisations also use anti-
corruption as a method for furthering the implementation of specific policies and 
programmes, as well as for the punishment of non-conformance. According to Zanotti (2006: 
152, 153) international organisations manage the behaviour of states through “mechanisms of 
control, reward and punishment.” Following the construction of corruption and the 
emergence of the anti-corruption industry, it became common practice for the World Bank 
and the IMF to engage with states about bribery and corruption concerns. Especially with 
regards to development financing and the provision of loans. 
The IMF and the World Bank enforce the anti-corruption agenda by including a number of 
stipulations as conditions to the provision of loans, as well as by withdrawing support from 
countries where corruption is thought to be so widespread that economic growth is affected 
(Ivanov, 2007: 32). For example, in 1997 “the IMF suspended a $220 million loan to Kenya 
because the government had not done enough to curtail bribery” (32). In 2006 the World 
Bank suspended all loans to Chad, due to the state not allocating all of its oil revenues to 
poverty alleviation projects (Dugger, 2006). It was stipulated in Chad’s agreement with the 
World Bank that oil revenues had to be spent on initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty, but 
the country’s parliament approved the allocation of a proportion of the revenue to defence 
spending (Dugger, 2006). In 2012, the World Bank cancelled a $1.2 billion loan to 
Bangladesh, due to concerns that the project has been hampered by corruption (Al-Mahmood, 
2012). Subsequently, Transparency International called on Bangladesh to establish a judicial 
committee for the investigation of the incident (Al-Mahmood, 2012). In 2016, the IMF 
suspended all loans to Mozambique due to concerns over unreported and undisclosed loans 
received from other banks (Wernau, 2016). Under its agreement with the IMF, Mozambique 
has to fully disclose all loans received and that it is obliged to attend regular meetings with 
the IMF (Wernau, 2016). 
Interestingly, before the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, withholding a loan from a 
country because of bribery was not common practice for the international financial 
institutions. Even in the 1990s, it was still commonly accepted business practice for 
businesses in some countries to bribe government officials of other states (Hines, 1995: 1). 
Up until the mid-1990s, the United States was the only country to outlaw international 
bribery (Salbu, 1997: 232, 233). Many companies even received tax deductions for foreign 
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bribery payments (232, 233). It was only in 1996 that the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) addressed the “tax policy that is widely believed to 
encourage or support international bribery - the deductibility of bribes paid to foreign 
officials as business expenses in a number of industrialised nations” (233).  
In the wake of a scandal implicating a Canadian company with bribing Argentine and South 
Korean officials in the 1970s, the then trade minister of Canada stated that the “commercial 
practices in other countries sometimes are different from ours...It would be very 
presumptuous for Canadians to tell other people how to conduct their morals” (Ivanov, 2007: 
30, 31). According to Ivanov (30, 31), a statement such as this would be “unthinkable” in the 
context of the contemporary fight against corruption. This means that it was around the time 
of the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse and the construction of corruption as an 
economic problem that bribery became considered as illegitimate and illegal in international 
business dealings.  
It is important to keep in mind that the majority of states that perform poorly on CPI are 
states that have been plagued by extended periods of instability, violence and armed conflict 
(Transparency International, 2016b). These are the states that are in desperate need of loans 
from financial institutions and it is these states that are most likely to agree to conditions that 
involve institutional and political alteration to get access to financing. Developing countries, 
for example, have to comply with a very high number of conditions in order to gain access to 
IMF and World Bank funding (Eurodad, 2006: 3). It is reported that, on average, these 
countries face up to 67 conditions, but Uganda had to comply with 197 conditions in order to 
receive a development grant from the World Bank in 2005 (3). The majority of these 
conditions are related to privatisation and trade liberalisation, but a number of these 
conditions are related to public sector reform and anti-corruption (Eurodad, 2006). 
It is also developing countries that have to alter local governmental structures, policies and 
procedures to gain access to regional and multilateral organisations, such as the European 
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Latvia, for example, 
established the Corruption Combating and Prevention Bureau (KNAB) to demonstrate its 
progress in corruption alleviation in order to be accepted into the EU and NATO (Kuris, 
2012: 9). Another example is that of Croatia. According to Zanotti (2006: 159):  
The admission of Croatia to the EU can be read as an endeavour to modify behaviour 
by making inclusion/exclusion from a particular association conditional upon the 
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achievement of a given set of benchmarks. This process is based upon definition of 
detailed rules of behaviour, constant scrutiny and examination of performance. 
This means that compliance with a set of international criteria has become a core condition 
“for the allocation of international assistance and for the inclusion in supranational political 
organisations” (151). In other words, the construction of corruption as a problem of 
economics enabled the World Bank and the IMF to exert control over states for not 
implementing specific governmental policies and procedures. The IMF, for example, can now 
make recommendations with regards to removing “unnecessary regulations and opportunities 
for rent seeking” (Ivanov, 2007: 31). Under the banner of fighting corruption, the IMF can 
compel countries to alter local laws and institutions, whilst maintaining that its actions are 
non-political.  
Importantly, the implementation of anti-corruption strategies does not simply result in the 
removal of inefficient policies leading to direct economic benefit. Anti-corruption does not 
only imply “technical adjustments within a largely functioning system”; on the contrary anti-
corruption discourse “categorises and thereby delegitimises entire societies” (Polzer, 2001: 
24). This means that addressing the non-political characteristics of corruption has enabled 
organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF to become directly involved in the 
political practices of sovereign states. In fighting corruption, the World Bank, for example, 
circumvents and mistrusts “local and national politics, while itself acting politically” (18). In 
other words, the irony here is that the depoliticisation of corruption, and the construction of 
corruption as an economic problem has allowed the World Bank and the IMF to themselves 
become politicised.  
It is at this point that one can bring Foucault’s notion of governmentality into the discussion. 
The concept refers to the linkage between the practices of government and the forms of 
knowledge that underpin the legitimacy of such practices (Fimyar, 2008: 5). The concept 
clarifies the relationship between political rationality and methods of governance (4). In the 
context of governmentality, power serves to rationalise its own existence through the social 
scientific discourses that form an integral component of its practices and its institutions (6). 
Therefore, the concept designates the analysis of the manner in which truth, and its linkage to 
cultural, political, economic and social spheres, is produced and subsequently employed to 
pursue governmental strategies (4).  
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As such, governmentality is used to describe a manifestation of power that drives the 
implementation of mechanisms aimed at the governance of populations, as well as the 
emergence of the forms of knowledge that serve to collect information about the societal 
characteristics that these governmental mechanisms are centred on. These forms of 
knowledge underscore and legitimise the rationality of government and serves as a 
mechanism for facilitating its global dispersion. In this context, fighting corruption is about 
legitimising particular governmental practices through the provision of academic and 
institutional discourses that rationalise the applicability and utility of those practices. 
Additionally, it is the establishment of mechanisms through which anti-corruption policies 
are implemented and compliance with international norms and rules is monitored and 
enforced. 
Therefore, the governmentality of the anti-corruption industry is about the establishment of a 
consolidated regime of knowledge that supports, legitimises and rationalises international 
governance reform under the banner of fighting corruption. Thus, if one relates this to 
UNCAC, for example, whether it has to do with the criminalisation of new forms of 
corruption, or the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, these actions are supported and 
legitimised by a host of influential international actors, as well as by an endless array of 
articles, research reports, assessments and position papers. UNCAC can be seen as a 
governmental disciplinary tool which calls for the global implementation of international 
norms of governance and the normalisation of states that are non-compliant. The legitimacy 
of UNCAC is grounded in the consolidated knowledge regime through which its conception 
and implementation is rationalised. This means that the policies and practices of the anti-
corruption industry are justified by the very knowledge regime upon which the anti-
corruption industry has been constructed.  
Importantly, the concept of governmentality illustrates that one cannot separate the operation 
of power from the forms of knowledge that underscore its legitimacy. This power does not, 
however, fall into the ambit of specific institutions or organisations. On the contrary, power 
infiltrates various spaces, and occupies divergent areas. Zanotti (2006: 151) quotes Foucault 
when she states that, power can be classified as “infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their 
own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics.” As such, power works 
through a multiplicity of mechanisms embedded within the sphere of international 
governance, as well as localised within the operating procedures and institutions of sovereign 
states.  
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Foucault’s concept of governmentality shows that power and knowledge, in the governance 
of society, are inseparable. In Foucault’s (1995: 27) words, “… power and knowledge 
directly imply one another ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of 
a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations.” In Foucault’s understanding, power is driven to achieve certain 
outcomes, but these outcomes are not defined, promoted or championed by specific 
individuals or institutions (Gutting, 2013). Disciplinary power, for example, is a 
governmental technology that may ramify through various institutions such as armies, 
hospitals, prisons, schools and law enforcement but it cannot be reduced to the operation of 
one specific institution alone (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153). In this sense, power “is not an 
institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the 
name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society” 
(Foucault, 1976: 93). This does not mean that power is reprehensible or that it has in some 
way corrupted the anti-corruption industry. Power is not a hidden and enigmatic cancer that 
needs to be uncovered, isolated and dispelled. On the contrary, power is a core element in the 
creation of societal relations as well as the forms of knowledge that serve to underpin such 
relations. This means that power forms the foundation of how the problems of society are 
identified, isolated and addressed. 
In this context, international organisations are not puppet masters pulling the strings of 
international order in pursuit of self-centred and self-interested ideological and political gain. 
These organisations have, no doubt, played a significant role in the development of the anti-
corruption industry and they are very influential actors in the international realm, but the 
locus of power does not rest solely in their ambit. International organisations are situated 
international actors. The strategies and discourses championed by these organisations are the 
result of the social, economic, ideological and political environment that they operate within. 
These organisations are not all-controlling nefarious entities; on the contrary international 
organisations respond to the threats, insecurities, instabilities and complexities of the 
international realm. These organisations generate information, data and knowledge to clarify 
the ambiguities that persist in the international political economy and endeavour to create 
order in a space that is characterised by unpredictability.  
Foucault’s concept of governmentality provides one with a framework that can be used to 
problematise and deconstruct the normatively accepted understanding of governmental and 
state practices (Fimyar, 2008: 4). This deconstruction opens up the forms of knowledge and 
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the discourses that are utilised in governance of populations and individuals. Fundamentally, 
governmentality allows one to deconstruct the truths that have been fostered into existence 
through the historical development of societies. These truths underpin the very rationality of 
governance. Without these truths, contemporary forms of government cease to retain their 
legitimacy and relevance. Without the constructed truth of corruption, and without the layer 
upon layer of discourse that obfuscates this construction, the fight against corruption loses its 
legitimacy and international organisations lose their accountability in their application.  
Therefore, if one asks the question, why does the anti-corruption industry continue to expand 
despite its failure in delivering on its objective? The answer is that the anti-corruption 
industry has not failed to achieve its objective. This is because the objective of the industry 
has never solely been the alleviation of corruption. Addressing the prevalence of corruption is 
only one component of its broader objective; which is centred on the global implementation 
of a normalised mode of governance. As such, the anti-corruption industry operates 
autonomously, and without respite, by classifying what counts as problems, what counts as 
solutions and what counts as legitimate discourse and knowledge. In this way, the 
governmentality of the anti-corruption industry drives and perpetuates its own prevalence.  
4.4) Conclusion 
The objective in this chapter was to make use of Foucault’s work to analyse the role that the 
anti-corruption industry plays in the realm of international governance and in the 
administration of states. The establishment of Transparency International and the emergence 
of the CPI played a very important role in the quantification of corruption. It was only once 
the prevalence of corruption was quantitatively measured within an internationally accepted 
statistical framework that the impact of corruption on economic growth could be illustrated. 
Once this link was made, it was possible for international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, to alter their discourse around the subject and to enter into the fight 
against corruption. The entry of these organisations resulted in an influx of resources and an 
immense proliferation of discourse, which served to entrench the conception of corruption as 
a problem of economics.  
This allowed the IMF and the World Bank to become directly involved in the political 
practices of sovereign states, while maintaining that their actions are non-political. 
Importantly, conventions such as UNCAC, serve to further propagate and embed anti-
corruption practices and discourses globally. This convention has become an international 
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mechanism which is used, not only to discipline and control states that are not complying 
with international standards, but also for transposing local business norms and ethics. All in 
all, even though the UN takes an overtly political approach when it comes to corruption 
alleviation while the international financial institutions take an economic approach, all of 
these organisations are nodes in the dissemination and propagation of the industry as a whole. 
This industry is based on a consolidated regime of knowledge which justifies and rationalises 
its own practices. In other words, by determining what counts as legitimate discourse and 
what does not, the industry drives and perpetuates its own prevalence. This means that failure 
in the alleviation of corruption does not hamper the growth of the industry; on the contrary 
perceived failure is used for further investment and research. Importantly, without the 
construction of corruption, and the measures taken in the fight against it, contemporary norms 
of governance fail to retain their legitimacy.  
Using Foucault’s work to analyse the anti-corruption industry thus does not take us any closer 
to solving the problem of corruption. Foucault’s work does, however, allow us to analyse the 
manner in which corruption has been constructed as a problem of economics. It shows clearly 
how the reigning discourse is ideological and normative and the alleviation of corruption is a 
governmental practice that is aimed less at enhancing the morality of economic interaction 
and more at standardising and entrenching a global framework of ‘good’ governance. As 
such, the industry, and the knowledge regime associated with it, acts as a justificatory 
principle for the involvement of international actors in the political practices of sovereign 
states, while legitimising their behaviour as non-political. This means that the fight against 
corruption plays a definite, active, political role in the manner in which international actors 
endeavour to govern the global political economy. Importantly, the objective of the industry 
is not necessarily related to the alleviation of corruption alone; the objective of the industry is 
to propagate and disseminate the norms of international governance globally and to embed 
these norms in the administrative procedures and institutions of sovereign states.  
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Chapter 5: The modes of Objectification and the Paradigm of Good 
Governance  
5.1) Introduction 
The objective in this chapter is to conclude the thesis by providing a brief summary of what 
has been discussed in the preceding chapters. Additionally, I will make a link between 
Foucault’s three modes of objectification and the anti-corruption industry. Discussing 
contemporary anti-corruption discourses and practices in the context of the modes of 
objectification is a good way to consolidate the argument and to highlight the role played by 
the individual subject in the propagation of the anti-corruption industry. This chapter has 
three main sections. The introductory section summarises the argument that was put forward 
in chapters 3 and 4. In section 5.2 the relations between the anti-corruption industry and 
Foucault’s three modes of objectification is discussed in more detail and in section 5.3 some 
final remarks and conclusions are provided. 
The original aim of this thesis was to unpack the discourses and practices that emanate from 
the anti-corruption industry in order to analyse the role that the industry plays in the 
governance of the international realm. In other words, the goal has not been to criticise the 
anti-corruption industry as such, nor has it been to overthrow contemporary norms of 
governance; the goal was to unpack and understand the constructed truths upon which 
contemporary forms of governance are based and to understand the role played by power and 
knowledge in this construction.  
The anti-corruption industry, as a global governmental practice, has expanded at a very rapid 
rate since the mid-1990s. The industry draws significant resources and attention, and it has 
had a very real impact on the way states endeavour to govern their citizens. The fight against 
corruption is presented as an apolitical international drive to eradicate what is constructed as 
a universal problem. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes evident that the anti-
corruption industry is based on normative concepts, values and ideals. Contemporary anti-
corruption practices involve embedding normative morals, codes and business standards into 
the structures of societies that played no role in the formation of these standards. This means 
that the industry is a global moralising endeavour that presents itself as an apolitical project 
in search of solutions to a seemingly collective global malady. Importantly, there is a limited 
understanding of what the anti-corruption industry is and what its actual impact has been. For 
this reason, this thesis was motivated as an attempt to come to grips with the underlying 
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factors that drives the industry, as well as the totalising nature of its discourse. This entailed 
unpacking the discourses and practices of the industry and the role that international 
organisations have played in bringing the industry to life and driving is global proliferation. 
Chapter 3 provides a genealogical account of the evolution of anti-corruption discourse and 
its consolidation through the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. This chapter is also 
centred on the primary criticisms that have been levelled against the industry since its 
inception. The goal of this chapter was to trace the development of anti-corruption discourse 
since the 1950s. It can be said that anti-corruption discourse disseminated in two waves, with 
the first starting roughly in the 1950s and the second in the 1990s. The first wave was 
characterised by an immense proliferation of multifaceted theories and arguments. Some 
authors argued that corruption has a fundamentally detrimental societal and economic impact, 
whilst other authors argued that corruption is part of the developmental process and that it 
could even have a positive impact on economic growth. As such, the discourse on the subject 
became highly diverse and the concept came to be broad and linked to a variety of different 
behaviours.  
In contrast, the second wave of anti-corruption discourse was characterised by consolidation. 
With the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, a more uniform understanding of 
corruption was entrenched. Notably, a version of Nye’s definition, the abuse of public power 
for private gain, became the primary way in which corruption was defined and understood. 
Importantly, however, the consolidation of the anti-corruption discourse did not result in a 
refined concept. The concept retained its indeterminate character. This means that the 
contemporary conception of corruption is characterised by conceptual ambiguity on the one 
side, and definitional uniformity on the other. It is for this reason that there has been a schism 
in contemporary anti-corruption critiques, with some criticisms centred on the overly 
simplistic and normative neoliberal definition of corruption, and other criticisms centred on 
the ambiguity of the concept. Importantly, the lack of impact of these criticisms on the anti-
corruption industry is not due to the fact that they are ill-founded; on the contrary these 
criticisms centre on very important shortcomings of the industry. The anti-corruption industry 
has, however, grown to the sufficient extent that criticisms are overcrowded by its sheer 
influence and magnitude.  
As discussed in chapter 4, Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, objectification, and 
disciplinary power provide a good framework for understanding the relationship between 
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knowledge and power in the anti-corruption industry. The consolidation of anti-corruption 
discourse in the mid-1990s and the emergence of the anti-corruption industry was the result 
of numerous factors. One key factor was the proliferation of perception based instruments 
used for gauging the global prevalence of corruption, the primary of which is the 
Transparency International CPI. As the CPI gained prominence, it became an important tool 
used by economists and analysts to quantitatively track the impact of corruption on economic 
growth, inequality and poverty. Perception based statistical surveys such as the CPI created a 
space of intelligibility that supported the reigning interpretation of corruption (Bracken, 2007: 
14). Importantly, the proliferation of these indices allowed organisations such as the World 
Bank the IMF to amend their discourses around corruption and it allowed these organisations 
to construct corruption as a problem of economics.  
On the back of this construction, the way was open for international financial institutions to 
enter into the anti-corruption and governance debate in full force, circumventing their 
respective non-political mandates in the process. Importantly, however, the construction of 
corruption allowed these organisations to include governmental and institutional stipulations 
into loan policies and thereby to force states into complying with international norms of 
governance. The political nature of this interaction means that the World Bank and the IMF 
occupy a contradictory position. These organisations present themselves as non-political 
actors, but their actions are inherently political. To this end, the construction of corruption as 
a problem of economics has enabled the IMF and the World Bank to become directly 
involved in the political practices of sovereign states, while retaining an air of legitimacy 
around their interventions.  
In terms of governmentality, these organisations play a role in the construction of anti-
corruption discourse as well as the implementation of the institutional arrangements that are 
called forth by this discourse. In this way, anti-corruption practices are fundamentally based 
on the very discourses that underscore their own rationality. As such, the anti-corruption 
industry perpetuates its own prevalence by determining what counts as problems, what counts 
as solutions and what counts as legitimate discourse in the context of the fight against 
corruption. International conventions such as UNCAC further entrenches the practices and 
discourses of the industry. UNCAC is an international disciplinary tool that is used to control 
states that are non-compliant with international norms, but it is also a tool used for 
deligitimising and removing business norms, practices and ethics that run contrary to 
international standards. Importantly, this convention serves to further embed the international 
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legitimacy of the industry by identifying, classifying and criminalising the actions that count 
as corruption. Furthermore, the convention ties states together within a realm of international 
cooperation and prosecution. Thus, in terms of governmentality and the disciplinary 
mechanisms associated with it, the actions of the international financial institutions and the 
UN are interlinked and serve to further drive the international expansion of the industry. As 
such, even though the UN makes explicitly political prescriptions, while the World Bank and 
the IMF make explicitly economic prescriptions, in terms of the drive to fight corruption, the 
actions of these organisations are two sides of the same coin. 
The next section links Foucault’s three modes of objectification with contemporary anti-
corruption discourse and practices. Using Foucault’s three modes objectification is a good 
way to conclude the thesis by presenting an overall perspective on the links between the anti-
corruption industry and Foucault’s work.  
5.2) Corruption and the three modes of objectification 
The relations between anti-corruption discourse and the first mode of objectification was  
discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, but, to summarise, anti-corruption discourse was 
consolidated in the 1990s, with the establishment of the CPI and the subsequent 
characterisation of corruption as a problem of economics. This allowed for the emergence of 
a uniform regime of knowledge, which opened the way for international organisations and 
financial institutions to amend their discourse on the subject. This discourse serves to elevate 
the relevance of particular forms of knowledge (empirical, quantitative and econometric) 
above other forms of knowledge (cultural, local, interpretive, and non-western). As such, 
similar to the manner in which sexuality was constructed within the context of the biological 
and medical sciences in the eighteenth century, corruption was constructed as an economic 
concept within neoliberal discourse in the 1990s. This means that corruption is a topic where 
one can clearly identify the production of truth, in the pursuit of normative, ideological and 
political objectives. This production occurs within the context of the consolidated anti-
corruption knowledge regime, which serves to rationalise and legitimise the fight against 
corruption as an international governmental practice. 
In terms of Foucault’s second mode of objectification, dividing practices, the actors involved 
in the anti-corruption industry endeavour to normalise everything that does not fit into the 
framework of classification as advocated by the consolidated anti-corruption knowledge 
regime. Divisions and specifications serve to separate permissible from impermissible 
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behaviour, after which normalising practices are employed to isolate, identify, transform and 
rectify any anomalies that are encountered (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). The role of 
dividing practices is very important in the creation and dissemination of anti-corruption 
knowledge. Dividing practices involve the division and classification of what counts as 
acceptable and what does not. In other words, the anti-corruption industry produces 
specifications and categories of abnormal, normal, corrupt and ethical behaviour; 
classifications which have been culturally and socially defined but that are presented as 
unbiased and neutral knowledge. Additionally, however, dividing practices also involve the 
entrenchment of these divisions into the governmental and institutional structures of society. 
As such, dividing practices are not limited to classification and separation in the realms of 
discourse alone; they also characterise separation within the context of institutional and 
governmental practices and policies.  
In other words, by striving for the alleviation of corruption, organisations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, endeavour to embed the international norms of governance within 
processes of the states that they engage with. Thereby, divisionary categories, and the 
discourses associated with these categories, are incorporated in the administrative and 
institutional practices of states. Subsequently, conventions such as UNCAC are used to 
embed the normative conceptions of corruption into an internationally entrenched legal 
framework, which is dissipated globally and implanted into the governance practices of 
sovereign states. In this way, new types of corruption are coined and specific behaviours are 
isolated, delegitimised, criminalised and prosecuted. The delegitimisation of these behaviours 
largely occurs unopposed, because it is rationalised and codified within reigning anti-
corruption discourse of influential international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, governments and civil society groups.  
Foucault’s point with regards to dividing practices is that the processes of classification and 
division that form a core component of social scientific discourse are also central to the 
establishment of the institutions and state practices that govern contemporary society (Ball, 
1990: 2). As is clearly identifiable in anti-corruption discourse, these classifications are all 
rooted in normative cultural values, political ideologies and economic exigencies, which 
means that dividing practices, and the anti-corruption knowledge that is tied to it, are rooted 
in the historical development of societies. In this context, it would never be possible to 
establish an objective definition of corruption, because it is fundamentally tied to normative 
cultural rules, standards and ethics. Any attempt to situate concepts such as corruption in a 
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realm of neutral and unbiased discourse, Foucault helps us to see very clearly, is driven to 
justify the implementation of certain governmental practices or policies.  
Corruption is a normative, value-laden term, but for the industry to be able to exist, it 
necessarily requires a concept that is universal to the sufficient extent that it would be 
applicable in the implementation of alleviation programmes in a diverse range of cultural 
constituencies. Importantly however, this concept, also needs to be indeterminate, to allow 
for additional behaviours to be isolated, classified and criminalised. The totalising character 
of anti-corruption discourse requires the discovery and normalisation of a constant stream of 
anomalies. For the industry and the discourse to maintain its expansion, there has to be 
hidden, as yet undiscovered, forms of corruption to identify and to expose. It is this 
supposedly hidden corruption that justifies and catalyses the continual drive to investigate 
and uncover new forms of behaviour that could be classified as corruption.  
In other words, the anti-corruption industry is characterised by a consolidated social scientific 
knowledge regime based on corruption as a problem of economics, with processes of 
classification and division that serve to delegitimise and criminalise certain behaviours while 
legitimising others. Furthermore, this industry is engaged in the implementation of an 
internationally standardised code of conduct with the aim of adjusting individual behaviour to 
international norms and values. Therefore, the anti-corruption industry is not only centred on 
the adjustment of the governance practices of states. Individuals play an important role in the 
appropriation of anti-corruption discourse and legitimising its prevalence. This is where 
Foucault’s third mode of objectification comes in.  
The third mode of objectification refers to the “mode of relation between the individual and 
himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). This entails the practices that individuals employ to 
transform themselves into ethical subjects within the political, societal and economic matrix 
in which they are situated. To refer back to chapter 2, any moral action implies the practices 
of the self (Foucault, 1985: 28). In Foucault’s words, moral action is: “... a process in which 
the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, 
defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of 
being that will serve as his moral goal” (28). This means that moral action requires the 
individual to work on himself and to monitor, improve and transform himself (28).  
In Foucault’s understanding, power is not a force that dominates everything in its wake; it is 
diverse and distributed in different sectors of society and individuals play a very important 
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role in its legitimisation and propagation. For Foucault, there is a “versatile equilibrium, with 
complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes 
through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Lemke, 2000: 5). This means 
that for any discourse, behavioural norm, policy or practice to be dispersed throughout 
society, individuals have to play a role in its appropriation and internalisation. Anti-
corruption knowledge, for example, has to resonate throughout society and it has to be 
perceived as rational for it to retain its legitimacy.  In this context, the fight against corruption 
has to be coherent and rational within the societal context in which it occurs. This legitimacy 
not only depends on the norms and knowledge that surrounds it, but also on the way 
individuals appropriate such practices. 
Therefore, with regards to anti-corruption industry, individuals play a role in managing, 
adapting, moulding and governing their own behaviour. Individuals are not slaves to reigning 
anti-corruption discourse. Individuals form their perceptions and ideas about what corruption 
is and how it is relevant to their lives within the context of different forms of information 
they are presented with, the different challenges and opportunities that they are faced with, as 
well as the societal context that they find themselves in. Importantly, however, individuals 
frame what they perceive as normal, abnormal, moral or immoral in the context of broader 
ideological narratives that are at play as well as the global economic and political factors that 
these are tied to. This means that, in terms of the third mode of objectification, individuals are 
not necessarily dominated by power; individuals are key nodes in the dissemination of power. 
There is space for individuals to react and respond to reigning discourse and not to blindly 
accept this discourse as true knowledge.  
The problem, however, is that anti-corruption discourse, and the industry that drives the 
propagation of this discourse, has a totalising character. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1983: 182, 183), this is a general characteristic of social scientific discourse. For Dreyfus 
and Rabinow (182-183), contemporary social scientific disciplines gravitate toward perpetual 
totalisation and specification (258). Ever greater principles are sought in order to subsume 
more and more phenomena and in order to eliminate anomalies (258). Importantly, this 
normalisation does not lead to normal science; on the contrary, it leads to totalising discourse. 
For Ball (1990: 2) this discourse is about “what can be said and thought, but also about who 
can speak, when, and with what authority.” This means that, even though individuals are not 
necessarily subjugated by reigning anti-corruption discourse, the all-encompassing nature of 
this discourse provides them with no real alternative. This makes it all but impossible to 
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formulate positions that oppose reigning anti-corruption discourse and there is no space left 
to establish new approaches and new forms of governance. Furthermore, the sheer size and 
resources of the anti-corruption industry makes it impervious to criticism, which means that it 
has the influence to deligitimise alternative approaches and to label them as contrary to 
economic growth and social cohesion. 
5.3) Final remarks: The Paradigm of Good Governance 
Foucault described himself as a historian of thought. Through his genealogical investigations, 
Foucault was interested in analysing the way in which man constitutes himself and is 
constituted as a thinking being. In this context, thought stretches further than the “universal 
categories of logic” (Foucault, 1988: 9, 10). One can also not characterise thought as the sole 
product of societal relations and social history. As stated in chapter 2, human beings are not 
wholly subjugated by hegemonic forces of power, but they are also not completely free to 
pursue self-determination. In this sense, there is a versatile equilibrium between the practices 
of power and the practices of the self. Knowledge is not the sole product of power, but it is 
also not only centred on finding the objective truths that characterise human interaction.  
The concept of governmentality gives one the opportunity to analyse the reciprocity between 
the governance of the state, the governance of the self, and the governance of others. 
Importantly, this concept emphasises that the social scientific discourses that are produced 
about society are a product of governmental practices and vice versa. These discourses are 
fundamentally related to relations of power. Power, in this sense, is embedded within the 
micropractices of the anti-corruption industry. It is grounded in the countless initiatives, 
policies, procedures, conventions and documents that are produced by anti-corruption actors. 
As already emphasised, this power is not inherently negative and the point is not to eradicate 
the relations of power that form part of the anti-corruption industry. Rather, the point is to 
shed light on the ideological, political and governmental role that the industry plays in the 
realm of international governance. 
A key strength of the anti-corruption industry is the constant proliferation of discourse, which 
serves to underscore the rationality of anti-corruption as a global governmental practice. In 
this sense, anti-corruption knowledge did not emerge due to the newfound discovery of the 
impact that corruption has on economic growth; anti-corruption knowledge emerged as a 
necessary requirement for the justification of the societal role that anti-corruption plays in the 
governance of the international realm. As such, the anti-corruption industry has a function 
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that stretches further than merely fighting corruption. Anti-corruption is a central component 
in an economy of power that pertains to the governance of contemporary states and its 
constitutive and correlative relation to the governance of the global political economy.  
The anti-corruption industry is thus driven, legitimised and globally propagated with the 
purpose of transforming and transposing divergent governmental structures, institutions, 
policies, ethics and practices of states and societies that operate contrary to international 
norms. In this way, international organisations and western actors have fostered into 
existence a totalising form of discourse which is part of an endeavour to clarify the 
complexities of the international political economy, as well as part of a strategy to mitigate 
the risks that are presented by unpredictable and ‘abnormal’ states, societies and cultures. 
Individuals are not necessarily subjugated by this industry, but its totalising character makes 
it all but impossible to resist and to formulate alternative governance structures, procedures 
and discourses.  
In countries that are plagued by political and economic difficulties, the anti-corruption 
industry makes possible the comprehensive alteration and reformation of not only 
governmental policies, practices and institutions, but also provide for the disposal of societal, 
cultural and business norms and values. This means that, under the umbrella of fighting a 
global malady, alternative modes of governance are delegitimised and different norms and 
cultures, different codes of behaviour and business practices, morals and ethics are classified 
as abnormal and, thereby, condemned into oblivion. As such, variance is depicted as 
abnormality and divergence as disease. 
To quote the title of a famous article by Leys (1965), “What is the Problem about 
corruption?” The problem is not that the fight against corruption plays a role in the 
governance of the international realm. The problem is also not that it is used as a tool to 
achieve political and ideological ends. The problem is that, in the search for transparency, the 
ideological objectives that permeate the anti-corruption industry are obfuscated and blurred. 
Thereby, the truth of what corruption is and why it should be fought is constructed; a 
construction which has been hidden under endless layers of discourse. It is constructed truths 
such as corruption that provide different modes of governance their rationality; without such 
constructed truths contemporary modes of governance lose their relevance and international 
actors lose their legitimacy in its application.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 110 
 
So, where does this leave the fight against corruption and resistance against this fight? The 
fight against corruption, and the involvement of international actors in this fight, should not 
be blindly accepted as a just and moral endeavour. The fight against corruption is 
characterised by interests and ideologies. It stems from normative evaluations and cultural 
preferences. There is nothing universal about anti-corruption discourses and practices. 
Importantly, the objective of the international drive to fight corruption may be obfuscated, 
but this does not mean that the concept is without meaning or significance. This only means 
that, before anti-corruption measures are instinctively accepted, there should be concerted 
effort to unpack these measures and to come to grips with the moral ramifications of 
implementation.  
Therefore, my suggestion is that anti-corruption actors make explicit the fact that their 
interventions are not only motivated by economic considerations, but also by ideological and 
political interests. Simply because this is the case does not render the international fight 
against corruption meaningless. What it does mean is that actors advocating the alleviation of 
corruption should make clear, from the start, that they seek commonality, not only on the 
economic front, but on the cultural, ideological and political fronts as well. There is no reason 
why it is not possible to bridge the gap between different modes of governance. International 
order can be facilitated, not by the global normalisation of a particular mode of governance, 
but by fostering acceptance and cooperation between different types of governance and 
different governmental practices. In this way, the forms of knowledge that rationalise 
alternative modes of governance in their respective local cultural constituencies are not 
dismissed and discarded, but recognised and understood.  
This means that the responsibility for overcoming the totalising character of contemporary 
anti-corruption discourse lies with both local and international actors. This does, however, 
come after the recognition that different modes of governance are fundamentally embedded 
with factors that stem from the cultural and historic development of societies. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, there can be no neutral framework of governance that can simply be 
installed into divergent societies. Each form of governance brings with it a regime of truth, 
which is based on normative and cultural variables. This does not mean that there should be 
renewed vigour in the search for the universals that define and describe human society. In 
terms of Foucault’s work, there can exist no such universals. This is not an inherently 
negative sentiment. Just as power forms a core component of how societies are governed, 
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constructions of truth and knowledge are extensions and reflections of governmental 
practices. 
The point here is to recognise that different forms of knowledge stem from different societal 
characteristics and exigencies. Even though it has become contemporary practice to situate 
knowledge within a realm of objective discourse, this does not mean that these forms of 
knowledge have gained independence from the societal characteristics they were constructed 
upon. Knowledge plays a role in society and its objective is not necessarily to uncover the 
objective truths of societal interaction. On the contrary, the function of knowledge is to 
rationalise certain governmental practices and policies. That being said, individuals can 
respond, react and incorporate different forms of knowledge into their own self-
understandings. Importantly, if one can recognise the constructions upon which social 
scientific discourse is based, one can also sketch a pathway to the emergence of new modes 
of governance; modes of governance that may be able to shed the totalising character of the 
anti-corruption industry.  
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